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This dissertation deals with three issues that are important to many
firms, namely, volatile commodity prices, environmental regulations, and glob-
alization. In the first essay I study the benefit and the coordination of inven-
tory sharing when there are two existing channels for procurement, i.e., the
spot and forward markets. I propose a method for sharing inventory such that
the decentralized firms get the same benefit per unit of the sharing transac-
tions regardless of whether the firm is borrowing or lending. The procurement
cost gap between the centralized and decentralized cases is dramatically small
by using this method. In the second essay, I analyze whether imposing car-
bon costs to retailers and consumers changes the supply chain design or social
welfare. I consider three types of players who want to maximize different
objectives and three kinds of competitive settings. Different from previous
studies, I show that the supply chain design is changed significantly by impos-
ing carbon costs especially when market competition is medium to high. In
the third essay, I consider long-term / short-term strategies of multi-national
corporations. For the long-term strategy, I show that the correlation between
vi
the exchange rate and the market demand in a foreign country affects plant
location. For the short-term strategy, I show that manufacturers increase the
inventory levels as the exchange rate of the country where the plant is located
grows weaker. I confirm these results empirically using plant-level data of
Korean multi-national corporations provided by the Export-Import Bank of
Korea.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation deals with three important issues to many firms, i.e.,
volatile commodity prices, environmental regulations, and globalization. First,
commodity prices are notoriously volatile. For instance, the spot price of the
crude oil touched $142.5 in July 2008 and then abruptly dropped to a bottom
low at $37.0 in February 2009; the price gained ground in 2010, exceeding $100
again in March 2011, and then varied between $80 and $110, afterwards. The
highly volatile commodity prices pose a substantial challenge to the operations
planning of the companies that need direct commodity inputs. For example,
Royal Dutch Shell’s profit from April to June in 2012 decreased by $1.2 bil-
lion compared to that in 2011 ($6.6 billion) because of oil price volatility. In
addition, due to the price spike of commodities in 2008, Kraft Foods’ input
materials cost that year increased about $2 billion from 2007, which repre-
sents a 13 percent cost surge. Hence, a good operational strategy that takes
commodity prices into account can significantly reduce a firm’s cost.
Second, environmental regulations are also becoming important items
on companies’ daily agenda. Not only are the governments pushing for tighter
regulations on energy consumption and pollution control, but the consumers
are also giving more preferences to environment-friendly products and socially
responsible companies. For instance, the European Union has imposed carbon
emission limits while allowing the companies to trade their allowances. British
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Columbia, Canada, imposed a carbon tax, at $20 per metric ton of CO2 ini-
tially and then increased to $30 per metric ton from July 2012. While it is
difficult to determine the exact cost of carbon emission to the society, the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2007 suggested that if we impose
$80 per metric ton of CO2 to large carbon emitters, then we can prevent se-
vere climate change. Several researchers have documented that the estimated
carbon cost can range from $20 to $ 300 per metric ton of CO2. In the United
States, while there is no regulation in place yet, the Mandatory Reporting of
Greenhouse Gases Rule has been issued by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and large greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters need to report GHG
data. Along with the policy change, the public is becoming more receptive to
the idea of imposing cost to curb carbon emission, and also more companies
have started to report the carbon footprint of their products and services and
have been making efforts to reduce their carbon emission. As a result, to stay
viable and competitive, companies need to have their operational decisions to
the new environment.
Third, globalization has transformed many companies into Multi-national
Corporations (MNCs), with either their supply bases and manufacturing func-
tions located in the overseas countries or their markets covering multi-continents.
To manage global supply chains, as a long-term strategy, the MNCs invest to
other countries and the amount of the investment is enormous. For example,
in 2011, the MNCs based in the U.S. invested $4,156 billion (28% of the U.S.
GDP) overseas and the MNCs based in countries outside of the U.S. invested
$2,548 billion (17% of the U.S. GDP) in the U.S. Hence, understanding how
firms invest to other countries is important not only to firms who are planning
to invest to overseas countries but also to governments who want to attract
2
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In addition, as a short-term strategy, how
to efficiently manage the operations is a significantly important question for
MNCs due to the increased uncertainties by producing in foreign countries,
e.g., volatile exchange rate and economic instability.
In this thesis, we study these three issues from the perspective of Opera-
tions Management. In Chapter 2, we study commodity procurement policies in
the presence of inventory sharing. In Chapter 3, we analyze whether imposing
carbon cost changes the supply chain design and reduces the carbon emissions.
Chapter 4 analytically studies the impacts of exchange rates on global supply
chain design, and then empirically confirms the analytical findings.
1.1 Overview of Chapter 2
In Chapter 21, we study the benefit and the coordination of inventory
sharing when there are two existing channels for procurement, i.e., the spot
and forward markets. We consider two firms that use a common commodity
input to satisfy stochastic demands in a multi-period setting. The firms can
procure the commodity as well as sell excess inventory through either the spot
or the forward market. The firms can also share the commodity between them
when one has leftover inventory while the other has excess demand. We first
analyze a benchmark, the centralized case, and show the benefit of inventory
sharing. Then, we focus on the more realistic decentralized case. We show that
the stochastic prices necessitate more sophisticated and closer coordination
for the decentralized case because the benefit per unit of inventory shared
changes over time. We propose a method such that the decentralized firms get
1Joint work with Guoming Lai and Sridhar Seshadri
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the same benefit per unit of the sharing transactions regardless of whether the
firm is borrowing or lending. The proposed method is fair for the borrower and
lender and seems to work very well, i.e., the procurement cost gap between the
centralized and decentralized cases is dramatically small in our experiments.
We also identify factors that are critical for the benefit of inventory sharing to
be substantial which in turn will induce firms to cooperate.
1.2 Overview of Chapter 3
Chapter 32 analyzes whether imposing carbon costs changes the supply
chain structure and social welfare. In our model, we consider three players
(i.e., a central policymaker, retailers, and consumers) who optimize their own
objectives (i.e., social welfare, profits, and net utility, respectively) and three
competitive settings (i.e., monopoly, monopolistic competition with symmetric
market share, and monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share).
While the outcomes of the monopoly case are aligned with the literature where
imposing carbon costs neither increases social welfare nor changes the supply
chain structure, we find that the outcomes of the monopolistic competition
cases can be very different. In particular, for the case of monopolistic com-
petition with symmetric market share, charging carbon cost increases social
welfare, reduces carbon emissions, and also significantly changes the number
of retailers. These results depend only on the common factors of the industry,
e.g., fuel and carbon prices. The outcomes of the case of monopolistic compe-
tition with asymmetric market share fall in between the above two cases.
2Joint work with Gerard P. Cachon, Guoming Lai, and Sridhar Seshadri
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1.3 Overview of Chapter 4
In Chapter 43, we consider long-term / short-term strategies of multi-
national corporations when their home country is an export-oriented country
with small domestic markets. For the long-term strategy, when economic
growth and strength of the currency are positively (negatively) related, we find
that the reason a firm whose home country without a selling market invests
more to another country when the sunk cost (labor cost) in the foreign country
decreases. On the other hand, a firm whose home country has a selling market
invests more in another country when the labor cost (sunk cost) in the foreign
country decreases. We verify these results using Foreign Direct Investment
Data in Korea from 2002 to 2011. For the short-term strategy, we consider
a manufacturer’s inventory level decision when the plant and the market are
located in two different countries. We show that manufacturers increase the
inventory levels as the exchange rate of the country where the plant is located
grows weaker. We confirm this result by testing using the plant-level data
of Korean multinational corporations provided by the Export-Import Bank of
Korea.
3Joint work with Guoming Lai, Seungrae Lee, and Sridhar Seshadri
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Chapter 2
Benefit and Coordination of Sharing
Commodity Inventory
2.1 Introduction
Different from other industry supplies, commodities (e.g., crude and
wheat) are openly traded and can be procured from both spot markets with
immediate delivery and forward markets for future delivery. Commodity prices
are however notoriously volatile. For instance, Figure 2.1(a) shows the spot
prices of crude oil in Cushing, Oklahoma from January 2007 to December 2012.
The spot price of the crude oil touched $142.5 in July 2008 and then abruptly
dropped to a bottom low at $37.0 in February 2009; the price gained ground
in 2010, exceeding $100 again in March 2011, and then varied between $80
and $110, afterwards. Figure 2.1(b) shows the prices of the earliest delivery
wheat futures contracts in Kansas City Board of Trade. The futures prices of
wheat also show high volatility. The highly volatile commodity prices pose a
substantial challenge to the operations planning of the companies that need
direct commodity inputs. For instance, Royal Dutch Shell’s profit from April
to June in 2012 decreased by $1.2 billion compared to that in 2011 ($6.6
billion) because of oil price volatility (BBC News 2012). In addition, due to
the price spike of commodities in 2008, Kraft Foods’ input materials cost that
year increased about $2 billion from 2007, which represents a 13 percent cost
surge (Martin 2008). To cope with the risk associated with the commodity
6
(a) Weekly crude oil spot prices ($ per barrel)(b) Monthly wheat futures prices ($ per
bushel)
Figure 2.1: Commodity prices
inputs, companies have started making various attempts to mitigate the risk.
In one such example, firms share their commodity inventory to reduce the
amount of emergent procurement on one hand while better utilizing excess
inventory on the other hand (see, e.g., Lindner et al. 2012).
In this chapter, we study what factors prompt firms to engage in such
cooperative behavior, whether the coordination is complicated by the stochas-
tic prices in addition to stochastic demand and whether practical solutions
can be provided to conduct such transactions in the most beneficial possi-
ble way. To answer these questions, we investigate the potential benefit of
sharing commodity inventory between two firms. In our study, the firms face
stochastic demands that they need to satisfy by using a common commod-
ity input, in a multi-period setting. The firms can procure the input from
the commodity markets through forward contracts as well as spot purchases.
They can also sell short-term excess inventory to the commodity markets. The
commodity prices present a stochastic pattern. With imperfectly correlated
demands, scenarios may arise where a firm has excess inventory while the other
has inventory shortage. Besides the trades through the commodity markets,
7
inventory sharing provides an alternative option for the firms to balance their
demand and supply. We first study a benchmark, the centralized case, where
the inventory sharing decision is made by a central planner. We show the
benefit of inventory sharing. We then focus on the decentralized case where
the firms make the inventory sharing decision to minimize their own costs.
With stochastic prices, inventory sharing assumes a dimension beyond
determining optimal stocking quantities: firms need to decide how to price the
inventory sharing transactions. Due to the stochastic nature of spot and for-
ward prices, the benefit per unit of inventory shared changes over time. Thus,
the pricing of the sharing transactions becomes more complicated than that
with fixed procurement prices. There are many ways to arrange for the pay-
ment when firms share inventory. For example, we can assume the borrowing
firm pays the spot or forward price of the commodity (which is stochastic) plus
the transaction cost. This way the borrower pays all costs. At first this seems
an innocuous assumption to make because we expect (at least with identi-
cal firms facing independent demand streams) it is equally likely that a firm
borrows or lends - thus, the benefit from sharing is symmetric. However, we
show that the assumption about the transfer price is quite important because
it can affect the stocking decisions as well as the inventory sharing condition.
Therefore, attention has to be given to coordination between the firms. In
this study, we propose a coordination method under which the inventory shar-
ing condition regarding to the spot and forward prices in the decentralized
case becomes the same as that of the centralized case and firms get the same
benefits from the sharing transactions. The proposed method is fair for the
borrower and lender and seems to work very well, i.e., the gap relative to the
centralized solution is negligible in our experiments.
8
We also identify how the benefits from sharing inventory vary with
the parameter values of the demand and the transaction costs. The value of
inventory sharing, using our proposed pricing scheme, increases as the mean
and variance of demand increase, the correlation between the demand faced
by firms decreases or the sharing transaction cost decreases. The value may
either increase or decrease as the transaction costs in the spot market increase.
Hence, the contribution of our study is three folds. First, we bridge
the gap between the literatures on inventory sharing and commodity procure-
ment with stochastic demands and prices. We derive not only the optimal
ordering and selling decisions in the spot and forward markets but also the
optimal inventory sharing decisions. Second, we propose a simple method to
coordinate inventory sharing, and show that the gap between the centralized
and decentralized cases can be dramatically reduced by this method. Third,
we identify the critical factors that influence the benefit of inventory sharing.
Besides us, inventory planning of commodities with spot and forward
trades has been explored by others in the literature. Seifert et al. (2004) con-
sider a risk-averse newsvendor firm that procures inventory for serving ran-
dom future demand. They show that besides procurement through forward
contracts, utilizing the spot market with instantaneous delivery can lead to a
higher payoff for the firm as well as a higher service level. Differently, Seco-
mandi and Kekre (2011) emphasize the benefit of trades in the forward market
given its lower transaction cost compared to spot purchases. They analyze a
firm’s optimal commodity procurement strategy, facing some stochastic future
demand, by using both the forward and spot markets with joint evolution
of demand forecast and forward price. They characterize the value of the
forward procurement option. Based on a newsvendor context with two cor-
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related demands, Boyabatli et al. (2011) study the procurement, processing,
and production decisions of a meatpacker in the presence of both spot and
forward markets for the commodity, fed cattle, input. They solve the meat-
packer’s optimal contracting portfolio for the commodity. Goel and Gutierrez
(2011) study the commodity procurement strategy in a multi-period setting
with stochastic demand. They reveal the value of information regarding the
marginal convenience yield which can result in a significant procurement cost
reduction. Differently, Devalkar et al. (2011) investigate a risk-averse commod-
ity processor’s inventory planning problem who purchases commodity from a
spot market to produce and sell the output using forward contracts. Besides
the above cited studies, other researchers have studied optimal procurement
with stochastic input prices. We refer the readers to Haksoz and Seshadri
(2007) for an exhaustive survey of such papers. Our work differs from this
stream of research studies as we focus on two firms and explore the benefit of
inventory sharing between the firms in the presence of both spot and forward
markets.
We are however not the first to study inventory sharing. Inventory
transshipment, i.e., transshipping one firm’s excess inventory to another in
need of supply, has been explored from different aspects in the operations
management literature. As a seminal work, Krishnan and Rao (1965) study a
single-period transshipment problem among multiple retailers in a centralized
setting. They explore the inventory decision as well as the value of inventory
transshipment. The follow-up studies investigate the benefits of inventory
transshipment in a centralized system with multi-period settings, pooling ef-
fects and other factors (see, e.g., Tagaras 1989, Robinson 1990). More recent
studies extend the prior works to supply chain settings. Dong and Rudi (2004)
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consider a supply chain with a single manufacturer and multiple retailers. They
analyze the benefits of transshipment for the cases with both exogenous and
endogenous wholesale prices. Similarly, Wee and Dada (2005) focus on a case
with one common warehouse that serves multiple retailers. They show the
optimal transshipment policy of the retailers and analyze when having the
common warehouse is beneficial. C¸o¨mez et al. (2011) study inventory sharing
between two retail stores where the stores replenish a product periodically
by considering multiple transshipments per cycle, positive delivery times, and
backorder costs. They show partial transshipment by holding back inventory
can reduce the retailer’s cost.
There are also studies that explore transshipment between independent
decision makers. Rudi et al. (2001) consider a setting with two independent re-
tailers that decide whether to agree on transshipment. They show coordinating
transshipment prices exist by which both retailers can be better off. Hu et al.
(2007) extend Rudi et al. (2001) by considering uncertain capacity. Anupindi
et al. (2001) consider the benefit of common warehousing. They demonstrate
that coordinating allocation mechanism exists under which the retailers can
use the common warehouses not only to reduce the distribution cost for their
own retail stores but also to reduce the cost of transshipment. Granot and
Sosˇic´ (2003) extend Anupindi et al. (2001) by allowing the retailers to decide
the amount of sharing. They show retailers might withhold their leftover in-
ventories. In contrast, with a similar framework but allowing the retailers to
interact repeatedly, Huang and Sosˇic´ (2010) reveal that the retailers may share
all the residuals of their inventories if the discount factor is sufficiently large.
Differently, C¸o¨mez et al. (2012) explore the optimal transshipment strategies
and inventory polices for the retailers who compete against each other. This
11
literature however generally assumes that the selling price or the procurement
cost of the underlying product is constant. Differently, in our study, the spot
and forward prices of the commodity follow stochastic processes and the firms
can use both spot and forward purchases.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. §2.2 describes
the problem setting. In §2.3, we analyze the optimal procurement and inven-
tory sharing policies, and propose a coordination method for the decentralized
case. We evaluate the value of inventory sharing in §2.4, and discuss several
extensions in §2.5. We conclude in §2.6.
2.2 Model Setting
We consider a periodic review inventory planning problem of two firms,
denoted by i and j, in a time horizon of T periods. The inventory decisions
of the firms are made at the beginning of each period, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}, whose
goals are to minimize the expected cost-to-go.
2.2.1 Market Demand
The firms face a stochastic demand in each period from their customers.
The demand, when it arises, always needs to be satisfied within the same
period. That is, we assume the demand cannot be backlogged. Such an
assumption is appropriate if the customers are impatient while the premium
from the sales is significantly high. We denote the demand for firm i in period
t, by Dit, which is a non-negative random variable. We use xit to denote the
beginning inventory level of firm i in period t.
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2.2.2 Spot and Forward Transactions
To satisfy demand, the firms need a common commodity input which
they can procure from both the spot and forward markets. The firms can also
sell their excess commodity inventory to the spot and forward markets in any
period. The prices of the commodity in the spot and forward markets follow
some stochastic processes, denoted by St and Ft, respectively. We assume that
the prices always realize at the beginning of each period and they satisfy the
Markov property as well as the property of Et[St+1|St] = Ft, where Et[A|B] is
used to denote the conditional expectation of A given the event B. The firms
are price takers. Similar assumptions have been made in the literature (see,
e.g., Goel and Gutierrez 2011, Secomandi and Kekre 2011).
We assume the delivery lead time of a purchase or a sale in the spot mar-
ket is zero. To trade in the spot market, the firms incur a constant transaction
cost τb per unit of purchase and τs per unit of sale. Thus, the unit purchas-
ing cost to buy the commodity from the spot market is St + τb; whereas, the
unit sales revenue from selling in the spot market is St − τs. The transaction
costs in our model are mainly the transportation costs. We assume the firms’
locations are close enough so that they incur the same transaction costs when
they trade in the spot market.
In contrast to the spot market, we assume the trade in the forward
market is always associated with a one-period delay (see, Goel and Gutierrez
2011 for a similar assumption). That is, any purchase or sale in the forward
market will be delivered at the beginning of the next period and the payment
associated with the contract will also be transferred at that time. We normalize
the transaction cost of any forward trades to zero, which reflects the fact that
it is relatively inexpensive to trade in the forward market than in the spot
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market. This assumption has been made in the literature (see, e.g., Goel and
Gutierrez 2011). Hence, if a firm purchases (sells) one unit of commodity
through a forward trade in period t, then the firm will receive (deliver) the
commodity and pay (obtain) Ft at the beginning of period t + 1. We use
β to denote the time discount factor per period, which is assumed to be a
constant. Therefore, the unit present cost of purchasing (gain of selling) from
the forward market is βFt. We let ait and uit denote firm i’s spot and forward
trading actions, respectively, in period t. Here, a positive action corresponds to
a purchase, a negative action to a sale, and zero is a do-nothing action. Notice
that we allow the firms to sell in the forward market, which eases analysis.
This assumption however is not critical for our findings. In fact, in the entire
numerical study, we conduct, sales in the forward market do not arise under
the optimal polices. Finally, we do not allow short-selling in our model.
2.2.3 Inventory Sharing
Carrying the inventory of the commodity is costly. We assume a hold-
ing cost, h, for each unit of commodity held per period. The cost is charged at
the beginning of a period. Instead of holding or selling the excess commodity
inventory, we assume a firm can lend the inventory to the other party if there
is such a need; likewise, instead of buying from the markets, a firm can also
borrow inventory from the other party if it is available. We call such a transac-
tion the inventory sharing transaction. Notice that because the demand always
needs to be satisfied in each period, without the inventory sharing transaction,
if a firm is short of inventory, it would have to buy the excess amount of com-
modity from the spot market given there is a one-period lead time from the
forward market. Compared to the transactions in the forward market, inven-
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tory sharing is more flexible. Therefore, we assume that a firm can either buy
from the spot market or borrow from the other party to satisfy the current
period excess demand, which will always be delivered within the same period.
Sharing inventory however is not transaction cost free. We denote a sharing
transaction cost by τo per unit.
In the decentralized inventory sharing case, we assume that the bor-
rowing firm will return the same amount of commodity to the lending firm
at the beginning of next period. Specifically, we assume that the borrowing
firm enters into a forward contract for that amount of commodity and has it
delivered to the other party in the next period. Given the transaction cost
in the forward market is zero, this is equivalent to making a cash payment to
the lender. It is also clear that using spot purchases is dominated by using
forward purchases to compensate the lender because of the difference of the
transaction costs. In addition, we assume the sharing transaction cost τo is
paid by the borrower and thus the total unit cost of borrowing is τo + βFt. In
§2.3.3, we will consider a transfer pricing scheme to coordinate the inventory
sharing decisions. We let bit denote firm i’s inventory sharing action in period
t. As previously, a positive action corresponds to borrowing, a negative action
to lending, and zero is a do-nothing action. Inventory sharing will arise only if
it is beneficial for both of the firms. Finally, we assume that a firm can borrow
at most the amount that is short for satisfying the current period demand.
In other words, firms are prevented from borrowing to sell in the spot and
forward markets.
2.2.4 Assumptions
To facilitate analysis, we make the following assumptions.
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Assumption 2.2.1. Demand is independent of the spot and forward prices.
Assumption 2.2.1 greatly simplifies the analysis. Such an assumption
is not uncommon in the literature (see, e.g., Nascimento and Powell 2009 and
Goel and Gutierrez 2011). Note that this assumption is appropriate for a short
horizon problem like ours. According to Krichene (2002), the short run price
elasticity of the U.S. crude oil demand is -0.02; that is, if the crude oil price
increases by 1%, the crude oil demand decreases only by 0.02% in a short
horizon.
In addition, we make the following two assumptions to assure the value
function is finite in each period. Similar assumptions are made in the literature
(see Secomandi 2010).
Assumption 2.2.2. 0 < β < 1
Assumption 2.2.3. Et[Di,t+l] < ∞, Et[St+lDi,t+l] < ∞, ∀Pt ∈ R3+, l =
0, 1, ..., T − t, i = 1, 2, ∀t.
Finally, we define the concept of convenience yield as Ct ≡ St + τb +
h − βFt, which will be useful in our analysis. As Goel and Gutierrez (2011)
point out, St + h − βFt is always non-negative; otherwise, to buy (and hold)
commodity from the spot market and then sell it in the forward market would
lead to an arbitrage profit. From the fact that τb ≥ 0, we make the follow-
ing assumption which is justified with a similar reason. Assumption 2.2.4 is
guaranteed.
Assumption 2.2.4. Ct ≥ 0, ∀t.
Note that our definition of the convenience yield is slightly different
from Hull (2005), where the convenience yield is defined as “ownership of the
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physical asset enables a manufacturer to keep a production process running
and perhaps profit from temporary shortages.” That is, there exists a bene-
fit not from entering a forward contract but from owning physical inventory.
Differently, in our model, we assume a firm’s demand is realized at the be-
ginning of each period, and thus there is no “temporary shortages” during
a period. Hence, holding forward contracts is more beneficial than holding
physical inventory because firms can reduce the holding cost.
2.2.5 Timeline
Figure 2.2 details the timeline of the problem. At the beginning of
period t, the commodity ordered (or lent) in period t − 1 arrives; then the
demand, the spot price as well as the forward price are realized. Second, the
two firms make their inventory decisions. If the demand of a firm is less than
its beginning inventory (Dit ≤ xit), then the firm decides whether to sell the
excess inventory (xit−Dit) in the spot or forward market, to lend the inventory
to the other party, or to hold the inventory for future use. In contrast, if the
demand is more than the beginning inventory (Dit > xit), then the firm decides
whether to borrow inventory from the other party or procure from the spot
market to meet the excess demand (Dit − xit). Finally, the firms decide the
ordering quantities in the forward market. In period T (the last period), any
excess demand is satisfied by immediate purchase from the spot market, and
likewise, any excess inventory is sold to the spot market.
2.3 Model & Analysis
We analyze the centralized solution as a benchmark and the decentral-
ized case in §2.3.1 and §2.3.2, respectively. In §2.3.3, we discuss a stochastic
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The commodity ordered (or lent) in period t-1 arrives to the 
firm; the demand and the spot and forward prices are realized
If the demand is less than the initial inventory, decide to sell in the spot or 
forward market or hold (or lend to the counterparty);
If the demand is more than the initial inventory, decide to buy from the 
spot market (or borrow from the counterparty)Period t
Decide the order quantity from the forward market 
Period t+1
Figure 2.2: The timeline of the model
transfer price to improve the benefit of inventory sharing for the decentralized
case relative to the centralized solution.
2.3.1 Benchmark: The Centralized Solution
In this subsection, we analyze the centralized solution as a benchmark.
The amount of inventory that can be shared is limited to the minimum of
the amount of excess inventory of one firm and the amount of shortage of
the other. Therefore, the domain of inventory sharing can be defined as
Bijt := [−min{(xit − Dit)+, (Djt − xjt)+},min{(Dit − xit)+, (xjt − Djt)+}].
For notational convenience, we define Dt := (Dit, Djt) and xt := (xit, xjt)
to represent demands and the beginning inventory levels of two firms in pe-
riod t, respectively. Let Pˆt := (Ft, St,Dt) denote the information set in
period t. In addition, given that short-selling is not allowed in our model,
the total amount of selling in each market shall be limited to the amount
of inventory that is available. However, we do not limit the amount of pur-
chases. Therefore, the domain of a firm’s trading transactions can be defined
as Oit := [−(xit − Dit)+,∞). We define firm i’s immediate cost function as
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follows: vˆit(ait, uit, bit; xt, Pˆt) :=
(St − τs)ait + βFtuit + h((xit −Dit)+ + ait) + (βFt + h)bit
if ait ≤ 0 and bit ≤ 0.
(St + τb)ait + βFtuit + h(ait + xit −Dit)+ + (βFt + h)bit
if ait > 0 and bit ≤ 0,
(St + τb)ait + βFtuit + h(ait + xit −Dit)+ + (τo + βFt)bit
if ait ≥ 0 and bit > 0,
and firm j’s immediate cost function vˆjt(ajt, ujt, bjt; xt, Pˆt) is analogous. In the
centralized model, the optimal actions are decided to minimize the total cost
of the two firms, and thus the model can be formulated as follows:
V CT (xT , Pˆt)
≡ (ST + τb){(DiT − xiT )+ + (DjT − xjT )+}
−(ST − τs){(xiT −DiT )+ + (xjT −DjT )+},∀(xT , PˆT ) ∈ R6+
V Ct (xt, Pˆt)
≡
min
ait,uit,ait+uit+bit∈Oit,bit∈Bijt,ajt,ujt,ajt+ujt+bjt∈Ojt,bjt∈Bjit,ait+bit≥Dit−xit,ajt+bjt≥Djt−xjt
vˆit(ait, uit, bit; xt, Pˆt) + vˆjt(ajt, ujt, bjt; xt, Pˆt) + βEt[V Ct+1(xt+1, Pˆt+1)],
∀
(
xt, Pˆt
)
∈ R6+,∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1}
where
xi,t+1 = xit −Dit + ait + uit + bit and xj,t+1 = xjt −Djt + ajt + ujt + bjt.
Proposition 2.3.1 shows the optimal actions.
19
Proposition 2.3.1. In each period t, a unique pair of the optimal order-up-to
levels, (xCi,t+1, x
C
j,t+1) exists that minimizes Ft(xi,t+1+xj,t+1)+Et[V Ct+1(xt+1, Pˆt+1)],
and the optimal trading actions follow: (i) If Ct ≥ τo, then bCit = −bCjt =
min{(Dit − xit)+, (xjt − Djt)+} − min{(xit − Dit)+, (Djt − xjt)+}; otherwise,
bCit = b
C
jt = 0; (ii) If Ct ≥ τb + τs, then aCit = Dit − xit − bCit ; otherwise,
aCit = (Dit − xit − bCit)+; (iii) uCit = xCi,t+1 − (xit −Dit)− aCit − bCit .
From Proposition 2.3.1, we observe that the convenience yield plays
an important role in the decisions. First, given the optimal inventory sharing
actions, the optimal trading actions in the spot and forward markets can be
derived as the following. If a firm still has excess inventory after satisfying
its own demand and also the other firm’s borrowing request, the firm will
sell all leftover inventory to the spot market when Ct ≥ τb + τs (i.e., St −
τs + h − βFt > 0) and choose not to trade in the spot market otherwise.
This is because if Ct ≥ τb + τs, then it is beneficial for the firm to sell the
leftover inventory to the spot market in period t to avoid any holding cost
and, at the same time, purchase commodity from the forward market up to
the optimal order-up-to level for the next period (the commodity purchased
in the forward market will be delivered in the next period and thus the firm
will not incur any holding cost). In contrast, if a firm is still short of inventory
after using its own inventory and also the inventory borrowed from the other
firm, the firm will buy immediately from the spot market for the amount of
shortage. Then, the firms will trade in the forward market to increase the
beginning inventories of the next period to the equilibrium order-up-to levels,
after taking the borrowing and lending actions into account.
The optimal inventory sharing actions can be derived as the following.
The cost reduction by borrowing inventory from the other firm is the cost to
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buy directly from the spot market, St + τb, less the total unit cost to borrow
and return the inventory, τo+βFt. That is, Ct−h−τo is the unit cost reduction
for the borrowing firm. At the same time, the cost reduction by lending excess
inventory to the other firm is the gain from lending, h + βFt, less the gain
from selling the inventory to the spot market, St − τs + h, or selling it to the
forward market, βFt. Notice that the gain from the selling inventory to the
spot market is greater than that to the forward market if Ct ≥ τb + τs (i.e.,
St − τs + h− βFt ≥ 0). Hence, when Ct ≥ τb + τs, the unit cost reduction for
the lending firm is τb + τs + h − Ct; otherwise, the unit cost reduction is h.
Hence, if Ct ≥ τb + τs, then the total cost reduction by inventory sharing for
the centralized case is τb + τs− τo per unit; otherwise, the total cost reduction
is Ct−τo. Since τb+τs−τo is always positive by assumption, inventory sharing
will arise in the centralized case as long as Ct ≥ τo.
Note that from Proposition 2.3.1, the following two equations should
be satisfied simultaneously to find the optimal ordering levels for two firms,
(xCi,t+1, x
C
j,t+1):
−τb +Gi(xCi,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]}
−Et[ISt+1]{PiL(xCi,t+1, xCj,t+1)− PiB(xCi,t+1, xCj,t+1)} = 0
−τb +Gj(xCj,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]}
−Et[ISt+1]{PjL(xCi,t+1, xCj,t+1)− PjB(xCi,t+1, xCj,t+1)} = 0
where Et[FWt+1] := Et[(τb + τs − Ct+1)I{Ct+1<τb+τs}|Ct] denotes the expected
unit cost reduction by selling to the forward market, Et[ISt+1] := Et[(Ct+1 −
τo)I{τo≤Ct+1<τb+τs}|Ct] + Et[(τb + τs − τo)I{Ct+1≥τb+τs}|Ct] denotes the expected
total cost reduction per unit by inventory sharing, Gi denotes the cumulative
distribution function of Dit, and PiL(xit, xjt) := Pr(xit > Di, Di +Dj > xit +
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xjt), PiB(xit, xjt) := Pr(xit < Di, Di+Dj < xit+xjt), PjL(xit, xjt) := Pr(xjt >
Dj, Di +Dj > xit + xjt), PjB(xit, xjt) := Pr(xjt < Dj, Di +Dj < xit + xjt).
2.3.2 Decentralized Inventory Sharing
In the centralized case, inventory sharing can arise as long as it can
reduce the total cost of the two firms. Whereas, if the decisions are decen-
tralized, then inventory sharing will arise only if both firms can benefit from
sharing. Specifically, firm i’s problem with inventory sharing can be formulated
as follows (which is nested with firm j’s problem due to inventory sharing):
VˆiT (xT , Pˆt) ≡ (ST + τb)(DiT − xiT )+
−(ST − τs)(xiT −DiT )+, ∀(xT , PˆT ) ∈ R6+
Vˆit(xt, Pˆt) ≡ min
ait,uit,ait+uit+bit∈Oit,bit∈Bijt,ait+bit≥Dit−xit
vˆit(ait, uit, bit; xt, Pˆt) + βEt[Vˆit+1(xt+1, Pˆt+1)],
∀
(
xt, Pˆt
)
∈ R6+,∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T − 1}
where
xi,t+1 = xit −Dit + ait + uit + bit.
Note that when inventory sharing is executed, the borrowing firm enters two
types of forward contracts: one for an amount of uit delivered to the own firm
and the other for an amount of bit delivered to the lending firm in the next
period.
The presence of the inventory sharing transaction makes the decisions of
the two firms interact with each other. We assume firms make these decisions
independently of one another. Additionally, the inventory of the other firm is
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not observable to the firm making the decision. Thus, beyond optimization,
obtaining a Nash equilibrium between the two firms’ strategies is necessary.
In the following, we analyze the two firms’ inventory policies when they
can share inventory with each other. That is, a Nash equilibrium of the two
firms’ inventory policies can be obtained, which is shown below.
Proposition 2.3.2. In each period t, there exists a unique pair of order-
up-to levels, (xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ
∗
j,t+1), such that given xˆ
∗
j,t+1, xˆ
∗
i,t+1 minimizes Ftxi,t+1 +
Et[Vˆi,t+1(xi,t+1, xˆ
∗
j,t+1, Pˆt+1)] and given xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1 minimizes
Ftxj,t+1 + Et[Vˆj,t+1(xj,t+1, xˆ
∗
i,t+1, Pˆt+1)]. In addition, in each period of t, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium of the two firms’ inventory policies: (i) If
h+ τo ≤ Ct ≤ τb + τs + h, then bˆ∗it = −bˆ∗jt = min{(Dit − xit)+, (xjt −Djt)+} −
min{(xit −Dit)+, (Djt − xjt)+}; otherwise, bˆ∗it = bˆ∗jt = 0; (ii) If Ct ≥ τb + τs,
then aˆ∗it = Dit − xit − bˆ∗it; otherwise, aˆ∗it = (Dit − xit − bˆ∗it)+; (iii) uˆ∗it =
xˆ∗i,t+1 − (xit −Dit)− aˆ∗it − bˆ∗it.
As we have explained below Proposition 2.3.1, the unit cost reduction
for the borrowing firm is Ct − h − τo. When selling to the spot market is
more beneficial than selling to the forward market, i.e., Ct ≥ τb + τs, the unit
cost reduction for the lending firm is τb + τs + h−Ct; otherwise, the unit cost
reduction is h. In other words, h + τo ≤ Ct acts as a necessary condition in
order for a firm to benefit from inventory borrowing and Ct ≤ τb+τs+h serves
as a necessary condition in order for a firm to be willing to lend inventory to the
other firm given h > 0. Hence, the necessary condition for inventory sharing
is the following: h+ τo ≤ Ct ≤ τb + τs + h. Recall that in the centralized case,
inventory sharing will arise if Ct ≥ τo. Hence, the range of the convenience
yield under which inventory sharing can arise for the centralized is greater than
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that for the decentralized case. Moreover, inventory sharing can take place
only if one firm is short of inventory while the other firm has excess inventory.
Therefore, the amount of inventory sharing is limited to the minimum of the
excess demand and the excess inventory at the two firms. The optimal trading
actions in the spot and forward markets can be derived using the same logic
that has been applied to Proposition 2.3.1.
We note that from Proposition 2.3.2, the following two equations are
satisfied simultaneously and can be used to find the optimal ordering levels for
the two firms, (xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ
∗
j,t+1):
−τb +Gi(xˆ∗i,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]} − Et[Lt+1]PiL(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1)
+Et[Bt+1]PiB(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1) = 0
−τb +Gj(xˆ∗j,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]} − Et[Lt+1]PjL(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1)
+Et[Bt+1]PjB(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1) = 0,
where Et[Bt+1] := Et[(Ct+1 − h − τo)I{Ct+1∈(h+τo,h+τb+τs)}|Ct] and Et[Lt+1] :=
Et[hI{Ct+1∈(h+τo,τb+τs)}+(h+τb+τs−Ct+1)I{Ct+1∈(max{h+τo,τb+τs},τb+τs+h)}|Ct] de-
note the expected unit cost reductions by borrowing and lending transactions,
respectively.
Notice that since we normalize the transaction cost in the forward mar-
ket to zero, we can match the optimal order-up-to level for period t + 1 (i.e.,
xˆ∗i,t+1) regardless of the initial inventory level and demand in period t (i.e., xit
and Dit), and xˆ
∗
i,t+1 is independent of the later optimal ordering levels, i.e.,
{xˆ∗i,t+2, xˆ∗i,t+3, ..., xˆ∗iT}. The same argument holds in the centralized case.
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2.3.3 Coordination: Stochastic Transfer Price
In the above subsections, we have shown the centralized and decentral-
ized actions. Obviously, inventory sharing will be more beneficial if both firms
follow the centralized solution. However, with decentralized decision making,
the firms each may “myopically” deviate from the centralized solution because
one would benefit more by deviating if the other sticks to the centralized so-
lution (we show an example in §2.4.3). As a result, the centralized solution
becomes unattainable and some coordination methods might be needed.
In the transshipment literature, a few coordinating mechanisms have
been explored to improve the efficiency of the decentralized systems. For
instance, one stream of research considers design of transshipment price, by
which one firm makes a specific amount of payment to the other for the shared
inventory. However, even though deterministic transshipment price is easy
to implement, as shown by Hu et al. (2007), the coordinating transshipment
price may not always exist. Moreover, a deterministic transshipment price will
not coordinate in our model due to changing prices. Some other approaches
which guarantee decentralized firms choose the centralized decisions have also
been proposed, but they are relatively complex. For example, Hanany et al.
(2010) propose the transshipment fund mechanism. The mechanism adjusts
the transshipment price (or the transfer price) in three stages per period to
induce decentralized firms to decide the centralized ordering levels with a third
party financial entity. This mechanism might be beneficial in our setting, but
it is difficult to implement.
In this subsection, we propose a specific coordinating mechanism for
our context, a stochastic transfer price. This mechanism is easy to imple-
ment, similar to the transshipment price proposed in Hu et al. (2007), but
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it allows the transfer price to change corresponding to the commodity prices,
which is similar to the transshipment fund mechanism proposed in Hanany et
al. (2010). We let τk,t be the per unit payment from the lending firm to the
borrowing firm in period t. Lemma 2.3.3 characterizes the stochastic transfer
pricing schemes which make the convenience yield condition of the decentral-
ized inventory sharing transaction the same as that of the centralized inventory
sharing transaction (i.e., Ct ≥ τo).
Lemma 2.3.3. The convenience yield condition of the decentralized inventory
sharing transaction becomes the same as that of the centralized inventory shar-
ing transaction, i.e., Ct ≥ τo, if we set the stochastic transfer price in period
t, τk,t, as follows: i) if Ct ≥ τb + τs, then τk,t is in-between (h + τo − Ct) and
(τb+τs+h−Ct), i.e., τk,t ∈ {h+τo−Ct, τb+τs+h−Ct}; ii) if τo ≤ Ct < τb+τs,
then τk,t is in-between (h+ τo−Ct) and h, i.e., τk,t ∈ {h+ τo−Ct, h}. Specifi-
cally, the stochastic transfer price τk,t makes inventory sharing benefit to each
firm be the same in every period by setting τk,t as follows: iii) if Ct ≥ τb + τs,
then τk,t = −Ct+h+ τb+τs+τo2 ; iv) if τo ≤ Ct < τb+τs, then τk,t = −Ct2 +h+ τo2 .
Lemma 2.3.3 shows that there are various ways to set the stochastic
transfer price which make the convenience yield condition of the decentralized
inventory sharing transaction the same as that of the centralized inventory
sharing transaction. The setting affects the unit inventory sharing benefit for
both the lending and the borrowing firms. For example, if Ct ≥ τb + τs and
τk,t = τb + τs + h − Ct, then all the benefit (i.e., τb + τs − τo) belongs to the
borrowing firm. Numerically, there is not much difference by selecting different
τk,t within the range shown in Lemma 2.3.3. Hence, we select the fair division.
That is, when Ct ≥ τb+τs and τo ≤ Ct < τb+τs, we set τk,t = −Ct+h+ τb+τs+τo2
and τk,t = −Ct2 +h+ τo2 , and the two firms’ sharing benefits become τb+τs−τo2 and
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Ct−τo
2
, respectively. Therefore, the two firms will be willing to share inventory
as long as Ct ≥ τo (the condition becomes identical to that of the centralized
case) and the benefits the firms gain from inventory sharing become equal in
each period.
Notice that Lemma 2.3.3 shows that the stochastic transfer price makes
the range of the convenience yield under which inventory sharing can arise in
the decentralized case be the same as that in the centralized case. However,
we should note that the benefits of inventory sharing in the two cases are
different due to the different optimal ordering levels in the two cases. To find
the optimal ordering levels of the decentralized case (xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ
∗
j,t+1), we derive
the following two equations which should be satisfied simultaneously:
−τb +Gi(xˆ∗i,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]}
−Et[ISt+1]
2
{PiL(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1)− PiB(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1)} = 0
−τb +Gj(xˆ∗j,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]}
−Et[ISt+1]
2
{PjL(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1)− PjB(xˆ∗i,t+1, xˆ∗j,t+1)} = 0.
The above conditions are different from the conditions to find the optimal
ordering levels in the centralized case (see §2.3.1) because, in any period t+ 1,
the unit cost reduction by inventory sharing is ISt+1 in the centralized case
but ISt+1
2
in the decentralized case.
2.4 Value of Inventory Sharing
In this section, we assess the value of inventory sharing, which is defined
as the procurement cost difference without inventory sharing relative to with
inventory sharing. Notice that we can easily get the optimal actions in the
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model without inventory sharing by letting the amount of sharing quantity, bit
(or bjt), be zero for all t.
2.4.1 Experiment Setting
Market Demand. We assume that the demands faced by the two
firms in each period follow a bivariate normal distribution and the demands
across different time periods are independent. We consider a planning horizon
of 20 periods, each of which corresponds to two weeks (i.e., total 40 weeks).
The detailed information of the demand distributions is presented in Table 2.1.
Note that the coefficient of variation of the demand is chosen in the range from
0.1 to 0.2, which is typical for the large refinery firms in the U.S. (according
to the data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration).
Transaction Costs. The spot transaction costs depend on distance. Trench
(2001) reports that the transportation cost of gasoline by pipelines (for the
forward transactions) from Houston to Chicago was $0.84 per barrel; whereas,
the transportation cost of trucking (for the spot transactions) increases dra-
matically with distance. Hence, we set the selling and buying transaction costs
for spot trades range from $1.0 to $1.4 per barrel. We vary the transaction
cost of inventory sharing from $0.2 to $0.6 per barrel.
Discount Factor and Holding Cost. The 4-week T-bill rate from January
2006 to December 2010 varied from 0.02% to 5.13%. Thus, we set the time
discount rate for two weeks to 1.5%; i.e., β equals 0.985. The holding cost
in general consists of the opportunity cost and the physical cost. Considering
the typical handling and storage cost for crude oil ($0.3 per barrel per month
according to Bohn 1996) and the average spot price ($80), we set the holding
cost h at $1.35 per barrel for two weeks.
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Table 2.1: Demand and operational costs parameters
Parameter Description (unit) Estimate
(µi, σ
2
i ) mean and variance of demand for firm i
(barrels in two weeks)
(100, 202)
(µj , σ
2
j ) mean and variance of demand for firm j
(barrels in two weeks)
(100, 102), (100, 202),
(200, 202), (200, 402)
ρ correlation coefficient between the two
demands
0, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
τb buying transaction cost in the spot mar-
ket ($ per barrel)
1.0, 1.2, 1.4
τs selling transaction cost in the spot mar-
ket ($ per barrel)
1.0, 1.2, 1.4
τo transaction cost in inventory sharing ($
per barrel)
0.2, 0.4, 0.6
h holding cost ($ per barrel per two weeks) 1.35
β discount factor (per barrel per two
weeks)
0.985
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Price Model. Our numerical study assumes that the evolution of the crude
oil spot price and that of the forward price follow the model given in Schwartz
and Smith (2000). In particular, the log spot price, ln(St), decomposes into
a short-term deviation of the price, χt and an equilibrium price level, ξt; i.e.,
ln(St) = χt+ξt. The short-term deviation of the price, χt, follows the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process: dχt = (−κχt − λχ)dt + σχdZχ, where κ, λχ, and σχ are
the mean-reversion rate, the risk premium, and the volatility in the short-
term factor (χt), respectively; the long-term deviation of the price, ξt, follows
dξt = µ
∗
ξdt + σξdZξ, where µ
∗
ξ and σξ are the drift rate and the volatility in
the long-term factor (ξt), respectively. dZχ and dZξ are the standard Brown-
ian motion increments that satisfy dZχdZξ = ρχξdt. We use the parameters
calibrated in Schwartz and Smith (2000) in our experiments (see Table 2.2)
and set the initial short-term deviation χ0 to 0.17 and the initial equilibrium
price level ξ0 to 4.15.
Table 2.2: Price parameters
Parameter Description Estimate
κ Short-term mean-reversion rate 1.49
σχ Short-term volatility 0.286
λχ Short-term risk premium 0.157
µ∗ξ Equilibrium risk-neutral drift rate 0.0115
σξ Equilibrium volatility 0.145
ρχξ Correlation coefficient between dZχ and
dZξ
0.3
30
2.4.2 Value of Inventory Sharing in the Centralized Case
Here, we investigate the value of inventory sharing in the centralized
case which will serve as a benchmark for the later analysis. The magnitude
of the value of inventory sharing depends on the business environment. We
examine the impacts of the parameters including the mean and variance of
the counterparty’s demand, the correlation of the two firms’ demands, and
the per-unit transaction costs. Figure 2.3 presents the experiment results (the
caption of the figure shows the base values of the parameters and we vary
one parameter at a time reflected in each plot). Note that the percentage of
procurement cost reduction shown in our numerical study is relatively small
due to the large base cost (i.e., the raw material procurement cost). However,
given the nature of this industry with relatively thin profit margins, the small
amount of procurement cost reduction by inventory sharing as reported in our
study can still significantly increase the profitability of the firms. Therefore,
to have a better representation, we estimated the annual procurement cost
of typical U.S. oil refinery firms with comparable mean demands as in our
experiment and converted the percentage cost reduction to absolute cost saving
as reported in the figures 1.
1Chevron’s net refinery input in 2011 was 652, 255, 500 barrels. We assume that the
average oil price is $80 per barrel. Hence, the approximate annual raw material pro-
curement cost is 652, 255, 500 ∗ $80 = $52, 180, 400, 000. Since we consider two-size firms,
with mean of demands 100 and 200, we assume the firm with mean of demand 100 incurs
$52, 180, 400, 000/2 = $26, 090, 200, 000 per year, and the firm with mean of demand 200
incurs $52, 180, 400, 000 per year. Note that since the estimated procurement cost does not
include the spot transaction and holding costs, the actual procurement cost would be higher
than our estimation.
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(a) µj (b) σj (c) ρ
(d) τb (e) τs (f) τo
Figure 2.3: Demonstration of the value of inventory sharing in the centralized
case depending on the parameter values of the two demands. The base values of
the parameters are µi = 100, µj = 200, σi = 20, σj = 40, ρ = 0, τb = τs = 1.2,
τo = 0.4, h = 1.35. We change one parameter at a time while keeping the
other parameters fixed at the base values.
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2.4.2.1 Effect of Demand.
We observe in our experiments that a change in the mean of the coun-
terparty’s demand has little impact on the value of inventory sharing (see
Figure 2.3(a)). This is because with a normally distributed demand, an in-
crease of the mean results in a corresponding increase of the order-up-to level.
As a result, the probabilities of shortage and overage do not change signifi-
cantly. In contrast, an increase of the volatility of the counterparty’s demand
can influence the value of inventory sharing substantially. For instance, Fig-
ure 2.3(b) shows that as the standard deviation of the counterparty’s demand
increases from 10 to 40, the value of inventory sharing increases by $20.3 mil-
lion. Intuitively, as the counterparty’s demand becomes more volatile, the
chance of mismatch between its demand and supply will increase, which will
thus increase the probability of inventory sharing. In addition, in order for
inventory sharing to occur, one firm needs to have excess inventory while the
other firm needs to have excess demand. Therefore, inventory sharing will be
more beneficial if the demands of the two firms are less positively correlated
(or more negatively correlated). Figure 2.3(c) demonstrates the effect of the
correlation. As ρ increases from 0 to 1, the value of inventory sharing reduces
by nearly $40.7 million.
2.4.2.2 Effect of the Transaction Costs.
Changes in transaction costs also affect the value of inventory sharing.
As we have explained below Proposition 2.3.1, the range of the convenience
yield under which inventory sharing can arise is Ct ≥ τo. Furthermore, relative
to trading in the spot market, the magnitude of saving from sharing inventory
depends on the convenience yield; that is, when τo ≤ Ct < τb+ τs, the per unit
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saving is Ct−τo, and when Ct ≥ τb+τs, the per unit savings is τb+τs−τo. Hence,
as τb increases or τo decreases, the value of inventory sharing increases because
an increase of τb or a decrease of τo increases not only the per unit cost savings
but also the range of the convenience yield under which inventory sharing can
arise. For instance, Figures 2.3(d) and 2.3(f) demonstrate that as τb increases
from 1.0 to 1.4 and as τo decreases from 0.6 to 0.2, the values of inventory
sharing increase about $8.1 million and $8.5 million, respectively. The effect
of an increase of τs on the value of inventory sharing is not analytically clear
because as τs increases, the condition under which inventory sharing can occur
(i.e., Ct ≥ τb+τs) becomes tighter although the cost saving τb+τs−τo increases.
In our numerical study, as τs increases, the value of inventory sharing mostly
increases. For example, Figure 2.3(e) shows that as τs increases from 1.0 to
1.4, the value of inventory sharing increases by $4.2 million.
2.4.3 Gaps between the values of inventory sharing
In this subsection, we compare the gap between the centralized and
decentralized cases. Before examining the gap, we first check whether the
centralized solution can be installed when the firms make decentralized deci-
sions. Our numerical experiment shows that when one firm uses the policy
under the centralized solution, the other firm will benefit by deviating from
the centralized solution. As a consequence, a prisoner’s dilemma can arise, as
we show in Table 2.3. Even though the firms can obtain a higher profit under
the centralized solution, it is not implementable in equilibrium.
Now let us investigate the performances of the stochastic transfer price.
In our entire numerical study, we observe that the stochastic transfer price
significantly reduces the gap between the values of inventory sharing of the
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Table 2.3: Value of inventory sharing (millions of dollars). The borrowing
firm pays all the sharing transaction cost τo. The values of the parameters are
µi = 100, σi = 20, µj = 100, σj = 20, ρ = 0, τb = τs = 1.2, τo = 0.4, h = 1.35.
Firm j
Centralized Deviated
Firm i
Centralized ($31.26, $31.26) ($30.10, $31.89)
Deviated ($31.89, $30.10) ($30.72, $30.72)
centralized and decentralized cases. As an example, Table 2.4 shows the gap
is about $2,900 under the stochastic transfer price; whereas, the gap is about
$670,500 when a borrowing firms pays all the sharing transaction cost. Notice
that the assumption of the borrower pays all the sharing transaction cost τo
seems an innocuous because we expect it is equally likely a firm borrows or
lends, and thus the benefit from sharing is symmetric. However, the assump-
tion about the transfer price is quite important because it affects the stocking
decisions as well as the range of the convenience yield under which inventory
sharing can arise. Therefore, attention has to be given to coordination between
the firms. We note that calculating the stochastic transfer price is simple, so
it is easy to implement. Also, under the stochastic transfer price, the bene-
fits from inventory sharing are shared fairly between the two firms, while it is
generally not true under other mechanisms.
We additionally conduct a sensitivity analysis of the gap with respect
to the system parameters. Notice that the range of the convenience yield under
which inventory sharing can arise is the same for the centralized case and the
decentralized case with stochastic transfer price, i.e., Ct ≥ τo. In other words,
the convenience yield condition to the inventory sharing transactions does not
affect the gap. Hence, the gap is caused due to two reasons: First, as the
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Table 2.4: Gap of the value of inventory sharing (thousands of dollars). The
values of the parameters are µi = 100, σi = 20, µj = 200, σj = 40, ρ = 0,
τb = τs = 1.2, τo = 0.4, h = 1.35.
Default (τk,t = 0 for all t) Stochastic Transfer Price
Gap to the Cen-
tralized Case
$670.5 $2.9
value of inventory sharing in the centralized case increases, the gap increases.
We converted the percentage cost reduction to absolute cost saving. Hence,
although the percentage of the gap reduction is the same, the gap reduction in
dollars increases as the absolute cost saving in the centralized case increases.
Second, the gap is affected by the difference of the ordering levels due to the
different first order conditions for the ordering levels. Recall that the first order
conditions for firm i in the centralized and decentralized cases, respectively,
can be written as:
−τb +Gi(xi,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Common Term
−Et[ISt+1]{PiL(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)− PiB(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Different Term in the Centralized Case
= 0,
−τb +Gi(xi,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Common Term
− Et[ISt+1]
2
{PiL(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)− PiB(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Different Term in the Decentralized Sharing Case
= 0.
Hence, the only difference in the first order conditions between the two cases is
the term in front of the probability differences, i.e., Et[ISt+1] in the centralized
case and Et[ISt+1]
2
in the decentralized case. Hence, the gap increases as the
common term in the first order conditions decreases and the different term in
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the conditions increases. Notice that the common term is always positive.
2.4.3.1 Effect of Demand.
The changes of the gaps due to demand factors are explained by the
first reason, i.e., as the value of inventory sharing in the centralized case in-
creases, the gap increases. From Figures 2.3 and 2.4, we observe that when the
parameter value related to demand changes, the gap increases as the value of
inventory sharing in the centralized case increases. That is, the gap is almost
stable when the mean of demand changes; whereas, the gap increases as the
variance of demand increases or as the correlation between the two demands
decreases. Notice that the change in demand terms does not affect Et[ISt+1]
and has a negligible effect on the difference of the lending and borrowing prob-
abilities (i.e., PiL(xi,t+1, xj,t+1) − PiB(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)). Hence, the difference of
the ordering levels changes little as the demand factors change.
2.4.3.2 Effect of Transaction Costs.
The changes in transaction costs also affect the gap between the values
of inventory sharing of the centralized and decentralized cases. An increase
of τb decreases the common term in the first order condition and increases
Et[ISt+1]. In addition, as τb increases, the value of inventory sharing in the
centralized case increases (see Figure 2.3(d)). Hence, as τb increases, the gap
increases. For instance, Figure 2.4(d) illustrates that as τb increases from 1.0 to
1.4, the gap increases about $21,715. Differently, as τo increases, the common
term in the first order condition remains the same while Et[ISt+1] decreases.
Moreover, as τo increases, the value of inventory sharing in the centralized
case decreases (see Figure 2.3(f)). Hence, as τo increases, the gap decreases.
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(a) µj (b) σj (c) ρ
(d) τb (e) τs (f) τo
Figure 2.4: Demonstration of the gap of the value of inventory sharing between
the decentralized case and the centralized one depending on the parameter
values of the transaction costs. The stochastic pricing scheme is used. The
base values of the parameters are µi = 100, µj = 200, σi = 20, σj = 40, ρ = 0,
τb = τs = 1.2, τo = 0.4, h = 1.35. We change one parameter at a time while
keeping the other parameters fixed at the base values.
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For example, Figure 2.4(f) shows that as τo increases from 0.2 to 0.6, the gap
decreases about $947. The gap with respect to τs is not analytically clear
because an increase of τs increases both the common term and Et[ISt+1]. In
our numerical study, we observe that as τs increases, the gap mostly decreases.
For example, in Figure 2.4(e), as τs increases from 1.0 to 1.4, the gap decreases
about $15,594. Notice that in Figures 2.3(e) and 2.4(e), as τs increases, the
value of inventory sharing in the centralized case increases; whereas the gap
decreases. This observation implies that the inventory level difference has
greater impact on the gap than the magnitude of the value of inventory sharing
in the centralized case.
2.4.4 Transaction Volumes
It is also interesting to examine the volumes of transactions that drive
the inventory sharing value. We find in our experiments that the firms use the
forward market most frequently to procure the commodity. In particular, in
the experiments presented in Table 2.5, the two firms buy about 88% and 12%
of the commodity from the forward and spot markets, respectively, to satisfy
their demands, and they share about 1% of their total purchased commodity
with each other. The volume of selling in the spot market is about 2% of the
total purchased commodity.
It is interesting to note three things. First, we do not observe the
firms sell their inventory in the forward market in our entire numerical study.
An important reason for this is that the coefficient of variation of demand
is relatively small in our experiments (which matches the data in practice).
A firm will sell in the forward market only if the leftover inventory in one
period exceeds the optimal order-up-to level of the next period. Such an
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Table 2.5: Transaction quantities (%)(The values of the parameters are µi =
100, σi = 20, µj = 200, σj = 40, ρ = 0, τo = 0.4, h = 1.35)
(τb , τs) Buy From For-
ward
Buy From Spot Inventory
Sharing
Sell to For-
ward
Sell to Spot
(1.0, 1.4) 88.28%, 85.26% 11.72%, 14.74% 1.39%, 0.68% 0.00%, 0.00% 1.16%, 0.57%
(1.2, 1.2) 89.25%, 87.39% 10.75%, 12.61% 1.26%, 0.61% 0.00%, 0.00% 2.10%, 1.02%
(1.4, 1.0) 89.98%, 89.65% 10.02%, 10.95% 1.07%, 0.52% 0.00%, 0.00% 3.30%, 1.58%
event will rarely occur, with a small coefficient of variation and relatively high
order-up-to levels. Second, we observe that the volume of inventory sharing
transactions is small relative to the volume of total purchased commodity.
Such a result arises because in general the chance for one firm to have a large
inventory shortage and, at the same time, for the other firm to have much
leftover inventory is small. Therefore, inventory sharing should be considered
as a supporting tool, instead of playing a major role, to balance demand
with supply. Third, the value of inventory sharing increases as the sharing
quantity increases which is proportional to a firm’s demand. The relatively
small sharing transaction percentage compared to other procurement options
might not result in sufficient benefit for small firms to share inventory with
other firms. Hence, we expect that large companies (e.g., major petroleum
or food processing) share inventory, but small firms to rarely share inventory
unless the sharing transaction cost is negligible (example, borrowing salt from
a neighbor).
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2.5 Extensions & Discussion
In this section, we discuss several extensions of our main analysis. In
particular, we investigate the coordination mechanisms with fixed proportional
transfer price and sequential decision making in §2.5.1. We consider the case
with positive forward transaction costs in §2.5.2. Finally, we discuss the prop-
erties of the value of inventory sharing under a different price model in §2.5.3.
2.5.1 Transfer Prices and Sequence of Decisions
In this subsection, we consider the case in which each firm pays a frac-
tion of the sharing transaction cost and the case where the two firms make
decisions as in a Stackelberg competition model.
Fixed Share of Transaction Cost. Let us consider the case in which each
firm pays a fraction of the sharing transaction cost. By sharing the cost, the
benefits may be distributed more evenly, which can perhaps result in a better
outcome. Specifically, we assume that the borrowing firm pays τo − τk to the
lending firm where τo is the inventory sharing transaction cost. That is, the
lending firm will take a charge of τk for lending the inventory to the borrowing
firm. τk can be any value from zero to τo. Here, we assume τk is fixed in the
whole time horizon of T periods.
In §2.3.2, we have explained that the necessary condition for inventory
sharing to arise is: h + τo ≤ Ct ≤ τb + τs + h, where h + τo ≤ Ct represents
the condition under which the borrowing firm is willing to borrow and Ct ≤
τb + τs + h is the condition under which the lending firm is willing to lend.
Applying the same logic, when the lending firm shares a part of the transaction
cost, we can derive the new necessary condition for inventory sharing: h+τo−
τk ≤ Ct ≤ τb + τs + h − τk. Notice that with an extra parameter τk, we
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can adjust the sharing condition. In particular, for specific distributions of
the convenience yield, one might find appropriate τk that makes inventory
sharing more likely occur and thus achieves more benefits for the two firms.
We summarize the conditions and benefits under the fixed share of transaction
cost and the stochastic transfer price in Table 2.6.
Table 2.6: Summary of the Transfer Prices
Fixed Share of Transaction Cost
Ct < τb + τs Ct ≥ τb + τs
Transfer Price τk ∈ [h+ τo − Ct,min{τb + τs + h− Ct, h}]
Convenience Yield Condition h+ τo − τk ≤ Ct ≤ (τb + τs + h)− τk
Saving to the Borrower (Ct − h− τo) + τk
Saving to the Lender h− τk (τb+τs+h−Ct)−τk
Stochastic Transfer Price
Ct < τb + τs Ct ≥ τb + τs
Transfer Price −Ct
2
+ h+ τo
2
−Ct + h+ τb+τs+τo2
Convenience Yield Condition Ct ≥ τo
Saving to the Borrower Ct−τo
2
τb+τs−τo
2
Saving to the Lender Ct−τo
2
τb+τs−τo
2
Sequential Decision Making. So far, we assume that firms make decisions
simultaneously without observing the other firm’s inventory position as in a
Cournot competition model. Here, we consider a Stackelberg type of solution,
i.e., firms make decisions one after the other and the follower can observe the
inventory position of the leader. Even though the assumption that inventory
is visible to one but not the other is somewhat unrealistic, it might provide
benefits to the leader and improve the inventory decisions.
When the firms make their decisions sequentially, we assume firm i
moves first without loss of generality. Given firm i’s ordering level xi,t+1, firm
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j’s first order condition is
−τb +Gj(xj,t+1){(τb + τs)− Et[FWt+1]} − Et[Lt+1]PjL(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)
+Et[Bt+1]PjB(xi,t+1, xj,t+1) = 0.
Then, by backward induction, we can derive firm i’s first order condition (note
that xj,t+1 is the function of xi,t+1):
−τb +Gi(xi,t+1)[β(τb + τs)− βEt[FWt+1]]
−Et[Lt+1]
(
PiL(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)− ∂xj,t+1
∂xi,t+1
PjB(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)
)
+βEt[Bt+1]
(
PiB(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)− ∂xj,t+1
∂xi,t+1
PjL(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)
)
= 0.
The existence of an equilibrium can be also shown in this case. Notice
that Et[Bt+1] and Et[Lt+1], the expected unit cost reductions by borrowing and
lending, depend on the transfer price which can be either fixed or stochastic.
Comparing the Value of Inventory Sharing. Now let us investigate
the performances of four possible combinations (see Table 2.7) with different
sequences of decision making and transfer prices. In our entire numerical study,
we observe that the case with simultaneous decision making and stochastic
transfer price dominates the other cases. As an example, Table 2.7 shows the
gap between the centralized solution and the case with simultaneous decision
making and stochastic transfer price is about $2,900 which is the least among
all the combinations. We find that when the two firms move sequentially, the
leader can perform better than the follower, but the total gain is less than that
when they move simultaneously.
43
Table 2.7: Gap of the value of inventory sharing (thousands of dollars). In
the sequential decision, firm i decides the order-up-to level in advance. The
values of the parameters are µi = 100, σi = 20, µj = 200, σj = 40, ρ = 0,
τb = τs = 1.2, τo = 0.4, h = 1.35.
Fixed Share of Transaction Cost (τk = 0.2) Stochastic Transfer Price
Sequential Decision $117.5 $3.9
Simultaneous Decision $114.5 $2.9
2.5.2 Forward Transaction Costs
In this subsection, we consider the case with positive forward trans-
action costs. We denote the buying and selling transaction costs in the for-
ward market by τFB and τFS, respectively. By adding the forward transac-
tion costs to our model, we redefine the convenience yield concept as CFt ≡
St + τb +h−β(Ft− τFS). The non-negative convenience yield assumption still
holds to prohibit an arbitrage profit.
When we analyze the model with the forward transaction costs, we
assume that the leftover inventory level in the current period is always lower
than the optimal order-up-to level for the next period as we observe in Table 2.5
in §2.4.4. Proposition 2.5.1 shows the optimal actions with forward transaction
costs when firms decide ordering levels simultaneously and the borrowing firm
pays all the sharing transaction cost.
Proposition 2.5.1. Suppose (xit −Dit)+ is less than x∗i,t+1, xˆ∗i,t+1, and xCi,t+1
∀t, and h ≥ β(τFB+τFS). In each period t, firms are willing to share inventory
if h + τo + β(τFB + τFS) ≤ CFt ≤ τb + τs + h + β(τFB + τFS) in the case
of decentralized inventory sharing, and if CFt ≥ τo in the case of centralized
inventory sharing. Moreover, firms sell the rest of inventory to the spot market
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if CFt ≥ τb + τs; otherwise, they sell it to the forward market.
From Proposition 2.5.1, we observe that with forward transaction costs,
firms’ optimal actions continue to depend on the convenience yield, and the
convenience yield conditions for sharing inventory and selling it to the spot
market are similar to those in the model with zero forward transaction costs.
Note that although we assume h ≥ β(τFB + τFS) which guarantees that the
benefit from selling leftover inventory to the forward market is greater than
that from holding inventory in Proposition 2.5.1, we can similarly obtain the
optimal actions without that assumption.
We also examined the gap of the value of inventory sharing between the
centralized and decentralized cases under the four pricing schemes. Table 2.8
shows an example. As in the model with zero forward transaction cost, the case
with simultaneous decision making and stochastic transfer price dominates the
other three cases.
Table 2.8: Gap of the value of inventory sharing (thousands of dollars). In the
sequential decision, firm i decides in advance. The values of the parameters are
µi = 100, σi = 20, µj = 200, σj = 40, ρ = 0, τb = τs = 1.2, τFB = τFS = 0.2,
τo = 0.4, h = 1.35.
Fixed Transfer Price (τk = 0.2) Stochastic Transfer Price
Sequential Decision $1,580.3 $79.5
Simultaneous Decision $1,558.1 $48.3
2.5.3 Price Model of Gibson and Schwartz (1990)
In this subsection, we adopt the commodity price model developed by
Gibson and Schwartz (1990) to approximately assess the properties of the
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value of inventory sharing. This price model captures directly the spot price
(St) and the instantaneous net convenience yield (δt). Under the assumption
that δt measures the price difference between the spot and forward prices, the
distribution of convenience yield in period t+ 1 is the following:
(Ct+1|St, Ft) ∼ N
(
µc, σ
2
c
)
,
where µc =
(
α− λ
κ
)
(1−e−κ∆t)+(St−βFt)e−κ∆t+τb+h and σ2c = σ
2
δ
2κ
(1−e−2κ∆t).
Notice that κ, λ, α − λ/κ, σδ, and ∆t denote the mean-reversion rate, the
risk premium, the asymptotic mean, the volatility in the instantaneous net
convenience yield factor, and the duration of each time period, respectively2.
With this model, we can analytically derive two factors that directly affect
the value of inventory sharing, i.e., the probability that the convenience yield
satisfies the inventory sharing condition and the expected unit cost reduction
by sharing inventory as follows. We denote the marginal probability density
and cumulative distribution functions of the standard normal distribution by
φ(·) and Φ(·), respectively.
Lemma 2.5.2. In the centralized case and the decentralized case with stochas-
tic transfer price, the probability that the convenience yield satisfies the in-
ventory sharing condition during period t + 1 given Ct is 1− Φ
(
τo−µc
σc
)
. The
probability increases as the risk premium λ decreases, the buying transaction
2As discussed in Schwartz and Smith (2000), the price models in Gibson and Schwartz
(1990) and Schwartz and Smith (2000) can be converted from one to the other but each has
its own advantages and disadvantages in this study. Using the model in Schwartz and Smith
(2000), by taking exponential of the sample log spot and forward prices, we can simulate
the evolution of the convenience yield (as we have explored in §2.4), but the model is too
complex to derive analytical results; whereas, under the model in Gibson and Schwartz
(1990), the instantaneous net convenience yield δt (which is a good proxy for St − βFt) is
concise to derive analytical results (i.e., Lemmas 2.5.2 and 2.5.3), but the evolution of δt is
not exactly that of St − βFt.
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cost in the spot market τb increases, or, the sharing transaction cost τo de-
creases. The probability is independent of the buying transaction cost in the
spot market τs and may either increase or decrease as the standard deviation
of the convenience yield σδ increases.
Lemma 2.5.3. In the centralized case and the decentralized case with stochas-
tic transfer price, the expected unit cost reduction by sharing inventory during
period t+ 1 given Ct is (τb + τs− τo)− σc ·
{
φ
(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
− φ
(
τo−µc
σc
)}
− (τb +
τs−µc) ·Φ
(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
+ (τo−µc) ·Φ
(
τo−µc
σc
)
. The expected unit cost reduction
increases as the risk premium λ decreases, the buying transaction cost in the
spot market τb or the buying transaction cost in the spot market τs increases,
or, the sharing transaction cost τo decreases. The expected reduction may ei-
ther increase or decrease as the standard deviation of the convenience yield σδ
increases.
From Lemmas 2.5.2 and 2.5.3, we can obtain the following three insights
regarding the value of inventory sharing (Recall that the unit cost reductions
by sharing inventory are zero, Ct−τo, and τb+τs−τo when Ct < τo, τo ≤ Ct <
τb + τs, and Ct ≥ τb + τs, respectively). First, the value of inventory sharing
increases as the risk premium λ decreases because a decrease of λ increases the
asymptotic mean of the instantaneous net convenience yield (i.e., α − λ/κ),
and the increase of the mean increases both the frequency of the inventory
sharing transactions and the unit cost reduction by sharing inventory.
Second, an increase of the standard deviation of the instantaneous net
convenience yield σδ may either increase or decrease the value of inventory
sharing, which depends on the magnitudes of the mean of the convenience
yield µc, the sum of spot transaction costs τb + τs, and the sharing transaction
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cost τo. If the mean of Ct is larger (smaller) than τb+τs (τo), then the increased
variance of Ct increases the probability that Ct is less (greater) than τb + τs
or τo, and it will decrease (increase) the frequency of sharing or the unit cost
reduction by sharing inventory. In addition, we expect if the mean of Ct is
in-between τb+τs and τo, the effect of the increased variance of Ct on the value
of inventory sharing is negligible.
Third, changes in the transaction cost of procurement from the spot
market and the sharing transaction cost affect the value of inventory sharing
similarly as we have observed in §2.4. As τb increases, τs increases, or τo
decreases, the value of inventory sharing increases because an increase of τb,
an increase of τs, or a decrease of τo increases not only the unit cost savings
but also the frequency of the inventory sharing transactions.
2.6 Conclusion
In this study, we explore the benefit of inventory sharing between firms
that use a common commodity for their production to satisfy their demands,
in the presence of both spot and forward markets. We characterize the op-
timal inventory and transaction decisions for the cases with centralized and
decentralized inventory sharing, and reveal the gap of the values of inventory
sharing between the two cases. One might think that the setting of the transfer
price would not affect the value of inventory sharing since the borrowing and
lending transactions would tend to cancel out in the long-run, especially in
the case of inventory sharing between symmetric firms. However, the transfer
price affects not only the condition for inventory sharing but also the ordering
levels. We show that under the proposed stochastic transfer price, the benefit
of inventory sharing in the decentralized case is close to that in the central-
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ized case, and the gap can be large under other transfer price schemes. The
stochastic transfer price scheme might be useful in practice because 1) it is
easy to implement; 2) it shares the benefits fairly between the two firms; and
3) the cost reduction is significant.
We also identify how the benefits from sharing inventory vary with the
parameters of the demand process and the transaction costs. The value of in-
ventory sharing, using our proposed pricing scheme, increases as the mean and
the variance of demand process increase, the correlation between the demand
faced by the two firms decreases, or the sharing transaction cost decreases.
The value may either increase or decrease as the transaction costs in the spot
market increase.
Therefore, our work extends the existing literature to investigate firms’
procurement strategies utilizing both the commodity markets and inventory
sharing, which bridges the gap between the literatures on inventory sharing
and commodity procurement with stochastic demands and prices. While the
findings from our work are interesting and useful for practice, we believe more
studies can be conducted along this line of research. For instance, it is interest-
ing to consider scenarios where the demand and price processes are correlated,
to consider more than two firms, or to consider the issues of transportation
and logistics for commodity inventory sharing among firms.
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Chapter 3
Supply Chain Design and Carbon Penalty:
Monopoly vs. Monopolistic Competition
3.1 Introduction
Carbon emission has received significant attention in the recent years,
which is believed to be one of the global warming contributors. Central plan-
ners are passing various regulations on carbon emission. For instance, the
European Union has imposed carbon emission limits while allowing the com-
panies to trade their allowances (EC 2005). British Columbia, Canada, im-
posed a carbon tax (BC 2008), at $20 per metric ton of CO2 initially and then
increased to $30 per metric ton from July 2012. While it is difficult to deter-
mine the exact cost of carbon emission to the society, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change in 2007 (IPCC 2007) suggested that if we impose
$80 per metric ton of CO2 to large carbon emitters, then we can prevent severe
climate change. Several research also documents that the estimated carbon
cost can range from $20 to $ 300 per metric ton of CO2 (Tol 2008, Frank 2012,
and John and Hope 2012). In the United States, while there is no regulation
in place yet, the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule has been is-
sued by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and large greenhouse gas
(GHG) emitters need to report GHG data (EPA 2008). Along with the policy
change, the public is becoming more receptive to the idea of imposing cost to
curb carbon emission, and also more companies started to report the carbon
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footprint of their products and services and have been making efforts to reduce
their carbon emission. As such, a natural question surfaces whether imposing
carbon emission cost will influence the supply chain structure and consumers’
purchasing behavior, and if so, how to optimally determine the charge of car-
bon emission cost over the companies and consumers from a central planner’s
perspective.
To address this question, we focus on the “last mile” supply chain in
this study, i.e., ranging from retail stores to consumers. We follow the main
model settings as of those in Cachon (2013). However, instead of minimizing
the total costs, we consider the problem of maximizing social welfare with
three types of players, i.e., a central policymaker, retailers, and consumers,
and also allow the selling price to be determined endogenously. In addition,
we consider three competitive settings: monopoly, monopolistic competition
with symmetric market share, and monopolistic competition with asymmetric
market share.
Retailers and consumers maximize their own profits and net utilities,
which however incur negative externalities for the society by generating carbon
emissions. Increased carbon emissions can increase the average temperature
on Earth, influence the patterns and amounts of precipitation, reduce the
ice and snow coverage, and raise the sea levels (EPA 2012). The central
policymaker in our study is to maximize the social welfare by balancing the
retailers’ and consumers’ self-interest with the negative externalities. More
specifically, the central policymaker decides the carbon emission cost recovery
rates to be imposed on the retailers and consumers, and we define the social
welfare as the sum of the retailers’ total profits and the customers’ total net
utilities less the portion of carbon cost that is not recovered from the consumers
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and retailers. Charging the carbon costs on the retailers’ and consumers’
transportation activities may change their operations and shopping decisions,
thereby influencing the total carbon emission and social welfare.
While our results show that charging carbon costs does not affect much
the supply chain structure and the social welfare in the monopoly case (which
is aligned with the literature, Cachon 2013), it can however change the supply
chain structure and carbon emission significantly when there is competition.
In particular, we find that in the case of monopolistic competition with sym-
metric market share, imposing carbon costs on the retailers’ and consumers’
transportation activities can substantially change the number of retail stores
in the market and the total carbon emission. The negative effect on the social
welfare would be large if the carbon emission recovery rates are not properly
charged. These results depend only on the industry common factors, i.e., the
fuel efficiency and the carbon cost. The case of monopolistic competition with
asymmetric market share falls in between the monopoly case and the case
of monopolistic competition with symmetric market share. We show that the
benefit of properly imposing carbon costs becomes more significant as the com-
petition level increases. Furthermore, we find a good fit of the data from the
U.S. retail industry to the case of monopolistic competition with asymmetric
market share.
Our study is related to the recent literature that investigate how the
new carbon emission regulations influence firms’ operational decisions. Ben-
jaafar et al. (2010) study a lot-sizing problem with carbon cap, carbon tax,
and carbon cap-and-trade. They show that carbon emission can be reduced
not just by investing in energy-efficient technologies but also by adjusting the
operational decisions. To support and complement the numerical findings in
52
Benjaafar et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2011) and Hua et al. (2011) consider
economic order quantity (EOQ) models with carbon cap and carbon cap-and-
trade constraints, respectively. Chen et al. (2011) show that with the carbon
cap regulation, the relative decrease of carbon emission can be much higher
than the relative increase of costs, and similarly, Hua et al. (2011) find that
the carbon emission decreases as the carbon price increases when the carbon
cap-and-trade system is implemented. Differently, Hoen et al. (2010) consider
the transportation mode selection decision when carbon emission regulations
are imposed. They find that neither carbon tax nor carbon cap-and-trade will
change the firms’ transportation mode. Similar to us, Cachon (2013) studies
the “last mile” supply chain structure with an imposed carbon tax. He shows
that the current supply chain structure is robust. We endogenize the retailers’
store opening, stocking and pricing decisions and the consumers’ shopping de-
cisions with various retail competition. We show that imposing carbon cost
can significantly change the supply chain structure and social welfare.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. §3.2 describes
the problem and §3.3 analyzes each player’s optimal decisions in three com-
petitive settings. The carbon penalty which measures the negative effect by
not charging the optimal carbon cost is investigated in §3.4, and the impact
of carbon cost on the supply chain structure is presented in §3.5. We compare
our results with Cachon (2013) in §3.6 and conclude in §3.7.
3.2 Problem Description
In this section, we explain the problem settings regarding each player,
transportation, and competition. Note that, as a default case, we consider
carbon costs emitted by retailers’ and consumers’ transportation activities (we
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additionally consider carbon costs emitted by cooling and heating activities in
retail stores in §3.6.2).
3.2.1 Players
Central Policymaker. In our problem, retailers distribute products to their
retail stores and consumers travel to the retail stores to buy the products.
These actions emit carbon which is costly to society. The cost of emission is
assumed to be recovered by imposing a fee (i.e., a carbon tax) on the fuel price.
The fee is proportional to the amount of carbon emission when retailers and
consumers consume fuel. For example, if the carbon cost is $80 per metric ton
of CO2 and the amount of carbon emission per unit of gasoline is 2.325 kgCO2
per liter (Cachon 2013), then the gasoline price increase due to the carbon tax
is $0.186 per liter, i.e., $0.70 per gallon, when the carbon cost is fully recovered.
Note that we only consider a carbon tax because the carbon tax is easy to
implement (Frank 2012) and it is more effective than any other carbon-related
regulations, such as carbon cap and carbon cap-and-trade (Bauman and Hsu
2012).
The role of a central policymaker is to decide the fractions of carbon
emission cost recovered from the consumers and retailers. We use αc and αr to
denote the recovery fractions from the consumers and retailers, respectively.
We assume αc and αr are nonnegative; that is, no subsidy should be provided.
Furthermore, the policymaker can charge at most the full carbon emission
cost, i.e., αc and αr are bounded by one. The policymaker’s problem is to
maximize social welfare, SW (αc, αr):
max
αc,αr∈[0,1]
SW (αc, αr),
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where SW (αc, αr)
:= the retailers’ total profit + the customers’ total utility − carbon cost that
is not recovered from the consumers and retailers.
Consumers. The consumers are located evenly in the whole market area.
We normalize the consumer density to one. Except for their locations, the
consumers are identical. Below, we explain the consumer’s problem. Each
consumer’s demand rate is λc. The consumer obtains a utility uc per unit
of consumption. To buy products, consumer i travels in straight lines to the
closest store of a retailer j, and chooses the purchasing quantity per trip,
qj,ic . Let τc be the transportation cost per unit distance, d
j,i
c the round-trip
distance to the store, and hc the cost of holding one unit product per unit
time. Then, we can formulate consumer i’s problem as one of maximizing her
utility, U j,ic (q
j,i
c ):
max
qj,ic
U j,ic (q
j,i
c ) ≡ λc(uc − pj)−
λcτcd
j,i
c
qj,ic
− hcq
j,i
c
2
.
Retailers. The entire market area is a which is fixed to a single polygonal
region. Let k be the number of retailers. Before establishing a product distri-
bution plan to the retail stores, retailer j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k} chooses the number of
retail stores nj, serving area rj(≤ a), and unit selling price pj given a fraction
mj of the consumers prefer to shop at retailer j’s stores. We assume retailer j’s
consumers are uniformly distributed in the entire market area a and retailer
j’s retail stores are also uniformly located in retailer j’s serving area rj.
We follow Cachon (2013)’s store configuration assumption, i.e., the
store configuration forms a Voronoi diagram which consists of a single reg-
ular polygon. A retail store is located in the center of mass of the regular
polygon. We let b be the shortest distance from the the center of mass to the
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side of the regular polygon and θ be the smallest angle formed by the shortest
line from the center of mass to the side of the regular polygon and the shortest
line from the center of mass to the vertex of the regular polygon, i.e., θ = pi/s,
where s is the number of sides in the regular polygon. Then,
rj =
1
2
(bj)2(tan θ)(2s)nj ≤ a,
where 1
2
(bj)2(tan θ)(2s) is the area of the regular polygon. In addition, retailer
j’s demand rate, λjr is the following
λjr = r
jmjλc
because we normalize the consumer density to one. In other words, the demand
rate per unit area is mjλc and the total area served is r
j. Retailer j’s selling
price pj is the price that makes the utility of the farthest customer from the
nearest store equal to zero, i.e., the utility of the consumer at the vertex of
the polygon is zero. That is,
pj = uc − τc
qj,Fc
2
√
(bj)2 + (bj)2(tan θ)− hcq
j,F
c
2λc
where 2
√
(bj)2 + (bj)2(tan θ) is the round-trip distance from the center of mass
to the to the vertex of the regular polygon and F denotes the farthest con-
sumer. Notice that in §3.3.2.1, we show under reasonable alternative selling
price settings, the improved profitability of the retailer is negligible. We as-
sume the procurement cost gr is the same for all retailers. Therefore, retailer
j’s revenue and procurement cost per unit time are λjrp
j and λjrgr, respectively.
Besides the above decisions, retailer j needs to choose the distribution
quantity per trip qjr . We follow the same assumptions as those in Cachon
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(2013): 1) retailer j has a single warehouse and a single vehicle; 2) the ware-
house is co-located with one of the nj stores and the point where the distribu-
tion trip starts and ends; 3) transportation of the products from the supplier
to retailer j’s warehouse is not considered; 4) every distribution trip covers all
retail stores; 5) the vehicle travels in straight lines and the delivery time is zero;
6) retailer j’s distance of a distribution trip djr is 2b
jnj which is the minimum
distance to travel into and out of every regular polygon under the assumption
that there are two or more retail stores. Let τr be the transportation cost per
unit distance and hr the retailer’s cost of holding one unit of product per unit
time. Then, we can formulate retailer j’s problem as one of maximizing his
profit rate, Zj(qjr , n
j, rj, pj):
max
qjr ,nj ,rj
Zj(qjr , n
j, rj, pj) ≡ λjr(pj − gr)−
λjrτrd
j
r
qjr
− hrq
j
r
2
subject to
rj =
1
2
(bj)2(tan θ)(2s)nj ≤ a
λjr = r
jmjλc
pj = uc − τc
qj,Fc
2
√
(bj)2 + (bj)2(tan θ)− hcq
j,F
c
2λc
djr = 2b
jnj
3.2.2 Transportation Cost
In our study, the transportation cost consists of not only those com-
ponents considered in Cachon (2013) but also the carbon recovery rate. Let
c denote a consumer’s vehicle and r denote a retailer’s vehicle. The per-unit
transportation cost of a vehicle of type t ∈ {c, r} follows:
τt(αt) := vt + (pt + αtcte)ft,
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where vt is the non-fuel variable cost per unit of distance ($ per km); pt is
per unit fuel cost ($ per liter(l)); αt is the fraction of carbon emission cost
recovered; ct is the amount of carbon emission per unit of fuel (kgCO2 per l);
e is the carbon cost per unit of emissions ($ per kgCO2); and ft is the amount
of fuel necessary to transport the vehicle per unit distance (l per km). For
simplicity, we use τc and τr to denote τc(αc) and τr(αr), respectively.
Notice that changing the recovery rates of the carbon emission costs,
αc and αr, can influence the consumers’ and the retailers’ decisions. Thus, the
central policymaker can alter the recovery rates to maximize social welfare.
3.2.3 Competition
Besides the monopoly case, we consider two kinds of competitive set-
tings: monopolistic competition with symmetric market share and monopolis-
tic competition with asymmetric market share.
3.2.3.1 Monopoly.
In the monopoly setting, there is a single retailer in the market whose
stores are uniformly located in his serving area.
3.2.3.2 Monopolistic Competition.
Recall that we assume only a fraction mj of the consumers prefer to
shop at retailer j’s stores and retailer j’s customers are uniformly distributed
in the entire market area a. Hence, the retailers serve overlapping regions
and might even have their stores co-located with each other. In the case of
monopolistic competition with symmetric market share, we assume that each
retailer has the same market share, and retailers will keep entering the market
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until the profit becomes zero. In other words, mj = 1/k for all j where k is
the number of retailers in the market, and the profit to each retailer is zero.
For analytical simplicity, we assume that k ∈ R. In the case of monopolistic
competition with asymmetric market share, we assume that the number of
retailers in the market, k, is a fixed integer and retailers have different market
shares. For analytical simplicity, we assume the number of retailers and the
market shares are given. We elaborate on the market share model in §3.4 and
verify it using the real retail data set, see Table 3.3.
3.2.4 Timeline
Figure 3.1 details the timeline of the model. In the first stage, the
central policymaker decides the fractions of carbon emission cost recovered
from the consumers and the retailers. In the second stage, the retailers decide
their number of stores, selling price, and serving area. In the third stage
(the last stage), the consumers decide their purchasing quantity per trip and
the retailers decide their delivery quantity per trip. This timeline reflects the
sequence of decisions in a greenfield setting. However, given that retailers
have already made stage 2 decisions, the timeline makes sense if entry and
exit decisions are relatively costless.
Figure 3.1: The timeline of the model
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3.3 Optimal Decisions
We use the superscripts M , S, and A to denote the association with
the cases of monopoly, monopolistic competition with symmetric market share,
and monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share, respectively. For
notational convenience, let φc1 := 2
1/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4(1+(tan θ)2)1/4 and φr :=
21/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4, where s is the number of sides in a regular polygon and θ
is pi/s. We make the following assumption to ensure participation by a retailer.
Assumption 3.3.1.
τc(1)τr(1) ≤ λ
2
c(uc − gr)4
26(φc1φr)2(hchr)
.
Assumption 3.3.1 will guarantee: (1) the monopolist’s profit is always
non-negative; (2) the number of retailers is at least one in the model of monop-
olistic competition with symmetric market share; (3) the number of retailers is
at least one, and each retailer’s profit is always non-negative in the asymmetric
market share case (see the proofs of Propositions 3.3.1, 3.3.2, and 3.3.3).
3.3.1 Third Stage
In this stage, the customers decide their purchasing quantity per shop-
ping trip, qj,ic , to maximize their utility, and the retailers decide their distribu-
tion quantity per trip to each store, qjr , to maximize their profits. By the EOQ
formula (see Cachon and Terwiesch 2009), the optimal purchasing quantity
and the associated utility of customer i are:
qj,i,lc =
√
2λcτcd
j,i
c
hc
and U j,ic (q
j,i,l
c ) = λc(uc − pj)−
√
2λcτcd
j,i
c hc,
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where l ∈ {M,S,A}. Similarly, retailer j’s optimal delivery quantity and the
associated profit are:
qj,lr =
√
2λjrτrd
j
r
hr
and Zj(qj,lr ) = λ
j
r(p
j − gr)−
√
2λjrτrd
j
rhr.
3.3.2 Second Stage
Given the fractions of carbon emission cost recovery (αc, αr), retailer
j decides the selling price pj, number of retail stores nj, and serving market
area rj.
3.3.2.1 Monopoly.
Proposition 3.3.1 gives the monopolist’s optimal decisions in the second
stage.
Proposition 3.3.1. In the monopoly case, (i) the whole market area a is
served, i.e., rM = a; (ii) the optimal number of retail stores is
nM = a
(
φc1
φr
)2 (
τchc
τrhr
)
; (iii) the optimal unit selling price is pM = uc −(
2φc1φr
λc
)1/2
(τchcτrhr)
1/4; (iv) the demand rate is λMr = aλc; (v) the distance
of a distribution trip is dMr = φ
2
r(an
M)1/2.
Proposition 3.3.1 shows that the monopolist always serves the whole
market area (i.e., rM = a), and the number of retail stores is linearly pro-
portional to the market area. The increased carbon emission cost which is
included in τc and τr decreases the selling price, but may or may not increase
the number of retail stores. We remark upon three things on the market cov-
erage result. First, the retailer will cover every consumer or no consumer since
both the retailer’s revenue and cost are linearly proportional to the number
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of retail stores. Second, the whole market area is served. Third, the retailer
could alternately decide not to cover every customer within a polygon. For
example, the coverage area could be a circle within the polygon. In this case,
if the area covered is a circle strictly within the polygon, then the polygon can
be shrunk until the circle touches the midpoints of each side. Thus, without
loss of generality the actual optimal price will lie somewhere between the price
to entice the customer at the vertex (our assumption) and the price to entice
the customer at the midpoint of a side of the polygon. Extensive numerical
investigations show that setting the price in that way (to cover all customers
within a circle inscribed in the polygon) does not change the profitability of
the retailer by more than 1.3% when the polygon is a hexagon.
3.3.2.2 Monopolistic Competition with Symmetric Market Share.
The competitors enter the market until each retailer’s profit becomes
zero, and that decides the number of retailers k. We let tk be the total number
of retail stores in the market. Proposition 3.3.2 shows the optimal actions and
equilibrium in the symmetric case.
Proposition 3.3.2. In monopolistic competition with symmetric market share,
(i) all the market area is served, i.e., rj,S = a ∀ j; (ii) the optimal number
of retailers in equilibrium is kS = λ
2
c(uc−gr)4
26(φc1φr)2(τcτrhchr)
; (iii) the optimal number
of retail stores for each retailer is nj,S = a
26φ4c1(τchc)
2
λ2c(uc−gr)4 ; (iv) the total number
of retail stores is tkS = a
(
φc1
φr
)2 (
τchc
τrhr
)
; (v) the optimal unit selling price is
pS = 1
2
(uc + gr); (vi) the demand rate for each retailer is λ
j,S
r =
(
a
k
)
λc; (vii)
the distance of a distribution trip for each retailer is dj,Sr = φ
2
r(an
j,S)1/2.
As in the monopoly case, the retailers in the symmetric market share
case also serve the whole market area (i.e., rj,S = a ∀ j). As the carbon
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emission cost increases, the number of stores per retailer increases; whereas,
the number of retailers decreases. Hence, we infer that the increased carbon
cost decreases competition. We remark on two things. First, the number of
stores per retailer is independent of the retailer’s per-unit transportation and
holding costs but depends on the per-unit procurement cost. Second, the retail
price is independent of the transportation costs, τc and τr, and thus the price
is also independent of the carbon emission cost, e, and the optimal recovery
rates, αSc and α
S
r . Notice that the number of retailers is greater than or equal
to one.
3.3.2.3 Monopolistic Competition with Asymmetric Market Share.
In the asymmetric market share case, the retailers enter the market
(sequentially, that is j = 1,2,3,...) until the profit is negative for the retailer
that next enters the market. We assume that the number of retailers kA (which
is an integer value) is given and retailer j’s market share mj is also given for
all j. For notational convenience, we assume the market share of retailers
kA, mk
A
, is the smallest. Proposition 3.3.3 shows the optimal actions in the
asymmetric case.
Proposition 3.3.3. In monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share,
(i) all the market area is served, i.e., rj,A = a ∀ j; (ii) the optimal number of
stores for retailer j is nj,A = (amj)
(
φc1
φr
)2 (
τchc
τrhr
)
; (iii) the optimal unit sell-
ing price for retailer j is pj,A = uc−
(
2φc1φr
λc
)1/2
(τchcτrhr)
1/4 (mj)−1/4; (iv) the
demand rate for retailer j is λj,Ar = (am
j)λc; (v) the distance of a distribution
trip for retailer j is dj,Ar = φ
2
r(an
j,A)1/2.
From Proposition 3.3.3, ifm1 = 1, then the analytic results are the same
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as those in the monopoly case; whereas if mj is the same for all j, then the
analytic results are the same as those in the case of monopolistic competition
with symmetric market share. Notice that the profit of each retailer is non-
negative with the optimal actions if the following inequality holds:
1
mkA
≥ λ
2
c(uc − gr)4
26(φc1φr)2(τcτrhchr)
,
and λ
2
c(uc−gr)4
26(φc1φr)2(τcτrhchr)
equals the number of retailers in equilibrium in the sym-
metric case, that is, kS. Recall that kS is greater than or equal to one. Hence,
the above condition implies that the number of retailer is at least one and each
retailer’s profit is always non-negative because the retailer’s profit increases as
its market share increases (see the proof of Proposition 3.3.3).
3.3.3 First Stage
The central policymaker decides the fractions of carbon emission cost
recovery (αc, αr) to maximize social welfare. For notational convenience, let
φc2 :=
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0 (1+t
2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4. Proposition 3.3.4 shows the opti-
mal carbon recovery rate to maximize social welfare.
Proposition 3.3.4. In the monopoly case and the case of monopolistic com-
petition with asymmetric market share, if (vr + prfr) >
3φc1
(8φc2−4φc1)efrcr and
(vc + pcfc) >
3φc2
(8φc1−4φc2)efccc, then the optimal carbon recovery rate from con-
sumers is less than or equal to one, while that from the retailer(s) is one,
i.e., (αMc = α
A
c ≤ 1, αMr = αAr = 1). In the case of monopolistic competi-
tion with symmetric market share, both the optimal carbon recovery rates from
consumers and retailers are one, i.e., αSc = α
S
r = 1.
The optimal carbon recovery rate from retailers is one for each case.
In the monopoly case and the case of monopolistic competition with asym-
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metric market share, by fully charging the carbon emission recovery rates to
consumers (i.e., αc = 1), carbon emissions might decrease and thus social
welfare increases. However, by charging only a fraction of carbon emission
recovery rates to consumers, the consumer’s transportation cost and the num-
ber of retail stores decrease. This makes social welfare increase because of less
frequent travel by customers and less transportation by retailers. Notice that
the carbon recovery rates in the monopoly and the asymmetric cases are the
same because, in the asymmetric case, retailers act as if they are monopolists
since the profits are positive with the fixed fraction of market share. In the
numerical experiments replicating realistic parameters, more often than not
the central policymaker stops short of the boundary value of one and decides
to partially recover the carbon cost for maximizing welfare. Differently, in
the case of monopolistic competition with symmetric market share, consumers
pay fully when they emit carbon. The market is competitive, so the poli-
cymaker does not need to charge only a fraction of carbon emission cost to
customers any more. Analytically, the consumers’ total utility is independent
of the transportation costs, τc and τr, because the consumers’ total holding and
transportation costs (i.e., sum of
√
2λcτcd
j,i
c hc for all j and i) as well as the op-
timal selling price pS are independent of τc and τr. Hence, with each retailer’s
zero profit, social welfare can be maximized by reducing the carbon cost as
much as possible, and it is achieved by increasing the carbon recovery rate up
to the upper bound, i.e., αSc = 1. Note that the conditions in the Proposition
3.3.4, i.e., (vr + prfr) >
3φc1
(8φc2−4φc1)efrcr and (vc + pcfc) >
3φc2
(8φc1−4φc2)efccc, are
sufficient conditions that social welfare is jointly concave in αc and αr in the
monopoly and asymmetric cases. We note that these conditions hold when
the carbon cost is between $0 and $0.6 per metric ton of kgCO2 (i.e., between
$0 and $600 per metric ton of CO2) under our parameter values (see Table 3.1
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in §3.4). In our numerical study, even if the carbon cost is greater than $0.6
per metric ton of kgCO2, the uniqueness of the solution is still obtained.
3.4 Carbon Penalty
In this section, we simulate how social welfare and carbon emissions
change by imposing the carbon cost. To examine the changes, we use the
carbon penalty concept. The carbon penalty is the decrease in social welfare
or increase in carbon emissions that occurs due to not fully charging the true
cost of emissions. In other words, the penalty measures the negative effect
by not charging the optimal carbon cost. We define the two following carbon
penalties:
Social Welfare Penalty (SWP) := {SW (αlc, αlr)− SW (0, 0)}/SW (αlc, αlr)
Total Emission Penalty (TEP) := {TE(0, 0)− TE(αlc, αlr)}/TE(αlc, αlr)
where l ∈ {M,S,A} and TE(αc, αr) denotes the amount of total carbon
emissions when the carbon recovery rates from consumers and retailers are αc
and αr, respectively.
For the parameters that are defined in Cachon (2013), we use the same
values as those in Cachon (2013). We set the additional parameter values
for our numerical study when the values are not set in Cachon (2013), i.e.,
a, uc, λc, gr, hc, and hr. Table 3.1 shows the parameter values that are
used in our numerical study. We remark on four things: First, according to
Census Bureau (2008), the average annual food expenditure by a household in
2008 was $6,443, and adjusting for inflation of 2.5%, the average weekly food
expenditure by household, i.e., demand rate per customer in 2012, is estimated
as $136.77 per week, i.e., λc = 136.77. Second, although we let the market
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size be 300, the penalties are constant regardless of the market size because
social welfare and emissions are linearly proportional to the market size. That
is, when we calculate the penalties, the market size is canceled out. Third, it
is hard to estimate parameter values for the following four factors: 1) gross
utility per unit of consumption; 2) unit procurement cost to retailers; 3) unit
holding costs to retailers; 4) unit holding costs to consumers. As a default, we
choose those parameter values as shown in Table 3.1. However, even if we use
other parameter values for the four factors, the main result remains the same.
Fourth, we assume the Voronoi diagram generated by the retail stores consists
of hexagons, i.e., s = 6. Note that even if we change s to s = 3 (triangle) or
s = 4 (square), the main results remain the same.
Table 3.1: Parameters
Parameter Description (unit) Estimate
a market area 300
uc consumer utility per unit of consumption ($ per unit) 0.3
λc consumer’s demand rate ($ per week) 136.77
gr retailer’s per unit procurement cost ($ per unit) 0.25
(hc, hr) unit holding cost ($ per unit per week) (0.04, 0.06)
(vc, vr) non-fuel variable cost per unit of distance ($ per km) (0.0804, 0.484)
(fc, fr) the amount of fuel consumption per unit of distance (lper km) (0.111, 0.392)
(pc, pr) per unit of fuel cost ($ per l) (0.98, 1.05)
(cc, cr) the amount of carbon emission per unit of fuel (kgCO2 per l) (2.325, 2.669)
For the numerical study in the case of monopolistic competition with
asymmetric market share, we assume that the market share of the jth largest
retailer equals
mj :=
(
(1− γ)j−1
k
)
(1− (j − k)γ) ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of market share asymmetry. This special
form allows us to vary the analysis from the monopoly case to the case of mo-
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nopolistic competition with symmetric market share by changing γ. When γ
goes to zero, the model converges to the symmetric market share case; whereas,
when γ goes to one, the model converges to the monopoly case. Table 3.2 shows
a few examples of asymmetric market shares with different k and γ. For ex-
ample, if k = 2 and γ = 0.1, then the larger retailer’s market share is 0.55,
and the smaller retailer’s market share is 0.45.
Table 3.2: Asymmetric Market Share
γ = 0.1 γ = 0.5 γ = 0.9
k 2 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 4
m1 0.55 0.40 0.33 0.75 0.67 0.63 0.95 0.93 0.93
m2 0.45 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.06 0.07
m3 N/A 0.27 0.22 N/A 0.08 0.09 N/A 0.00 0.00
m4 N/A N/A 0.18 N/A N/A 0.03 N/A N/A 0.00
We validate whether the mj function is appropriate to reflect the ob-
served data. Table 3.3 shows the market shares of the U.S. major supermarket
chains and the estimated market shares of those chains using the mj function
in each market area. γ is the value that minimizes sum of squared errors.
For example, in the Pacific Coast area, the market share of Walmart is 20%,
and the estimated market share of Walmart is 17% with γ = 0.079. The mj
function works well in most market areas. Notice that we assume Costco,
Kroger, Safeway, Target, and Walmart represent the U.S. supermarket chain
industry. We calculate the sales of each supermarket chain in each area by
multiplying the number of retail stores in each area by the sales per retail
store. The number of retail stores in each area is found in each firm’s annual
report or website. The sales per retail store is estimated by dividing total sales
by the total number of retail stores of each retailer. In addition, we divide the
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U.S. market into ten areas, and each area has similar geographic features1 (AL
2013).
Note that, in the monopolistic competition case, consumers’ choice
among retailers can be explained by the choice model which is widely used
to explain consumer choice behavior among products, e.g., the multinomial
logit model (Honhon et al. 2010). If the choice probabilities are equal, then
we obtain the case of monopolistic competition with symmetric market share.
Otherwise, any distribution is possible to explain consumer choice behavior.
In our study, we use the mj function to explain the asymmetric market share
driven by the unequal probabilities in consumer choice. By changing γ, we
smoothly capture consumer choice behavior from the symmetric case to the
monopoly case, and the function fits well with real data as we observe in Table
3.3.
We simulate how social welfare and total carbon emission change by
imposing the carbon cost. Figures 3.2(a), 3.2(b), and 3.2(c) show the changes
in the social welfare penalty, total emission penalty, and difference of the num-
bers of retailers (i.e., number of retailers without charging carbon cost minus
that with charging optimal carbon cost) as the carbon price increases from zero
to $1,000 per metric ton of CO2. “Monopoly”, “Symmetric”, and “gamma”
1We divide the U.S. market into ten areas, and each area has similar geographic features
(see www.learner.org). In detail, Pacific Coast area includes California, Oregon, Washing-
ton, and Alaska; Mountain area includes Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Idaho, and
Montana; Southwest area includes Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma; Heartland
area includes Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Mis-
souri; Southeast area includes Arkansas, Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Florida; Midwest area includes Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and
Ohio; Appalachian area includes Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and
Tennessee; Mid-Atlantic area includes New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Delaware; New England area includes Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine, Vermont,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut.
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Table 3.3: Asymmetric Market Share Example in Supermarket Chain Industry
a Costco Kroger Safeway Target Walmart
Pacific Coast (AK,
CA, OR, WA)
Market Share 26% 20% 21% 12% 20%
mj(γ = 0.079, k = 5) 26% 20% 23% 14% 17%
Mountain
Market Share 16% 25% 11% 9% 38%
mj(γ = 0.196, k = 5) 18% 26% 12% 8% 36%
Southwest
Market Share 8% 16% 8% 11% 58%
mj(γ = 0.275, k = 5) 10% 26% 6% 16% 42%
Heartland
Market Share 6% 9% 1% 18% 66%
mj(γ = 0.545, k = 5) 3% 9% 1% 24% 64%
Southeast
Market Share 7% 12% N/A 12% 69%
mj(γ = 0.386, k = 4) 6% 27% N/A 13% 54%
Midwest
Market Share 8% 24% 2% 14% 52%
mj(γ = 0.390, k = 5) 6% 26% 3% 13% 51%
Appalachian
Market Share 7% 22% 2% 11% 59%
mj(γ = 0.429, k = 5) 5% 26% 2% 12% 54%
Mid-Atlantic
Market Share 17% N/A 7% 19% 57%
mj(γ = 0.339, k = 4) 15% N/A 7% 28% 50%
New England
Market Share 14% N/A N/A 20% 67%
mj(γ = 0.399, k = 3) 12% N/A N/A 28% 60%
Hawaii
Market Share 47% N/A 21% 5% 27%
mj(γ = 0.359, k = 4) 52% N/A 14% 7% 28%
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represent the cases of monopoly, monopolistic competition with symmetric
market share, and monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share,
respectively. Notice that, in the numerical study, we assume that the number
of retailer in the symmetric case is an integer as that in the asymmetric case.
Table 3.4 shows the detailed numbers in the cases of monopoly, symmetric
market share, and asymmetric market share. In the asymmetric case, we re-
port the penalties when γ equals 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5 because the actual γ seems
to range from 0.1 to 0.5 as we observe in Table 3.3. Note that, the monop-
olist’s profit is less than zero when the carbon price is over about $1,160 per
metric ton of CO2, and, in the case of monopolistic competition with symmet-
ric market share, the number of retailers is one when the carbon price is over
$985 per metric ton of CO2.
(a) Social Welfare Penalty (b) Total Emission Penalty (c) Difference of Numbers of
Retailers
Figure 3.2: Social Welfare Penalty, Total Emission Penalty, and Difference of
Numbers of Retailers
Under monopoly, when the carbon price is very high (i.e., over $600
per metric ton of CO2), then the social welfare penalty is significant (i.e., over
10%). However, under the reasonable range of the carbon price, i.e., between
$20 and $300 per metric ton of CO2, (see, IPCC 2007, Tol 2008, Frank 2012,
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Table 3.4: Social Welfare Penalty (SWP), Total Emission Penalty (TEP), and
Difference of Numbers of Retailers (DNR)
Carbon Price Monopoly γ = 0.5 γ = 0.3
(metric ton of
CO2)
(SWP, TEP, DNR) (SWP, TEP, DNR) (SWP, TEP, DNR)
$100 (0.7%, 1.4%, 0) (1.1%, 3.0%, 0) (1.1%, 3.0%, 0) $200
(1.6%, 7.0%, 0) (32.4%, 24.0%, 1) (2.9%, 6.96%, 0)
$300 (3.2%, 12.2%, 0) (39.1%, 30.1%, 1) (6.3%, 12.2%, 0)
$500 (9.3%, 22.1%, 0) (58.4%, 41.6%, 1) (64.4%, 44.0%, 1)
$1, 000 (63.3%, 43.8%, 0) (193.1%, 66.7%, 1) (208.9%, 69.5%, 1)
Carbon Price γ = 0.1 Symmetric
(metric ton of
CO2)
(SWP, TEP, DNR) (SWP, TEP, DNR)
$100 (1.8%, 3.0%, 0) (45.4%, 8.87%, 1)
$200 (5.3%, 7.0%, 0) (92.6%, 21.5%, 2)
$300 (54.6%, 24.0%, 1) (148.2%, 27.5%, 2)
$500 (113.1%, 34.9%, 1) (242.4%, 53.5%, 3)
$1, 000 (317.9%, 88.8%, 2) (466.3%, 115.0%, 4)
and John and Hope 2012), the social welfare penalty is negligible (i.e., less
than 3.2%) although the total emissions penalty is significant when the car-
bon price is $300 per metric ton of CO2 (i.e., 12.2%). Notice that the purpose
of charging carbon cost is to increase social welfare. Hence, although charg-
ing carbon costs decreases carbon emissions, the central policymaker does not
need to impose carbon costs. In contrast, in the case of monopolistic competi-
tion with symmetric market share, the two penalties are significant under the
reasonable range of the carbon price, e.g., the social welfare and total carbon
emission penalties are about 148.2% and 27.5%, respectively when the carbon
price is $300 per metric ton of CO2. Notice that the social welfare penalty
could be greater than 100% if social welfare is less than zero because of the
carbon emission cost which is not recovered. In the case of monopolistic com-
petition with asymmetric market share, the penalties are in-between the cases
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of monopoly and monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share.
The penalties in the asymmetric market share case are affected by the two
factors, i.e., as either the difference of the numbers of retailers increases or γ
decreases, the penalties become significant. For example, when the difference
of the number of retailers is zero, the social welfare penalties are less than
about 5%; whereas when the difference of the number of retailers is greater
than or equal to one, the social welfare penalties are more than about 30%
when carbon price exceeds $300. In addition, when the carbon price is $500
per metric ton of CO2, the social welfare penalty increases as γ decreases al-
though the difference of the number of retailers are the same. Notice that the
total emission penalty also shows the similar pattern. Overall, by imposing
the optimal carbon recover rates, we can not only increase social welfare but
also reduce carbon emissions when market competition is high.
One may suspect that the significant carbon penalty in the symmetric
case might come from our industry specific parameter values, e.g., demand
rate or holding cost. Proposition 3.4.1, however, rules out such possibilities.
Proposition 3.4.1. In monopolistic competition with symmetric market share,
(i) the social welfare penalty is e
2
(
1−φc2
φc1
) (φc2
φc1
fcccτc(0)
−1 + frcrτr(0)−1
)
; (ii) the
total emission penalty is(
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(0)−1+frcrτr(0)−1
)
−
(
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(1)−1+frcrτr(1)−1
)
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(1)−1+frcrτr(1)−1
. Hence, the social welfare
and total emission penalties are independent of industry specific parameter
values, i.e., a, uc, λc, gr, hc, and hr.
Proposition 3.4.1 shows that the social welfare and total emissions
penalties in the symmetric case are independent of industry specific parame-
ter values. In other words, the two penalties only depend on industry com-
mon factors, e.g., fuel and carbon prices. Notice that in the monopoly and
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asymmetric market share cases, the two penalties are also independent of the
market size a because social welfare and emissions are linearly proportional
to the market size. That is, when we calculate the penalties, the market size
is canceled out. However, the penalties change with respect to other industry
specific parameter values, such as, uc, λc, gr, hc, and hr. In our numerical
study, the two penalties become more significant as either the retailer’s profit
or the consumer’s utility decreases, i.e., uc and λc decrease, and gr, hc and hr
increase. That is, as market competition becomes more intense, the carbon
penalties become more significant. Notice that in Proposition 3.4.1, we assume
the number of retailers is a real number. The values of the carbon penalties
when the number of retailers is a real number are almost the same as those
when the number of retailers is an integer.
3.5 Supply Chain Design and Carbon Cost
In this section, we discuss the impact of carbon cost on supply chain
design, such as total number of retail stores, number of retailers, total carbon
emissions, and social welfare. We assume that the optimal carbon recovery
rates are always imposed upon consumers and retailers. We vary the carbon
emission price from zero to $1,000 per metric ton of CO2. For other parameter
values, we use the values that are used in §3.4 (see Table 3.1). We also use
the mj function which is defined in §3.4 to represent the market share of each
firm in the case of monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share.
In the monopoly case (see Figure 3.3), the increased carbon cost in-
creases the number of retail stores, but the changes are not significant although
carbon emissions and social welfare decrease significantly. Hence, the supply
chain design in monopoly is robust even if the cost of carbon emission is high.
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(a) Total Number of Retail Stores (b) Number of Retailers
(c) Total Carbon Emissions (d) Social Welfare
Figure 3.3: Supply Chain Design and Carbon Cost
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Note that as the carbon price increases, the number of retail stores decreases
and then increases. This happens due to the restriction that recovery rates
are between zero and one. If there is no constraint on the rates, then the
optimal carbon cost recovery rate imposed over customers would become neg-
ative when the carbon cost is very low, and the number of retail stores would
increase as the carbon cost increases.
In the case of monopolistic competition with symmetric market share,
as the carbon price increases, the number of retailers and total carbon emis-
sions decrease significantly. Hence, as the carbon price increases, the supply
chain design changes significantly, i.e., it results in decreased number of com-
petitors, and the reduction of carbon emission is also significant by imposing
the optimal carbon recovery rates. Note that the total number of retail store in
the symmetric case is the same as that in the monopoly case (see Propositions
3.3.1 and 3.3.2).
In the case of monopolistic competition with the asymmetric market
share, when γ is high, the changes to the supply chain are similar to those in
the monopoly case; whereas, when γ is low, the changes to the supply chain
are similar to those in the case of monopolistic competition with symmetric
market share.
We remark upon two things. First, social welfare in the monopoly
case is the greatest and that in the case of monopolistic competition with
symmetric competition is the least. This is because, as the market changes
from monopolistic competition with symmetric competition to monopoly, the
retailer profit increases more than the decrease in consumer utility. Second,
total carbon emission is the least in the monopoly case and the greatest in
the symmetric case. This comes from our assumption that the retailer’s cus-
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tomers are uniformly distributed in the entire market area and the distribution
system of each retailer is independent. Hence, the monopolist’s distribution
system is the most efficient and the emissions in the monopoly case is less than
that in other cases, while the symmetric retailers’ is the least efficient and the
emissions in the symmetric case is more than that in other cases. Notice that
the U.S. nationwide retailers, e.g., Kroger and Walmart, have their own distri-
bution systems (Kroger 2010 and Walmart 2011). Although the assumption
that each retailer has its own distribution system is reasonable, we explain the
effect of relaxing the assumption by using a third-party logistics provider in
§3.6.1.2.
3.6 Comparison with Cachon (2013)
We discuss why our results are different from Cachon (2013) in §3.6.1.
Then, we consider retail space costs in §3.6.2. The main different result from
Cachon (2013) is that imposing carbon cost to consumers and retailers could
make significant changes in the supply chain design. In the monopoly case,
the changes in the number of retail stores and in social welfare are not sig-
nificant although total carbon emissions can be reduced. Since the purpose
of charging carbon costs is to increase social welfare, the central policymaker
does not need to impose carbon costs and thus, charging carbon costs is point-
less from a social welfare perspective which is the same result as in Cachon
(2013). However, in the monopolistic competition case, as the carbon cost in-
creases, the changes in social welfare, carbon emissions, and the supply chain
design are significant. Therefore, we expect that by imposing carbon cost, the
supply chain design will change, and the impact of the change becomes more
significant when the market is more competitive.
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3.6.1 Comparing the Two Penalties: Social Welfare and Total Costs
Penalties
In this subsection, we explain why the two problems (i.e., maximizing
social welfare and minimizing total costs) yield different results by comparing
two penalties (i.e., social welfare penalty for this study and total costs penalty
for Cachon 2013). We recall and define the two penalties as follows:
Social Welfare Penalty := {SW (αlc, αlr) − SW (0, 0)}/ SW (αlc, αlr)
Total Costs Penalty := {TC(0, 0)− TC(αlc, αlr)}/TC(αlc, αlr)
where l ∈ {M,S,A} and TC(αc, αr) denotes the total costs when the carbon
recovery rates from consumers and retailers are αc and αr, respectively.
3.6.1.1 Different Denominators and Competition.
The two main reasons of the difference are different denominators in
the two penalties and considering competition. Recall that social welfare is
“retailers’ total profit + customers’ net utility − carbon cost that is not recov-
ered from the consumers and retailers”. In addition, retailers’ total profit is
“revenue − procurement cost − distribution cost”, and customers’ net utility
is “gross utility − procurement cost − travel cost”. Since retailer’s revenue
is the same as customers’ procurement cost and every customer is always cov-
ered by retailers, retailers’ procurement cost and consumers’ gross utility are
constant. Hence, social welfare can be re-written as “social welfare = constant
term − cost term” where “constant term” equals to “customers’ gross utility
− retailers’ procurement cost” and “cost term” equals to “retailers’ distribu-
tion cost + consumers’ travel cost + carbon cost that is not recovered from
the consumers and retailers”. Therefore, the numerator in the social welfare
penalty (i.e., social welfare decrease by not charging optimal carbon cost) is
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the same as the numerator in the total costs penalty (i.e., total costs increase
by not charging optimal carbon cost).
However, the denominators in the penalties (i.e., social welfare and
total costs with optimal carbon recovery rates) are different. If a denominator
in one penalty is less than that in the other penalty, then the penalty is
more significant than the other since the numerators in the two penalties are
the same. In the case of monopolistic competition with symmetric market
share, we can analytically show that social welfare is always less than the
total costs and the difference increases as the number of retailers increases. In
the case of symmetric market share with positive profit, we can show that as
the number of retailers increases, social welfare decreases and the total costs
increases. Hence, we can infer that as competition increases, the total costs
will eventually become higher than social welfare, and the difference will also
increase. Moreover, as the carbon costs increase, the total costs will go up but
social welfare will decrease in any case. Therefore, the social welfare penalty
is high under competition.
Notice that when we explain the total costs above, the retailer’s pro-
curement cost is included not in the “cost term” but in the “constant term”
since Cachon (2013) does not consider the retailer’s procurement cost and our
goal in this subsection is comparing the two studies. If we add the retailer’s
procurement cost to the “cost term”, then the total costs penalty should be
much lower.
3.6.1.2 Independent Distribution Systems.
In §3.6.1.1, we explain that the social welfare penalty becomes signifi-
cant as the number of retailers increases since the denominator of the penalty
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(i.e., social welfare) decreases as the number of retailer increases. Social wel-
fare in the monopolistic competition case is less than that in the monopoly
case because we assume that each retailer owns and operates its own distribu-
tion system to support retail stores which are located all over the market area.
Hence, the retailer’s supply chain system in the competition case becomes less
efficient than that in the monopoly case. The above assumption reflects the
practice in the real world, e.g., major supermarket chains (at least the top
five chains) are located all over the U.S. (see Table 3.3) and they have their
own distribution systems (from the supermarket chains’ annual reports). We
checked how the carbon penalty changes if retailers use a third-party logistics
(3PL) company to distribute their products. We can show that if the retailers
are symmetric and use a common 3PL company to distribute their products,
then the total number of retail stores and the selling price become the same
as those in the monopoly case. That is, the retailers act as if they are mo-
nopolists. Hence, the carbon penalty becomes the same as the monopoly case
even if there are multiple retailers. This result implies that using the 3PL
company’s distribution system could be an alternative option to reduce car-
bon emissions rather than imposing carbon costs although it might be hard to
implement.
In summary, the social welfare penalty is more significant than the
total costs penalty due to the different denominators in the two penalties
under the two assumptions that competition is high and each retailer has its
own distribution system to support retail stores which are located all over
the market area. Since the two assumptions fit the current retail industry
situations well, if we impose the carbon price, then we can not only increase
social welfare but also decrease carbon emissions.
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3.6.2 Extension: Retail Space Costs
Now we additionally consider retail space costs. Similar to the trans-
portation costs, the retail space costs consists of not only those considered
in Cachon (2013) but also the carbon recovery rate. Notice that, in Cachon
(2013), the unit of the space cost is $ per m2 per period, but since in our study,
we use the concept of the unit space cost per period, the unit is changed to $
per period.
The per-unit retail space cost follows:
vs + (ps + αscse)fs,
where vs is the variable cost of the per-unit retail space cost per period ($
per period); ps is per unit energy cost ($ per unit energy); αs is the fraction
of carbon emission cost recovered; cs is the amount of carbon emission per
unit energy usage (kgCO2 per unit energy); e is the carbon cost per unit of
emissions ($ per kgCO2); and fs is the amount of energy necessary to hold a
unit of product per period (energy usage per period). Note that both the retail
space and holding costs are proportional to the inventory levels. Hence, for
notational convenience, we use hˆr(αs) to denote the retail space and holding
costs, i.e., hˆr(αs) := (hr + vs) + (ps + αscse)fs. Similar to the transportation
costs, we use hˆr to denote hˆr(αs) for simplicity.
With the retail space costs, the policymaker’s problem is to maximize
social welfare, SW (αc, αr, αs):
max
αc,αr,αs∈[0,1]
SW (αc, αr, αs).
Consumer i’s problem is the same as before. That is, consumer i’s problem is
as follows:
max
qj,ic
U j,ic (q
j,i
c ) ≡ λc(uc − pj)−
λcτcd
j,i
c
qj,ic
− hcq
j,i
c
2
.
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Since the retail space and holding cost hˆr is linearly proportionally to inventory
level, we formulate retailer j’s problem as one of maximizing his profit rate,
Zj(qjr , n
j, rj, pj):
max
qjr ,nj ,rj
Zj(qjr , n
j, rj, pj) ≡ λjr(pj − gr)−
λjrτrd
j
r
qjr
− hˆrq
j
r
2
subject to
rj =
1
2
(bj)2(tan θ)(2s)nj ≤ a
λjr = r
jmjλc
pj = uc − τc
qj,Fc
2
√
(bj)2 + (bj)2(tan θ)− hcq
j,F
c
2λc
djr = 2b
jnj
We examine how social welfare and carbon emission change by consid-
ering retail space costs. By substituting hˆr for hr in §3.3, the optimal decisions
in the second and third stages with retail space costs can be derived. We set
that the carbon recovery rates equal to one for all cases. Notice that we find
that there exists a unique solution which satisfies the first order conditions
without considering the bounds of the carbon recovery rates (between zero
and one), and the solutions are αc = 1, αr > 1, and αs > 1 in the cases of
monopoly and monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share. We
use the same parameter values as those in Table 3.1. For hˆr, we follow Ca-
chon (2012) by assuming 100 units can be stored per m2, the variable cost is
$1.84/100/52 per week per unit; the energy consumption cost is $0.197/100/52
per week per unit; the amount of carbon emission is 1.087/100/52 kgCO2 per
week per unit. For example, if the carbon price is $200 per metric ton of CO2
and the carbon recovery rate is one, then, the retail space cost is $0.0004 per
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week per unit, and hˆr, i.e., the sum of unit holding cost and space cost to
retailers, is $0.0404 per week per unit .
Figures 3.4(a), 3.4(b), and 3.4(c) show the changes in the social welfare
penalty, the total carbon emission penalty, and the difference of numbers of
retailers, respectively, as the carbon price increases from zero to $500 per
metric ton of CO2 (see Table 3.5 for the detailed numbers). Note that when the
carbon price is over about $585 per metric ton of CO2, the monopolist’s profit
is less than zero and the number of retailer is one in the case of monopolistic
competition with symmetric market share. Similar to Cachon (2013), the
penalties tend to become more significant by considering retail space costs
especially in the asymmetric case. For example, when γ equals to 0.1 and the
carbon price is $300 per metric ton of CO2, by considering retail space costs,
the social welfare and total emissions penalties increase by 15.1% and 10.4%,
respectively although the difference of numbers of retailers are the same (see
Tables 3.4 and 3.5).
(a) Social Welfare Penalty (b) Total Emission Penalty (c) Difference of Numbers of
Retailers
Figure 3.4: Social Welfare, Carbon Emissions Penalties, and Difference of
Numbers of Retailers with Retail Space Costs
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Table 3.5: Social Welfare Penalty (SWP), Total Emission Penalty (TEP) and
Difference of Numbers of Retailers (DNR) with Retail Space Costs
Carbon Price Monopoly γ = 0.5 γ = 0.3
(metric ton of
CO2)
(SWP, TEP, DNR) (SWP, TEP, DNR) (SWP, TEP, DNR)
$100 (0.0%, 4.7%, 0) (0.3%, 4.8%, 0) (41.2%, 23.5%, 1)
$200 (1.5%, 9.1%, 0) (1.5%, 9.1%, 0) (51.8%, 28.7%, 1)
$300 (3.8%, 13.1%, 0) (3.8%, 13.1%, 0) (66.5%, 33.4%, 1)
$500 (14.6%, 20.3%, 0) (14.6%, 20.3%, 0) (119.6%, 41.8%, 1)
Carbon Price γ = 0.1 Symmetric
(metric ton of
CO2)
(SWP, TEP, DNR) (SWP, TEP, DNR)
$100 (0.7%, 4.8%, 0) (51.6%, 16.0%, 1)
$200 (54.4%, 29.7%, 1) (79.4%, 20.8%, 1)
$300 (69.7%, 34.4% , 1) (114.5%, 48.9%, 2)
$500 (125.0%, 42.9%, 1) (200.1%, 58.3%, 2)
3.7 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications of our findings for policy-
making. We have shown that the nature of competition can significantly
change not only the impact of the carbon tax policy but also the optimal
value of the carbon tax. However, the majority of retail industries fall in the
asymmetric market share case. In the asymmetric case, the optimal carbon
tax rate is independent of the degree of competition. Hence, the policy maker
can impose the carbon tax easily. The optimal suggested carbon tax rates
are one for retailers (i.e., fully recover the negative impact caused by retailers’
activities) and less than one for consumers (i.e., partially recover the negative
impact caused by retailers’ activities). We have also shown that imposing the
carbon tax tends to make the industry less competitive. This inefficiency is
caused due to individual retail companies conducting their own logistics op-
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erations. This study focused on the last mile issue, therefore such a result is
to be expected. However, as we discussed in Section 6.1.2, if retailers use a
common 3PL company to distribute their products, then their logistics oper-
ations might become more efficient and competition will be intensified again.
Therefore, provision of suitable incentives to 3PL companies might be a pri-
ority policy issue. While we believe our work is useful for practice (especially
for policy-making), we hope more studies can enrich this line of research. For
instance, the following limitations in our analysis can be relaxed and the re-
sulting configurations studied: the simplified spatial model to represent the
location of retail stores, the exogenous retailer choice by consumers, and the
limited players in supply chain (i.e., the last-mile supply chain).
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Chapter 4
Exchange Rate and Global Supply Chain
Design: Long-term and Short-term Strategies
4.1 Introduction
Globalization has transformed many companies into Multi-national Cor-
porations (MNCs), with either their supply bases and manufacturing functions
located in the overseas countries or their markets covering multi-continents.
To manage global supply chains, as a long-term strategy, the MNCs invest to
other countries and the amount of the investment is enormous. For example,
according to BEA (2013), in 2011, the MNCs based in the U.S. invested $4,156
billion overseas countries (28% of the U.S. GDP) and the MNCs based in coun-
tries outside of the U.S. invested $2,548 billion (17% of the U.S. GDP) in the
U.S. Hence, understanding how firms invest outside their home countries is im-
portant not only to firms who are planning to invest to overseas countries but
also to governments who want to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). We
specifically focus on the FDI of export-oriented countries with small domestic
markets, e.g., Korea1 and Taiwan. In addition, as a short-term strategy, how
to efficiently manage the operations is an important question for MNCs due
to the increased uncertainties involved in producing in foreign countries, e.g.,
volatile exchange rate and economic instability (see, Dornier et al. 1998).
1According to World Bank Database, the amount of exports of good and services in
Korea is 56% of GDP of Korea.
86
In this study, we investigate both long-term and short-term strategies
of MNCs, i.e., location decision and inventory level decision, respectively. For
the long-term strategy, we consider two types of firms whose headquarters are
located in two different countries. The firms produce an identical product,
and compete with each other by selling the product in the same market. The
market is located in one of the two countries, and the firms want to maximize
their own profits in the currencies of countries where their headquarters are
located. We analytically show that the relationship between the economic
growth of a country where the market is located and the currency of the
other country is a critical factor to decide the firms’ locations especially when
the uncertainty in the future economic growth is high. That is, we find that
when economic growth and strength of the currency are positively (negatively)
related, we find that the reason a firm whose home country without a selling
market invests more in another country is because the sunk cost (labor cost) in
the foreign country decreases. On the other hand, a firm whose home country
with a selling market invests more to another country is because the labor cost
(sunk cost) in the foreign country decreases. Then, we validate our analytical
findings using the data obtained from the Export-Import Bank of Korea and
the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. The dataset includes outward
FDI and inward FDI of Korea between 2002 and 2011.
For the short-term strategy, we study a manufacturer’s inventory level
decision when the plant and the market are located in two different countries.
We show that manufacturers increase the inventory levels as the exchange rate
of the country where the plant is located grows weaker. We confirm this result
by testing using the plant-level data of Korean multinational corporations pro-
vided by the Export-Import Bank of Korea. The dataset provides information
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on individual plants between 2002 and 2010 established by firms that are listed
on the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE).
Hence, the contribution of our study is three fold. First, we analyti-
cally discuss the location decision as well as the inventory decision from the
perspective of the MNCs whose home country is an export-oriented country,
such as Korea and Taiwan. Second, we empirically validate our analytical
findings using the unique data set obtained from the Export-Import Bank of
Korea and the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. Third, we provide
several interesting managerial insights. That is, the export-oriented country
can increases inward FDI by adjusting its labor policies, such as enabling flex-
ible labor force. On the other hand, a country who has big market (e.g., the
U.S. and China) can increase inward FDI by reducing costs related to the sunk
cost, such as lowering investment barriers. In addition, by adjusting inventory
level depending on the exchange rate, firms can reduce costs.
Besides us, the global supply chain design problem has been explored
by others in the literature. Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994), analytically, study
the option value of switching a production base from one country to the other
country. The value depends on the real exchange rate. Notice that Kogut and
Kulatilaka (1994)’s study is similar to ours, but they do not consider compe-
tition. Kazaz et al. (2005) consider the production and allocation problems
when a manufacturer serves two markets in foreign countries. The production
decision (i.e., total production quantity for the two markets) is made before
exchange rates of the foreign countries are realized, but the allocation decision
can be made after the exchange rates are realized. They show that the degree
of correlation between the exchange rates affects the production decision. We
note that Kazaz et al. (2005) consider nominal exchange rates, but we consider
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real exchange rates.
In addition to the analytical studies, there are several papers which
empirically analyze the multinational firms’ location decision. Campa and
Guillen (1999) study the degree of internalization of exports (e.g., an alliance
with a foreign partner and an exporter’s own distribution) using a survey
data set from manufacturing exporting firms in a middle-income country (i.e.,
Spain). They consider the ownership factor (e.g., the level of firm’s intangible
asset) and the location factors (e.g., the competitor’s home country), and
show that the location factors are independent of the degree of internalization.
Chung and Alcacer (2002) study whether the R&D intensity attracts the FDI,
use the data of the inward FDI transactions by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. They show that companies in
research-intensive industries (e.g., pharmaceutical industry) are more willing
to invest to regions with higher R&D intensity. Nachum et al. (2008) define
three types of proximity measures, i.e., knowledge, markets, and resources, and
test whether the proximity to other countries affects location decision of MNCs.
Using a data set of U.S. MLCs’ investments to foreign countries, the authors
show that the effect of proximity to location decision is positive. Notice that
our study is different from others since we consider the relationship between
the economic uncertainty and the location decision as well as the relationship
between the exchange rate and the inventory level.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. §4.2 and §4.3
analyze the long-term and short-term strategies, respectively. We conclude in
§4.4.
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4.2 Long-term Strategy
In this section, we investigate a MNC’s long-term strategy, i.e., location
decision. §4.2.1 describes the model setting and §4.2.2 explains four possible
equilibriums between two types of MNCs. We provide the analytical results
in §4.2.3 and empirically validate the findings in §4.2.4.
4.2.1 Model Setting
We consider two types of manufacturers who produce an identical prod-
uct, and call manufacturers U and K. The headquarters of manufacturers U
and K are located in countries U and K, respectively. The two manufacturers
produce an identical product, and they sell in a market in country U , i.e.,
there is only one market. Each manufacturer wants to maximize its own profit
in the currency of the country where its headquarter is located.
Exchange Rate. We let Xt be the nominal exchange rate between two cur-
rencies in period t. Xt denotes the amount of money in the currency of country
K per unit of money in the currency of country U . That is, an increase of
Xt means the currency of country K becomes weaker than the currency of
country U .
Demand and Exchange Rate Processes. The evolutions of demand and
exchange rate are related to the economic growth of country U . Given demand
in period t− 1, Dt−1, an increase of Dt compared to Dt−1 is positively related
to Gt, i.e., Dt = Dt−1 + βGt and β > 0, where Gt is the economic growth of
country U in period t. Similarly, given Xt−1, an increase of Xt compared to
Xt−1 is Xt = Xt−1 + αGt, but α can be either positive or negative. In period
t − 1, we assume that the economic growth in period t follows the normal
distribution, i.e., Gt ∼ N(µt, σ2t ).
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Selling Price. The selling price of the product in period t, Pt, is repre-
sented by the currency of country U . We assume a linear selling price, i.e.,
Pt = Dt − qUt − qKt , where qUt and qKt denote the production quantities by
manufacturers U and K in period t, respectively. If a manufacturer’s plant
is located in country K, then the manufacturer has to pay a transportation
cost to ship its products from country K to country U . We let τ be the unit
transportation cost from country K to country U .
Unit Production Cost. The unit production cost is the sum of two unit
costs, i.e., the technology related cost and the labor related cost. We assume
the technology related costs depend on the type of the manufacturer; whereas
the labor related costs depend on the location of the manufacturer. In other
words, we let cU and cK be the technology related costs of manufacturers U
and K, respectively, and let wU and wK be the labor related costs of countries
U and K, respectively. The currency units of cU and wU are country U ’s cur-
rency and those of cK and wK are country K’s. The relation between cU and
cK or that between wU and wK cannot be expressed only using the nominal
exchange rate Xt because the labor cost in one country could be much lower
than the other under the same currency unit. Hence, we introduce θT and θW
to adjust the technology difference between the two manufacturers and the
labor cost difference between the two countries, respectively. θT and θW are
defined as follows:
θT := Xt · c
U
cK
and θW := Xt · w
U
wK
.
For example, θT < 1 means the technology related cost of manufacturer U is
lower than that of manufacturer K, and θW > 1 means the labor related cost
of country U is higher than that of country K.
Transportation Cost & Sunk Cost. If a manufacturer’s plant is located in
91
country K, then the manufacturer has to pay the transportation cost to ship
its products from country K to country U . We let τ be the unit transportation
cost from country K to country U in country U ’s currency (which is similar to
Kazaz et al. 2005). In addition, each manufacturer can move from one country
to the other, but moving its plant is not free. We let SU and SK be the sunk
costs to move from country K to country U and country U to country K in
the currencies of countries U and K, respectively. Notice that the sunk cost
is unit independent.
Decisions. Each manufacturer makes two decisions to maximize its own profit
in the currency of a country where its headquarter is located. First, each
manufacturers decides its plant location. Notice that by moving its plants,
the total cost is changed due to the labor and transportation costs. Second,
based on the location decision, manufacturers U and K decide the production
quantities in period t, qUt and q
K
t , respectively.
4.2.2 Four Possible Equilibriums
In this subsection, we first formulate a general case given location deci-
sions, and then show the expected profits depending on the two manufacturers’
location decisions.
Let us formulate a generalized case given location decisions. We let A
and B be the sum of unit production and transportation costs of manufacturer
U and K, respectively. In addition, we let SCU and SCK be the sunk costs
to move plants to countries U and K, respectively. Then, manufacture U ’s
problem in period t given the location decision can be formulated as:
ΠU = max
qUt ,y
U
V Ut (q
U
t , y
U ; qKt , y
K) = E[Pt|Pt−1]qUt − AqUt − SCUyU ,
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where Pt = Dt − qUt − qKt . Similarly, manufacture K’s problem given the
location decision can be formulated as:
ΠK = max
qKt ,y
K
V Kt (q
K
t , y
K ; qUt , y
U) = E[XtPt|Xt−1, Pt−1]qKt −BqKt − SCKyK .
The first derivatives of V Ut and V
K
t with respect to q
U
t and q
K
t , respec-
tively, are
∂V Ut
∂qUt
= E[Dt]− 2qUt − qKt − A
∂V Kt
∂qKt
= E[XtDt]− E[Xt]qUt − 2E[Xt]qKt −B.
Hence, the manufacturers’ optimal production quantities (qU,∗t , q
K,∗
t ) are
qU,∗t =
1
3
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2A+
B
E[Xt]
}
qK,∗t =
1
3
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + A−
2B
E[Xt]
}
,
and the expected selling price given the optimal production quantities is
E[Pt|Pt−1] = 1
3
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] + A+
B
E[Xt]
}
.
Therefore, the expected profits for manufacturers U and K, respectively, are
ΠUt =
(
qU,∗t
)2
− SCU,
ΠKt = E[Xt]
(
qK,∗t
)2
− SCK.
Now, let us investigate profits depending on location decisions. As a
default, each manufacturer’s plant is located in the country where its head-
quarter is located, and we call it Case 1. That is, in Case 1, manufacturers
U and K are located in countries U and K, respectively. Three more possible
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(a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
(c) Case 3. (d) Case 4.
Figure 4.1: Four Possible Cases
cases as well as Case 1 are presented in Figure 4.1, where MU and MK stand
for manufacturers U and K, respectively. For example, in Case 2, the two
manufacturers are located in country U .
The generalized unit costs A and B are affected by the location of
plants. For manufacturer U , if its plant is located in country U , then A is
replaced by cU + wU ; otherwise, A is replaced by cU + wK/Xt + τ . Notice
that wK/Xt is the unit labor related cost by producing in country K in the
currency of country U . Similarly, for manufacturer K, if its plant is located
in country U , then B is replaced by cK + Xtw
U ; otherwise, B is replaced by
cK +wK + τ . Notice that Xtw
U is the unit labor related cost by producing in
country U in the currency of country K.
The generalized sunk costs SCU and SCK are also affected by the
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location of plants. If manufacturer U decides to move its plant to country K,
then SCU is SK/Xt; otherwise, SCU is zero. Similarly, if manufacturer K
decides to move its plant to country U , then SCK is XtS
U ; otherwise, SCK
is zero. Then, we can get each manufacturer’s profit in each case and it is
summarized in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Profits in Each Case
Cases Profits
Case 1. U 1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU ) +
(
cU
θT
+ w
U
θW
+ τ
)}2
Case 1. K
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU )− 2
(
cU
θT
+ w
U
θW
+ τ
)}2
Case 2. U 1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU ) +
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
Case 2. K
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU )− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2 − x0SU
Case 3. U 1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU + w
U
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+ w
U
θW
+ τ
)}2 − SK
x0
Case 3. K
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU + w
U
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+ w
U
θW
+ τ
)}2
Case 4. U 1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU + w
U
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2 − SK
x0
Case 4. K
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU + w
U
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2 − xoSU
4.2.3 Analysis
We investigate an equilibrium of two manufacturers’ location decisions.
The equilibrium depends on the values of various parameters. We consider
four major factors that affect the location decisions. First, the exchange rate
Xt and the economic growth Gt can be positive and negative, and it is rep-
resented by α. In other words, if α is negative, then the currency of country
K becomes stronger as the economic growth of country U increases, and vice
versa. Second, the labor- and transportation-cost differences between the two
countries is also important. If wK/Xt + τ is less than w
U , then production in
country K can reduce cost, ceteris paribus. Third, the sunk cost to build a
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plant in country K, i.e., SK , can be (almost) zero or positive. Notice that as
Xt increases, then S
K goes to zero. Fourth, the sunk cost to build a plant in
country U , i.e., SU , can be negative or positive. Notice a negative SU is due
to the benefit of producing in the local plants, e.g., no export tax, shorter lead
time, etc. Therefore, we need to consider 16 different scenarios.
4.2.3.1 No Uncertainty in Economic Growth.
We first consider an equilibrium when there is no uncertainty in eco-
nomic growth, and the result is summarized in Lemma 4.2.1.
Lemma 4.2.1. Suppose that there is no uncertainty in economic growth. (i)
If wK/Xt + τ < w
U , SU ≥ 0, and SK = 0, then both manufacturers U and
K produce in country K, i.e., Case 3. (ii) If wK/Xt + τ ≥ wU and SU < 0,
then both manufacturers U and K produce in country U , i.e., Case 2. (iii) In
other scenarios, the equilibrium depends on the parameter values.
Intuitively, if the labor cost in country U is greater than the sum of
labor cost in country K and transportation cost from country K to country
U as well as the sunk cost to build a plant in country U is positive, then both
manufacturers want to produce in country K. Similarly, if the labor cost in
country U is less than the sum of labor cost in country K and transportation
cost from country K to country U as well as the sunk costs to build a plant in
countries U and K are negative and zero, respectively, then both manufactur-
ers want to produce in country U . In other words, manufacturers produce in a
country where the labor cost is low enough to compensate the transportation
cost and the sunk cost is low.
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4.2.3.2 High Uncertainty in Economic Growth.
Now let us consider an equilibrium when the uncertainty in economic
growth is high. For notational convenience, let
σ2U := −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
·
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 4(D0 + βµt)

−(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
·
[
+2
(
2cU − c
U
θT
+ max
{
wU ,
wU
θW
+ τ
})]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
,
and
σ2K := −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
−max
{
wU ,
wU
θW
+ τ
})}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Propositions 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 show equilibriums when α < 0 and α ≥ 0,
respectively.
Proposition 4.2.2. Suppose that σ2t ≥ max{σ2U , σ2K} and α is negative. (i)
If wK/Xt + τ < w
U and SU ≥ 0, then both manufacturers U and K produce
in country K, i.e., Case 3. (ii) If wK/Xt + τ < w
U and SU < 0, then
manufacturers U and K produce in countries K and U , respectively, i.e., Case
4. (iii) If wK/Xt+τ ≥ wU and SU ≥ 0, then manufacturers U and K produce
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in countries U and K, respectively, i.e., Case 1. (iv) If wK/Xt + τ ≥ wU and
SU < 0, then both manufacturers U and K produce in country U , i.e., Case 2.
Proposition 4.2.3. Suppose that σ2t ≥ max{σ2U , σ2K} and α is positive. (i)
If wK/Xt + τ < w
U and SK > 0, then manufacturers U and K produce in
countries U and K, respectively, i.e., Case 1. (ii) If wK/Xt+τ < w
U , SK = 0
and SU < 0, then both manufacturers U and K produce in country K, i.e.,
Case 3. (iii) If wK/Xt + τ ≥ wU , then both manufacturers U and K produce
in country U , i.e., Case 2.
Propositions 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 are summarized in Table 4.2. Notice that
a number in parenthesis in Table 4.2 represents each scenario. First, the
equilibriums in scenarios (1), (2), (11), (12), (15), and (16) are explained
below Lemma 4.2.1. That is, whether the uncertainty in the economic growth
is high or not, the equilibriums remain the same in those scenarios.
Second, let us compare scenarios (5) and (6). In these scenarios, the
labor cost in country K is low enough to compensate the transportation cost
and the sunk cost in country U is positive. Hence, manufacturer K does not
need to move its plant and the equilibrium is either Case 1 or Case 3. When
the sign of α is negative, the manufacturer U ’s profit increase by moving to
country K increases as the uncertainty in the economic growth increases since
E[XtDt] decreases as the magnitude of the shock increases (see, Table 4.1).
Hence, if α < 0, the equilibrium becomes Case 3. Similarly, the equilibrium
becomes Case 1 if α > 0.
Third, in scenarios (3) and (4), the labor cost in country K is not low
enough to compensate the transportation cost. Hence, manufacturer U does
not need to move its plant and the equilibrium is either Case 1 or Case 2. When
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Table 4.2: Equilibriums With an Economic Shock
wK/Xt + τ < w
U wK/Xt + τ ≥ wU
α < 0 α ≥ 0 α < 0 α ≥ 0
SU ≥ 0 S
K = 0 (1) Case 3 (2) Case 3 (3) Case 1 (4) Case 2
SK > 0 (5) Case 3 (6) Case 1 (7) Case 1 (8) Case 2
SU < 0
SK = 0 (9) Case 4 (10) Case 3 (11) Case 2 (12) Case 2
SK > 0 (13) Case 4 (14) Case 1 (15) Case 2 (16) Case 2
the sign of α is positive, the manufacturer K’s profit increase by moving to
country U increases as the uncertainty in the economic growth increases since
E[XtDt] increases as the magnitude of the shock increases (see, Table 4.1).
Hence, if α > 0, the equilibrium becomes Case 2. Similarly, the equilibrium
becomes Case 1 if if α < 0. We can explain scenarios (7) and (8) in a similar
argument.
Fourth, the labor cost in country K is low enough to compensate the
transportation cost and the sunk cost in country K is negligible in scenarios
(9) and (10). Hence, manufacturer U is willing to move its plant to country K
and the equilibrium is either Case 4 or Case 3. When the sign of α is positive,
the manufacturer K’s profit increase by moving to country U increases since
E[XtDt] increases as the uncertainty in the economic growth increases (see,
Table 4.1). Hence, if α > 0, the equilibrium becomes Case 3. Similarly, the
equilibrium becomes Case 4 if α < 0.
Fifth, let us compare scenarios (13) and (14). In these scenarios, the
labor cost in country K is low enough to compensate the transportation cost.
In addition the sunk cost in country K is not negligible. and the sunk cost in
country U is negative. Hence, when the sign of α is negative, manufacturer
U is willing to move its plant to country K and manufacturer K is willing to
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move its plant to country U . That is the equilibrium is Case 4. Similarly, the
equilibrium becomes Case 1 if α > 0.
4.2.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we characterize the data and variables for empirical
analysis. With these measures, we build hypotheses based on our theoret-
ical framework and provide an empirical specification to test our analytical
findings.
4.2.4.1 Data Description.
To test our analytical findings, we require a data that provide bilat-
eral FDI between countries. However, since obtaining such information is not
available, we use data on outward FDI and inward FDI of Korean firms for the
analysis. The main data source on outward FDI from Korea is obtained from
Overseas Direct Investment Statistics from the Export-Import Bank of Ko-
rea. This data includes the full list of Korean worldwide investment from 2002
to 2011 and the status on foreign investment is disaggregated by three-digit
Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC) industry sectors and by des-
tination countries in a given year. To make it consistent with our theoretical
framework, we aggregate the data within three-digit KSIC manufacturing in-
dustry sectors for each year and measure outward FDI from Korea by using
data on the amount of investment and number of reported plant establish-
ment in destination countries. Hence, we expect that Korean manufacturers
invest more in the foreign country as their investment amount and number of
reported establishment increase in that country.
On the other hand, the main data source on inward FDI to Korea is
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obtained from the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy of Korea. This data
include the full list of worldwide investment into Korea for between 1980 and
2011 and the investment is disaggregated by three-digit KSIC industry sectors
and by the source country in a given year. Consistent with outward FDI, we
aggregate the data within three-digit KSIC manufacturing industry sectors for
the year between 2002 and 2011. We measure inward FDI to Korea by using
the data on the amount of investment arrived in Korea and number of reported
establishments in Korea. Therefore, an increase in the investment amount or
number of new establishment can be interpreted that foreign manufacturers
invest more in Korea.
Our model focuses on the likelihood of firms to invest abroad and its
link to the relationship between the home currency and the economic growth
of a host country (α), sunk costs of FDI – Sj stands for sunk costs associated
with Korean outward FDI in country j while Sk represents sunk costs asso-
ciated with inward FDI to Korea by foreign investors – and the labor costs
between home and foreign countries (wk, wj). For the empirical specification,
we estimate α as a correlation coefficient between the real exchange rate of
Korea currency and the GDP growth of a host country. Hence, we expect neg-
ative α in countries where Korean currency is stronger than the GDP growth
of the country.
To capture the labor costs between home and foreign countries, using
the data on earnings per hour across countries from International Labor Or-
ganization leads to reduced number of observations. Instead, we follow prior
literature that analyze the relationship between country’s labor cost and GDP
per capita by using real GDP per capita as a proxy for labor cost and measure
the labor cost difference between home and foreign countries. In particular,
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we construct real GDP per capita ratio between Korea and host countries
(wk/wj). Thus, we expect an increase in a ratio as higher labor cost incurred
from Korea than from host country.
To capture the sunk cost of FDI, we use two measures for the analysis.
First, following Carr et al. (2001), we measure sunk cost of FDI as investment
barriers or investment costs in host countries and compute a simple average of
nine indices of perceived impedients to foreign investment, which is obtained
from the World Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum. These
indices are calculated on a scale from zero to 100 in which a higher number
implies higher investment costs.2 Second, following the previous results that
show investment costs are more likely to be larger in countries with high polit-
ical risk (see, Campos et al. 1999 and Asiedu 2006), we use data on estimating
the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of pol-
icy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies. This estimate of governance ranges from -2.5 to
2.5 in which a higher number indicates that country is politically stable where
data is obtained from the World Government Indicators from World Bank.
Therefore, we expect a low investment cost or barrier as country is more polit-
ically stable. To represent the difference in sunk costs between countries, we
construct the ratio between Korea and host country for each measure. Thus,
an increase in investment cost ratio or a decrease in political stability ratio
2These indices include restrictions on the ability to acquire control in a domestic company,
limitations on the ability to employ foreign skilled labor, restraints on negotiating joint
ventures, strict controls on hiring and firing practices, market dominance by a small number
of enterprises, an absence of fair administration of justice, difficulties in acquiring local bank
credit, restrictions on access to local and foreign capital markets, and inadequate protection
of intellectual property.
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indicates a lower sunk cost of FDI in foreign countries than Korea.
We also incorporate other control variables that affect firm’s FDI deci-
sion. Previous trade literature examines foreign market size and transportation
costs as determinants of firms choosing between exports and FDI to serve for-
eign markets such that firms are more likely to undertake FDI in countries with
large market size or high transportation costs from home (see, Markusen 1984
and Brainard 1997). Thus, we add country’s market size measured by real
GDP, transportation costs from Korea by computing a ratio of Cost, Insur-
ance, Freight imports into the country to Free on Board imports, and country’s
infrastructure level by computing the simple average of three communication
indices – telephone users, mobile users, and internet users per 100 habitants
– where data are obtained from World Development Indicators 2012 and IMF
Direction of Trade Statistics. Summary statistics of variables are provided in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Descriptive summary statistics
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Investment cost 38.89 24.26 0.86 94.81
Political stability estimate 0.194 1.011 -2.34 1.99
Real GDP per capita (in thou-
sand)
10.01 13.38 0.83 108.11
Real GDP (in billion) 361.61 1267.25 0.07 11744.22
Infrastructure (per 100 people) 40.65 28.1 0.22 115.24
Trade cost 1.07 0.91 0.004 25.99
Investment amount (Outward, in
million)
141.34 500.3 0.56 5945.72
New plants (Outward) 34.22 180.3 0 2298
Investment amount (Inward, mil-
lion)
106.07 380.7 0.89 4717.78
New plants (Inward) 29.7 84.9 0 672
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4.2.4.2 Hypotheses.
The signs of α are negative for all the countries (except for Argentina),
i.e., as the GDPs of foreign countries increase Korean currency becomes stronger.
The reason is that Korean economy is highly dependent on foreign countries,
i.e., the ratio of export to GDP is high. Hence, we only test the analytical
results when α is negative.
Lemma 4.2.1 and Proposition 4.2.2 can be summarized as follows.
When there in no uncertainty in the economic growth (i.e., no economic shock),
the manufacturers invest abroad more as the sunk cost as well as the labor
cost becomes lower. When the uncertainty in the economic growth is very
high (i.e., an economic shock), regardless of the production cost (including the
labor and transportation costs) difference, manufacturer K is more willing to
move its plant to country U as the sunk cost in country U becomes lower than
that in country K. On the other hand, regardless of the sunk cost difference
between two countries, manufacturer U is more willing to move its plant to
country K as the production cost in country K becomes lower than that in
country U . Hence, we can derive the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4.2.4. When there is no economic shock, home (foreign) manu-
facturers invest abroad as foreign (home) countries incur lower sunk costs and
lower labor costs than home (foreign) country.
Hypothesis 4.2.5. When there is an economic shock, home manufacturers’
production location choices are affected by sunk cost differences while foreign
manufacturers’ location choices depend on the labor cost differences.
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Table 4.4: Firm’s Long-term strategy (Outward FDI)
Outward FDI
Pre-crisis (2002-2007)
Investment amount Investment number
Investment cost
0.026∗∗∗ 0.153
(0.009) (0.104)
Political stability
-0.041 −0.192∗∗
(0.037) (0.075)
Real GDP per capita
-0.002 0.052∗
(0.013) (0.028)
Real GDP
0.969∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.134)
Infrastructure
0.027∗∗ 0.012
(0.011) (0.01)
Trade cost
0.967∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.072)
Investment cost*Real GDP per capita
0.0009∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.0003) (0.003)
Political stability*Real GDP per capita
−0.001∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.005)
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1014 1014
R-squared 0.4081 0.6181
Outward FDI
Full sample
Investment amount Investment number
Investment cost
0.241∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.06)
Political stability
−0.197∗∗ -0.159
(0.09) (0.148)
Real GDP per capita
-0.03 -0.024
(0.056) (0.045)
Real GDP
1.19∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.134)
Infrastructure
0.018 0.003
(0.019) (0.006)
Trade cost
0.134∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.183)
Investment cost*2008
0.035∗∗ 0.044
(0.015) (0.122)
Investment cost*2009
0.239∗ 0.213∗∗
(0.133) (0.089)
Political stability*2008
−0.467∗∗∗ -0.094
(0.111) (0.193)
Political stability*2009
−0.179∗∗ −0.458∗∗
(0.085) (0.225)
Real GDP per capita*2008
0.061 -0.019
(0.125) (0.079)
Real GDP per capita*2009
0.201 0.074
(0.134) (0.064)
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1690 1690
R-squared 0.5730 0.7124
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4.2.4.3 Results.
We first estimate Korean firm’s FDI decision as a balanced panel with
country fixed effects for the period 2002 to 2011. All regressions include
industry- and year-fixed effects to control for the possible time trends and for
any unobserved systematic differences across industry sectors. The standard
errors have been corrected for heteroskedasticity at the country level.
The results from estimating Korean outward FDI are presented in Table
4.4. To examine the effects of economic shock and other country characteristics
on outward FDI, we first estimate firm’s decision using data only up to 2007,
which avoids the global financial crisis period between 2008 and 2009, and
present the results in first two columns. We then incorporate global crisis
period by estimating with the full sample period and construct interaction
variables between crisis periods and sunk cost difference variables and report
the results in last two columns. For each specification, we provide the results
from using data on investment amount and new plant establishments as a
dependent variable. Between non-economic shock periods, columns 1 and 2
in Table 4.4 show that firms are likely to invest abroad in countries that
incur relatively lower sunk cost than Korea. In particular, we can see that
firms’ investment amount are positively and significantly affected by country’s
investment barrier differences (0.026), while the number of establishing plants
are negatively and significantly associated with government effectiveness (-
0.192). This indicates that firms are likely to invest abroad as foreign country
has relatively low investment costs or is more politically stable.
The interaction variable between real GDP per capita ratio and invest-
ment barrier ratio indicates that if Korea has relatively high labor costs, firms
are more likely to invest in foreign countries that incur low sunk costs of FDI.
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Alternatively, coefficients on interaction term between political stability ratio
and real GDP per capita ratio are negative and significant, implying that firms
invest more in countries with relatively low labor costs and low sunk costs that
result from high political stability. These results support our first hypothesis
where home manufacturers prefer producing abroad if home incurs high labor
and sunk costs when there is no economic shock. For other covariates, our
results are consistent with prior trade literature that firms tend to invest in
countries with large market size and low transportation costs.
Examining outward FDI using the full sample of period, columns 3 and
4 in Table 4.4 show that firm’s FDI decision is negatively and significantly as-
sociated with foreign country’s sunk costs (positive and significant coefficients
on investment cost ratio, while negative and significant coefficients on political
stability ratio for both dependent variables). Analyzing the effects of economic
shock and cost differences on firm’ s FDI, we first construct binary variable
to capture economic shock. Using the fact that global financial crisis occurred
between 2008 and 2009, binary variables, 2008 and 2009, are equal to 1 if there
was outward FDI in year 2008 and 2009. Interacting crisis variables with al-
ternative measures for sunk cost and labor cost differences between Korea and
foreign countries, coefficients on interaction terms between crisis variable and
real GDP per capita ratio are statistically insignificant implying that firm’s
FDI during the crisis period is not affected by labor cost differences. On the
other hand, interaction terms between investment cost and crisis dummies, and
between political stability and crisis dummies are positively and negatively as-
sociated with outward FDI, respectively. These coefficients indicate that in
crisis periods, firms invest more in foreign countries that incur relatively low
sunk costs, which support our second hypothesis that manufacturers tend to
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produce abroad as foreign country has low sunk costs when there is an eco-
nomic shock.3 For other controls, we still find that country’s market size and
scale of transportation costs are significantly and positively associated with
firm’s FDI decision.
The results from Table 4.4 support our hypothesis by showing that
between the periods without economic shock, the firm’s FDI decision is affected
by the link between sunk cost and labor cost differences across countries. In
particular, we find that in countries with low labor costs, firms are more likely
to produce through FDI as countries incur lower sunk costs. Alternatively,
between periods with economic shock, results show that labor cost differences
are not determinant of firm’s FDI. Instead, firms are affected by sunk cost
differences such that they prefer to invest in countries with low sunk costs
during the economic crisis.
Table 4.5 reports the results from estimating inward FDI to Korea from
other foreign countries with country characteristics by dividing into pre-global
financial crisis periods and full sample of periods involving financial crisis.
All the variables are same as from the previous specification except for their
interpretation. For instance, all the ratio between home and foreign countries
represent the difference between Korea as a host country and foreign country
as an investing (source) country, while other country characteristics such as
real GDP, transportation cost, and infrastructure now capture that of Korea
over the sample period. Analyzing the effects of independent variables on
3We also included interaction variables between year dummy variables and alternative
measures for sunk cost differences. The results shows that except for interaction term
between investment cost and year 2003 from the specification with investment amount as
a dependent variable, all coefficients are statistically insignificant. we do not report these
interaction variables in Table 4 to save space.
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Table 4.5: Firm’s Long-term strategy (Inward FDI)
Inward FDI
Pre-crisis (2002-2007)
Investment amount Investment number
Investment cost
−0.019∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.003)
Political stability
0.462∗∗∗ 0.099∗
(0.137) (0.059)
Real GDP per capita
-0.034 0.024
(0.022) (0.015)
Real GDP
0.779 0.41
(0.544) (0.394)
Infrastructure
0.032∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.009) (0.005)
Trade cost
0.001 0.0056
(0.005) (0.006)
Investment cost*Real GDP per capita
−0.003∗∗∗ −0.0007∗∗
(0.001) (0.0003)
Political stability*Real GDP per capita
0.019∗∗ -0.006
(0.007) (0.004)
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 744 744
R-squared 0.5255 0.4889
Inward FDI
Full sample
Investment amount Investment number
Investment cost
-0.079 −0.018∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.005)
Political stability
-0.138 0.006
(0.137) (0.018)
Real GDP per capita
−0.181∗ 0.024
(0.093) (0.033)
Real GDP
0.647 0.389∗∗
(0.386) (0.132)
Infrastructure
0.021 0.02∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.005)
Trade cost
-0.015 0.098∗
(0.439) (0.055)
Investment cost*2008
0.582 -0.096
(0.375) (0.172)
Investment cost*2009
-0.241 0.364
(0.226) (0.53)
Political stability*2008
-0.248 0.102
(0.499) (0.147)
Political stability*2009
-0.262 0.036
(0.215) (0.026)
Real GDP per capita*2008
−0.464∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗
(0.151) (0.026)
Real GDP per capita*2009
−1.896∗∗ −0.054∗
(0.829) (0.028)
Year Fixed effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1240 1240
R-squared 0.476 0.6354
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Korean inward FDI before the crisis, the results in columns 1 and 2 in Table
4.5 show that foreign countries tend to invest more in Korea as Korea has
relatively low sunk cost. For example, a fall in investment cost ratio between
Korea and source country of 10 percentage points increases source country’s
foreign investment by 0.2%. Consistent with outward FDI case, labor cost
differences do not seem to be a determinant of inward FDI.
Interacting between alternative measures for sunk costs and real GDP
per capita, the coefficients imply that if Korea has relatively higher labor cost,
foreign firms invest more as Korea has an advantage in sunk cost differences
with source country, which supports our first hypothesis on foreign manu-
facturers’ production location choices when there is no economic shock. In
contrast to the previous specification, other variables capturing characteristics
of Korea do not have significant effects on inward FDI. Examining the full
sample of period including global financial crisis, columns 3 and 4 Table 4.5
show that sunk cost differences and labor cost differences by themselves have
insignificant effects on foreign manufacturer’s FDI decision. However, when
differences are interacted with economic shock variables – binary variables that
are equal to 1 if year is 2008 and 2009, respectively – the coefficients on in-
teraction terms between real GDP per capita and crisis dummies are negative
and significant. This indicates that in crisis period, foreign manufacturers are
likely to invest more in Korea as Korea has relatively low labor costs. Al-
ternatively, statistically insignificant coefficients on interaction terms between
alternative measures for sunk cost differences and crisis dummies suggest that
sunk cost differences do not affect foreign manufacturer’s FDI decision in Ko-
rea during economic shock.4 These results also support our second hypothesis
4Consistent with previous results, we add interaction terms between cost difference mea-
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that foreign manufacturers choose production locations on the basis of labor
cost differences between home and host countries when there is an economic
shock.
4.3 Short-term Strategy
In this section, we consider a manufacturer’s short-term strategy, i.e.,
inventory decision with respect to the exchange rate and the transportation
cost.
4.3.1 Model Setting
We consider two types of models, i.e., the economic order quantity
(EOQ) model and the newsvendor model.
4.3.1.1 EOQ Model.
We let DE denote the constant demand rate in the EOQ model. The
unit holding cost is hK in the currency of country K. There are two types of
transportation costs, i.e., the transportation cost in country K (e.g., shipping
cost from a plant to a port in country K) and that in country U (e.g., shipping
cost from a port to a customer in country U). We denote the transportation
costs per shipment in countries U and K by tU and tK in the currency of coun-
tries U and K, respectively. Notice that considering per unit transportation
cost does not change the decision because of the constant demand rate. We
sures and year dummies. The estimates show that sunk cost differences have significant
effects on firm’s FDI decision between 2004 and 2006, and after 2010, while labor cost dif-
ferences are not significant in pre- and post-crisis periods. We do not report coefficients on
other interaction terms in Table 5 to save space.
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let qE,U and qE,K denote the quantities per shipment in the plants of manu-
facturers U and K, respectively. Then, manufacture U ’s cost is:(
hK/X
2
)
qE,U +
DE(tU + tK/X)
qE,U
.
where h
K/X
2
is the average holding cost and DE/qU is the number of shipments.
Similarly, manufacture K’s cost is:(
hK
2
)
qE,K +
DE(tUX + tK)
qE,K
.
4.3.1.2 Newsvendor Model.
In the newsvendor model, demand D is random. We let G(·) denote
the cumulative distribution of D. We let p and c denote the unit selling price
in the currency of country U and the unit production cost in the currency of
country K, respectively. Similar to the EOQ model, there are two types of
transportation costs, i.e., the transportation cost in country K and that in
country U . We denote the per unit transportation costs in countries U and K
by τU and τK in the currency of countries U and K, respectively. Notice that
considering the transportation cost per shipment does not change the decision
because of the one-time selling opportunity. In addition, for simplicity, we do
not consider the salvage value and the shortage cost. We let qN,U and qN,K
denote the quantities per shipment in the plants of manufacturers U and K,
respectively. Then, manufacture U ’s expected cost is:(
c/X + τU + τK/X
)
qN,U − pE[min{D, qN,U}].
Similarly, manufacture K’s expected cost is:(
c+XτU + τK
)
qN,K −XpE[min{D, qN,K}].
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4.3.2 Analysis
Proposition 4.3.1 shows the relationship between the exchange rate and
the inventory level.
Proposition 4.3.1. From the EOQ and the newsvendor model, both the in-
ventory levels of manufacturers U and K increases as the the exchange rate
increases. That is, qU and qK increase as X increases.
In the EOQ model, when manufacturer U produces in country K, as
the currency of country K becomes weaker, the transportation cost in country
U becomes relatively expensive because both the holding cost and the trans-
portation cost in countryK decreases and the transportation cost in country K
remains the same. Hence, manufacturer U increase the quantity per shipment
as the currency of country K becomes weaker, and it increases the inventory
level of manufacturer U . Similarly, when manufacturer K produces in country
K, as the currency of country K becomes weaker, the transportation cost in
country U becomes expensive while the holding cost and the transportation
cost in country K remain the same. Hence, manufacturer K also increases the
quantity per shipment as the currency of country K becomes weaker, and it
increases the inventory level of manufacturer K.
In the newsvendor model, when manufacturer U produces in country
K, as the currency of country K becomes weaker, the unit underage cost (i.e.,
p− (c/X + τU + τK/X)) increases and the sum of unit overage and underage
costs (i.e., p) remain the same. Hence, manufacturer U produce more as the
currency of country K becomes weaker, and it increases the inventory level
of manufacturer U . Similarly, when manufacturer K produces in country
K, as the currency of country K becomes weaker, the relative unit underage
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cost increases and the relative sum of unit overage and underage costs (i.e., p)
remain the same. Hence, manufacturer K also produce more as the currency of
countryK becomes weaker, and it increases the inventory level of manufacturer
K. More intuitively, as the currency of country K becomes weaker, the relative
unit underage cost increases while the relative unit overage cost decreases.
Hence, the inventory level increases as the currency of country K becomes
weaker.
Proposition 4.3.2 shows the relationship between the transportation
cost and the inventory level.
Proposition 4.3.2. From the EOQ model, as the transportation cost per ship-
ment increases, the inventory level increases. From the newsvendor model, as
the transportation cost per unit decreases, the inventory level increases.
Intuitively, in the EOQ model, as the transportation cost per shipment
increases, manufacturers increase the amount of shipment to reduce the to-
tal cost. Hence, the average inventory levels increase as the transportation
cost per shipment increases. In the newsvendor model, an increase of the
transportation cost per unit increases the unit overage cost and decreases unit
underage cost. Hence, the inventory level increases as the transportation cost
per unit decreases.
4.3.3 Empirical Analysis
4.3.3.1 Data Description
In order to test our hypothesis for short-term strategy, we use plant-
level data of Korean multinational firms obtained from the Export-Import
Bank of Korea. This panel dataset provides information on individual plants
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between 2002 and 2010 established by firms that are listed on the Korean Stock
Exchange (KSE). All plants are in 92 three-digit KSIC equivalent sectors and
located in 169 countries. Our plant-level data are very unique in that they
provide information on each plant, divided by its industry sectors and host
country in a given year. For our interest, in particular, the data not only
provides information on plants’ balance sheets but also on total sales which
is divided into sales made from local market, sales made from exporting back
to Korea, and sales made from exporting to third countries. Furthermore,
the dataset contains information on total imports which is also divided into
imports from host country, from Korea, and from third countries.
To make it consistent with our model, we first use data on Korean for-
eign plants from three-digit KSIC manufacturing industry sectors for the year
between 2002 and 2007.5 Using the information on plant’s distribution of sales
to different markets, we consider plants that are designed to produce in the
host country and export back to home (export-platform FDI). In other words,
foreign manufacturing plants that make sales only from Korea are considered
for the empirical specification. Thus, the final dataset is an unbalanced panel
of around 65 plants per year with a total of 621 observations.
Our analytical findings highlight on the effects of exchange rates and
transportation costs on plants’ inventory changes. First, to test the link be-
tween plants’ inventory levels and the exchange rates of host countries, we
construct a dependent variable, inventory levels by using data on the amount
of inventories a plant has for a given year which is measured in tons. For
5Our hypothesis is on testing the effects of exchange rates on plant’s inventory levels
when there is no economic shock. Hence, our sample period is identical to the pre-crisis
period from the previous empirical specification on testing firm’s long-term strategy.
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independent variables, we construct exchange rates in two measures. First, we
use data on real effective exchange rates, obtained from The Brussels-based
Think Tank (Bruegel) and from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS).
Both real effective exchange rate indices are CPI-based where Bruegel indices
are based on year 2007, while BIS indices are based on year 2010. From the
based year, therefore, we expect national currency is stronger as exchange rate
index decreases. Second, we compute the period average national currency per
Korean won by using data from IMF.
Examining the effects of transportation costs on inventory levels, we use
two alternative measures for transportation costs. We first consider shipment
costs of foreign trade (see, Brainard 1997 and Helpman et al. 2004). These
costs are due to costs of shipping products across borders, such as transport
and insurance. Therefore, we measure transportation cost per shipment as
an ad-valorem measure of freight and insurance, which we compute the ratio
of CIF imports into the Korea from the host country to FOB imports using
data from IMF Direction of Trade and Statistics. On the other hand, we
consider unit costs of foreign trade (see, Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003
and Bergstrand 1985). We interpret these costs from arising due to the phys-
ical barriers across countries that are not restricted by barriers created by
destination-country governments, such as insurance costs or tariffs. Hence, we
measure transportation costs per unit by computing the distance between host
country and Korea where the data is obtained from Centre d’Etudes Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales (i.e., France Institute for Research on
the International Economy).
For other controls, we include variables that represent plant and host
country characteristics. To capture plant characteristics, we add plant size
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measured as total employment in the plant, share of material imports from its
headquarter located in Korea, and its ownership structure measured as equity
share of a plant owned by Korean parent firm. For host country characteristics,
we include country’s real GDP per capita as a proxy for labor costs using data
from World Development Indicators 2012.
4.3.3.2 Hypotheses.
Proposition 4.3.1 shows that regardless of the demand types, both the
inventory levels of manufacturers U and K increase as the the exchange rate
of country K becomes weaker. In addition, Proposition 4.3.2 shows that the
inventory levels of manufacturers U and K increase as the transportation cost
per shipment increases and the transportation cost per unit decreases. Hence,
we derive the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 4.3.3. The inventory level of the plant in the foreign country
increases as the currency of the foreign country becomes weaker.
Hypothesis 4.3.4. The inventory level of the manufacturer’s plant in the
foreign country increases as the transportation cost per shipment increases
and the transportation cost per unit decreases.
4.3.3.3 Results.
Table 4.6 reports the results from estimating the effects of exchange
rates and transportation costs on plants’ inventory changes. Year dummies
and industry sector dummies are included to control for year- and industry-
specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustering for host countries are
presented in the parenthesis to explain the possible correlated shocks that
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Table 4.6: Firm’s short-term strategy
Variables
Inventory levels
(1) (2) (3)
REER (Bruegel)
−0.016∗∗∗
(0.005)
REER (BIS)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.0005)
National currency per won
0.024∗∗
(0.012)
Inventory levelt−1
0.812∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.03) (0.036)
Plant size
0.132∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.043) (0.046)
Share of imports from HQ
−0.159∗∗ -0.011 -0.025
(0.076) (0.077) (0.069)
Ownership structure
−0.005∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.0013) (0.001)
Real GDP per capita
-0.002 −0.065∗ −0.084∗
(0.031) (0.036) (0.046)
CIF/FOB ratio
0.083∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.011) (0.019)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 308 578 483
R-squared 0.8487 0.8084 0.7999
Variables
Inventory levels
(4) (5) (6)
REER (Bruegel)
−0.019∗∗∗
(0.005)
REER (BIS)
−0.003∗∗∗
(0.0005)
National currency per won
0.023∗∗
(0.011)
Inventory levelt−1
0.795∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.027) (0.033)
Plant size
0.152∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.041) (0.044)
Share of imports from HQ
-0.391 -0.01 -0.035
(0.238) (0.079) (0.063)
Ownership structure
−0.004∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.0015) (0.001)
Real GDP per capita
-0.013 −0.098∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.042) (0.043)
Distance
−0.151∗ −0.143∗ −0.134∗∗
(0.088) (0.081) (0.068)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 307 578 483
R-squared 0.8528 0.8093 0.8007
Note: Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote
significance at the 1,5,10 percent, respectively. Time, country and industry dummies are suppressed.
REER stands for real effective change rate.
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could affect all plants in the same host country. We also assume an AR(1)
process in the error-term, which is equivalent to including a lagged dependent
variable but allows for the inclusion of plant-level fixed effects.
The first three columns present the results from using three alterna-
tive measures for exchange rates and a measure for transportation cost per
shipment (CIF/FOB ratio). Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4.6 show that the co-
efficients on the real effective exchange rates are negatively and significantly
associated with plant’s inventory levels. This indicates that inventory levels of
plants in the host country increase as foreign currency becomes weaker, which
supports Hypothesis 4.3.3. For instance, we can see that a fall in real effective
exchange rates of 10 percentage points increases the inventory level by 0.2%
when using data from Bruegel and by 0.02% when using data from BIS. In the
last column, we use foreign currency per Korean Won as a proxy for exchange
rates. Its coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level, implying that
plants are likely to increase inventories as foreign currency becomes weaker
which is also consistent with third hypothesis. Furthermore, all three columns
show positive and significant coefficients on CIF/FOB ratio. These results
indicate that the inventory level of foreign plant increases as transportation
cost per shipment rises, which is consistent with Hypothesis 4.3.4.
The last three columns in Table 4.6 report the results from using same
proxies for exchange rates and a proxy for transportation cost per unit mea-
sured by the distance between host country and Korea. As expected, all
columns show similar coefficients on explanatory variables as from the first
three columns. Exchange rates still have significant effects on plants’ invento-
ries, indicating that plants tend to increase their inventories as foreign currency
becomes weaker. However, the coefficients on the distance are negative and
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significant, indicating that plants decrease their inventories they are more dis-
tant from the destination country, which is Korea in our specification. In other
words, plants are more likely to ship their products to the destination country
as transportation cost per unit measured by physical barriers across countries
decreases, which all support our hypotheses.
Turning to other covariates, it can be seen that plants tend to increase
inventories as they are large in size and contain a large volume of inventories
from the previous period. It is also interesting to find that as Korea parent
firms have small equity share, plants are more likely to increase to inventories
as they are more free to make decisions by themselves or in other words, as
parent firms have less influence over plant manager’s decision due to the weak
ownership over the plant, such as when plants are established through joint-
venture ownership. Furthermore, the coefficients on real GDP per capita are
negative and significant, indicating that plants increase inventories in countries
that incur low labor cost of production.
4.4 Conclusion
In this study, we explore the FDI decision as well as inventory deci-
sion of multi-national corporations when their home country is one of export-
oriented countries with small domestic markets. For the long-term strategy,
when economic growth and strength of the currency are positively (negatively)
related, we find that the reason a firm whose home country without a selling
market invests more to another country is because the sunk cost (labor cost)
in the foreign country decreases. On the other hand, a firm whose home coun-
try with a selling market invests more to another country is because the labor
cost (sunk cost) in the foreign country decreases. We verify these results using
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Foreign Direct Investment Data in Korea from 2002 to 2011. For the short-
term strategy, we consider a manufacturer’s inventory level decision when the
plant and the market are located in two different countries. We show that
manufacturers increase the inventory levels as the exchange rate of the coun-
try where the plant is located grows weaker. We confirm this result by testing
using the plant-level data of Korean multinational corporations provided by
the Export-Import Bank of Korea.
Hence, a country whose economy is heavily dependent on exports (e.g.,
Korea or Taiwan) can increase its inward FDI by adjusting its labor policies,
such as enabling flexible labor force. On the other hand, a country who has big
market (e.g., the U.S. and China) can increase its inward FDI by reducing costs
regarding to the sunk cost, such as lowering investment barriers or investment
costs. In addition, by adjusting inventory level depending on the exchange
rate, firms can increase profit.
While the findings from our work are interesting and useful for practice,
we believe more studies can be conducted along this line of research. For
instance, it is interesting to consider how the free trade agreements among
countries can affect firms’ long-term and short-term strategies.
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.1 Proofs of Chapter 2.
We denote the marginal probability density and cumulative distribution
functions of Dit by gi(·) and Gi(·), and the joint density and cumulative dis-
tribution functions of (Dit, Djt) as gˆ(·) and Gˆ(·). We define BQit(xit, xjt) :=
min{(Dit − xit)+, (xjt − Djt)+} to measure the maximum borrowing quan-
tity for firm i from firm j in period t or, identically, the maximum lending
quantity from firm j to firm i. In addition, we define Pt := (Ft, St, Dit). For
notational convenience, let Mit(xi,t+1,Pt) := βFtxi,t+1 +βEt[Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,Pt+1)]
and MUit (xt+1, Pˆt) := βFtxi,t+1 + βEt[V Ui,t+1(xt+1, Pˆt+1)] where Vit(xit,Pt) and
V Uit (xt, Pˆt) denote the minimum cost of firm i without and with sharing in-
ventory, respectively. Notice that V Uit (xt, Pˆt) represents the generalized cost
function of firm i with sharing inventory (i.e., centralized or decentralized).
We first present Lemmas A1, A2, and A3. Lemma A1 will be used for
the proof of Lemma A2. Lemma A2 will be used for the proofs of Propositions
1 and 2 as well as Lemma A3. To prove Propositions 1 and 2, Lemma A3 will
be also used.
Lemma A1 βEt[Vit(xit,Pt)] is finite for finite (xit,Pt) ∀ t.
Proof of Lemma A1. Suppose (xit,Pt) is finite. Let V¯it(xit,Pt) be the total
expected cost when the entire procurement is done through the spot market;
i.e., V¯iT (xiT ,PT ) = ViT (xiT ,PT ) and
V¯it(xit,Pt) = (St + τb)(Dit − xit)+ + h(xit −Dit)+ + βEt[V¯t+1(xi,t+1,Pt+1)],
∀(xit,Pt) ∈ R4+
where xi,t+1 = (xit −Dit)+. Also, xi,l+1 ≤ xil for l = t, t + 1, ..., T − 1. Then,
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by Assumptions 2 and 3,
V¯it(xit,Pt) =
T∑
l=t
Et[βl−t(Sl + τb)(Dil − xil)+] +
T∑
l=t
Et[βl−th(xil −Dil)+]
≤
T∑
l=t
βl−tEt[SlDil] + τb
T∑
l=t
βl−tEt[Dil] + h
T∑
l=t
βl−txit <∞
Since V¯it(xit,Pt) ≥ Vit(xit,Pt), Vit(xit,Pt) is finite ∀t. So is βEt[Vt(xit,Pt)].
Lemma A2 In each period t, the cost function Vit(x,Pt) is convex in finite
x ∈ R+ for any given finite Pt ∈ R3+. In addition, a unique x∗i,t+1 exists that
minimizes Ftxi,t+1 + Et[Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,Pt)], and the optimal trading actions in
the spot and forward markets follow: (i) a∗it = Dit − xit if Ct ≥ τb + τs, and
a∗it = (Dit − xit)+ otherwise; (ii) u∗it = x∗i,t+1 − (xit −Dit)− a∗it.
Proof of Lemma A2. Using backward induction, we show the convexity
property for the model without sharing inventory.
In the last period T , since βET [Vi,T+1(xi,T+1,PT+1)] = 0 and ViT (xiT ,PT ) =
(ST + τb)(DiT − xiT )+ − (ST − τs)(xiT −DiT )+, βET [Vi,T+1(xi,T+1,PT+1)] and
ViT (xiT ,PT ) are convex in xi,T+1 and xiT , respectively.
Suppose the convexity property holds in periods t + 1, ..., T − 1. Let
xφi,t+1 ≡ φx1i,t+1 + (1 − φ)x2i,t+1 for arbitrary φ ∈ [0, 1] and x1i,t+1, x2i,t+1 ∈ R+.
The convexity of Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,Pt+1) in xi,t+1 implies that
Vi,t+1(x
φ
i,t+1,Pt+1) ≤ φVi,t+1(x1i,t+1,Pt+1) + (1− φ)Vi,t+1(x2i,t+1,Pt+1).
Taking expectations and discounting on both sides of the above inequality,
βEt[Vi,t+1(xφi,t+1,Pt+1)] ≤ φβEt[Vi,t+1(x1i,t+1,Pt+1)] + (1− φ)βEt[Vi,t+1(x2i,t+1,Pt+1)]
124
since βEt[Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,Pt+1)] is finite with finite (xi,t+1,Pt+1) ∈ R4+ by Lemma
A1. Hence, βFtxi,t+1 + βEt[Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,Pt+1)] is convex in finite xi,t+1 ∈ R+
for any given finite Pt ∈ R3+ and there exists a unique solution, x∗i,t+1, that
minimizes βFtxi,t+1 + βEt[Vi,t+1(xi,t+1,Pt+1)].
We show that Vit(xit,Pt) is convex in xit ∈ R+ in three steps. First,
we show x∗i,t+1 is nonnegative; second, we derive the optimal trading actions;
finally, we establish the convexity result.
Step 1. x∗i,t+1 is nonnegative: Let x
′
i,t+1 ∈ R− and we have
Mit(0) = βEt[(St+1 + τb)Di,t+1
+ min
ui,t+1∈R+
[βFt+1ui,t+1 + βEt+1[Vi,,t+2(ui,t+1,Pt+2)]]
Mit(x
′
i,t+1) = βFtx
′
i,t+1 + βEt[(St+1 + τb)(Di,t+1 − x
′
i,t+1)
+ min
ui,t+1∈R+
[βFt+1ui,t+1 + βEt+1[Vi,t+2(ui,t+1,Pt+2)]]
Hence, Mit(0)−Mt(x′i,t+1) = −βFtx′i,t+1+βEt[(St+1+τb)x′i,t+1] = −x′i,t+1(βFt−
βEt[St+1 + τb]). Given Ft = Et[St+1], Mit(0) −Mit(x′i,t+1) ≤ 0, which implies
x∗i,t+1 ≥ 0.
Step 2. the optimal trading actions in period t: When xit < Dit,
vit(ait, uit;xit,Pt) = (St + τb)ait + βFtuit + h(ait + xit−Dit)+. Due to the non-
negative convenience yield property (St+τb+h ≥ βFt), firm i buys sufficient in
the spot market to meet the excess demand and orders in the forward market
to install the optimal order-up-to level for period t+1, x∗i,t+1. Hence, a
∗
it =
−xit + Dit and u∗it = x∗i,t+1 if xit < Dit. When xit ≥ Dit, vit(ait, uit;xit,Pt) =
(St − τs + h)ait + βFtuit + h(xit − Dit). If firm i sells the excess inventory
in the spot market, then the per-unit revenue is St − τs + h and the per-unit
cost is βFt. Hence, if Ct ≥ τb + τs (or identically, St − τs + h ≥ βFt), then
a∗it = −xit+Dit and u∗it = x∗i,t+1; otherwise, a∗it = 0 and u∗it = x∗i,t+1−(xit−Dit).
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Step 3. Vit(xit,Pt) is convex in xit ∈ R+: If Ct ≥ τb + τs, then, by Step 2,
Vit(xit,Pt) = (St + τb)(Dit − xit)+ − (St − τs)(xit −Dit)+
+βFtx
∗
i,t+1 + βEt[Vi,t+1(x∗i,t+1,Pt+1)].
By −(St+ τb) ≤ −(St− τs), (St+ τb)(Dit−x)+− (St− τs)(xit−Dit)+ is convex
in xit. Hence, Vit(xit,Pt) is convex in xit. If Ct < τb + τs, then, by Step 2,
Vit(xit,Pt) = (St + τb)(Dit − xit)+ + (h− βFt)(xit −Dit)+ + βFtx∗i,t+1
+βEt[Vi,t+1(x∗i,t+1,Pt+1)].
By the assumption of nonnegative convenience yield, St + τb + h ≥ βFt; i.e.,
−(St + τb) ≤ (h − βFt), which asserts that Vit(xit,Pt) is convex in xit. Note
that x∗i,t+1 is independent of xit.
Hence, by induction, βEt[Vt+1(xit,Pt+1)] and Vit(xit,Pt) are convex in
finite xit ∈ R+ for any given finite Pt ∈ R3+, ∀t.
Lemma A3 In each period t, given the optimal inventory sharing decisions
and the optimal actions in the spot market, there exists a unique pair of order-
up-to levels, (xUi,t+1, x
U
j,t+1), such that given x
U
j,t+1, x
U
i,t+1 minimizes Ftxi,t+1 +
Et[V
U
i,t+1(xi,t+1, x
U
j,t+1, Pˆt+1)] and given xUi,t+1, xUj,t+1 minimizes
Ftxj,t+1 + Et[V
U
j,t+1(xj,t+1, x
U
i,t+1, Pˆt+1)].
Proof of Lemma A3. We prove this lemma by backward induction.
In period (T − 1), firm i derives xUiT to minimize MUi,T−1(xT , PˆT ). By
Assumption 1,
MUi,T−1(xT , PˆT ) = βFT−1xiT + βET−1[ST + τb]ET−1[(DiT − xiT )+]
−βET−1[ST − τs]ET−1[(xiT −DiT )+].
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Taking the first derivative of MUi,T−1(xT , PˆT ) with respect to xiT yields:
∂MUi,T−1(xT , PˆT )
∂xiT
= βFT−1−βET−1[ST+τb](1−Gi(xiT ))−βET−1[ST−τs]Gi(xiT ).
Hence, given ET−1[ST ] = FT−1, firm i’s optimal order-up-to level for period T
satisfies the following equation:
Gi(x
U
iT ) =
βET−1[ST + τb]− βFT−1
βET−1[τb + τs]
=
τb
τb + τs
.
The analysis for firm j is analogous. Therefore, there exists a unique pair
of order-up-to levels in period (T − 1), (xUiT , xUjT ) = (G−1i ( τbτb+τs ), G
−1
j (
τb
τb+τs
))
where G−1i (·) and G−1j (·) are inverse functions of Gi(·) and Gj(·), respectively.
Suppose a unique pair of order-up-to levels exists in periods t+1, ...T−2;
i.e., (xUi,t+2, x
U
j,t+2),...,(x
U
i,T−1, x
U
j,T−1) exist. We show the existence of a unique
pair of order-up-to levels in period t, (xUi,t+1, x
U
j,t+1) by showing that the two
best-response functions, xUi,t+1(xj,t+1) and x
U
j,t+1(xi,t+1), are monotone and the
absolute value of the slope is less than 1 (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991).
From the optimal actions in Lemma A2, we can derive the expectation
of the immediate cost function for period t+1 in the model of without sharing
inventory as the following:
Et[mi,t+1(xi,t+1)] + Et[βFt+1xUi,t+2]
where
Et[mi,t+1(xi,t+1)] := Et[(St+1 + τb)]Et[(Di,t+1 − xi,t+1)+]
−Et[(βFt+1 − h)I{Ct+1<τb+τs}|Ct]Et[(xi,t+1 −Di,t+1)+]
−Et[(St+1 − τs)I{Ct+1≥τb+τs}|Ct]Et[(xi,t+1 −Di,t+1)+].
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Then, the expectation of the immediate cost function for period t + 1
in the model of with sharing inventory follows
Et[mi,t+1(xi,t+1)] + Et[βFt+1xˆ∗i,t+2]− Et[GBt+1]Et[BQi,t+1(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)]
−Et[GLt+1]Et[BQj,t+1(xj,t+1, xi,t+1)],
where Et[GBt+1] and Et[GLt+1] denote the expected unit cost reduction by
borrowing and lending, respectively. Hence,
MUit (xi,t+1, xj,t+1) = βFtxi,t+1 + βEt[mi,t+1(xi,t+1)] + βEt[MUi,t+1(xUi,t+2, xUj,t+2)]
−βEt[GBt+1]Et[BQi,t+1(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)]
−βEt[GLt+1]Et[BQj,t+1(xj,t+1, xi,t+1)].
The first order condition of MUit (xi,t+1, xj,t+1) with respect to xi,t+1 satisfies
∂MUit (xi,t+1, xj,t+1)
∂xi,t+1
= βFt +
∂βEt[mi,t+1(xi,t+1)]
∂xi,t+1
−βEt[GBt+1]∂Et[BQi,t+1(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)]
∂xi,t+1
−βEt[GLt+1]∂Et[BQj,t+1(xj,t+1, xi,t+1)]
∂xi,t+1
= 0.
Using implicit differentiation, the slope of firm i’s best-response function fol-
lows
∂xUi,t+1(xj,t+1)
∂xj,t+1
= −
∂2MUit (xi,t+1,xj,t+1)
∂xi,t+1∂xj,t+1
∂2MUit (xi,t+1,xj,t+1)
∂2xi,t+1
,
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where
∂2MUit (xi,t+1, xj,t+1)
∂xi,t+1∂xj,t+1
= −βEt[GBt+1]∂
2Et[BQi,t+1(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)]
∂xi,t+1∂xj,t+1
−βEt[GLt+1]∂
2Et[BQj,t+1(xj,t+1, xi,t+1)]
∂xi,t+1∂xj,t+1
,
∂2MUit (xi,t+1, xj,t+1)
∂2xi,t+1
=
∂2βEt[mi,t+1(xi,t+1)]
∂2xi,t+1
−βEt[GBt+1]∂
2Et[BQi,t+1(xi,t+1, xj,t+1)]
∂2xi,t+1
−βEt[GLt+1]∂
2Et[BQj,t+1(xj,t+1, xi,t+1)]
∂2xi,t+1
.
We can show that
∂2MUit (xi,t+1,xj,t+1)
∂xi,t+1∂xj,t+1
≥ 0 and ∂2MUit (xi,t+1,xj,t+1)
∂2xi,t+1
≥ ∂2MUit (xi,t+1,xj,t+1)
∂xi,t+1∂xj,t+1
.
Thus,
∂xUi,t+1(xj,t+1)
∂xj,t+1
is non-positive and the absolute value of
∂xUi,t+1(xj,t+1)
∂xj,t+1
is less
than 1. The same properties for xUj,t+1(xi,t+1) can be shown. Hence, by induc-
tion, there exists a unique pair of order-up-to levels, (xUi,t+1, x
U
j,t+1) ∀t.
Proof of Proposition 1. The optimal inventory sharing actions can be
derived as the following. The cost reduction by borrowing inventory from
the other firm is the cost to buy directly from the spot market, St + τb, less
the total unit cost to borrow and return the inventory, τo + βFt. That is,
Ct − h − τo is the unit cost reduction for the borrowing firm. At the same
time, the cost reduction by lending excess inventory to the other firm is the
gain from lending, h+βFt, less the gain from selling the inventory to the spot
market, St − τs + h, or selling it to the forward market, βFt. Notice that the
gain from the selling inventory to the spot market is greater than that to the
forward market if Ct ≥ τb + τs (i.e., St − τs + h − βFt ≥ 0). Hence, when
Ct ≥ τb + τs, the unit cost reduction for the lending firm is τb + τs + h − Ct;
otherwise, the unit cost reduction is h. Hence, if Ct ≥ τb + τs, then the total
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cost reduction by inventory sharing for the centralized case is τb + τs − τo per
unit; otherwise, the total cost reduction is Ct− τo. Since τb + τs− τo is always
positive by assumption, inventory sharing will arise in the centralized case as
long as Ct ≥ τo.
Hence, Et[ISt+1](= Et[(Ct+1 − τo)I{τo≤Ct+1<τb+τs}|Ct] + Et[(τb + τs −
τo)I{Ct+1≥τb+τs}|Ct]) denotes the expected total cost reduction per unit by in-
ventory sharing. We can show the existence of the unique pair of order-up-
to levels by substituting Et[ISt] into both Et[GBt] and Et[GLt] as well as
V Cit (xit, x
U
jt, Pˆt) into V Uit (xit, xUjt, Pˆt) for all t in Lemma A3. In addition, the
optimal actions in the spot and forward markets are analogous to Lemma A2.
Proof of Proposition 2. As we have explained in Proposition 1, the unit
cost reduction by borrowing is Ct−h−τo. In addition, if Ct ≥ τb+τs, the unit
cost reduction by lending is τb + τs +h−Ct; otherwise, the unit cost reduction
is h. Since h is positive, firms share inventory when h+ τo ≤ Ct ≤ τb + τs + h.
Hence, Et[Bt+1] (= Et[(Ct+1 − h − τo)I{Ct+1∈(h+τo,h+τb+τs)}|Ct]) and Et[Lt+1]
(= Et[hI{Ct+1∈(h+τo,τb+τs)}+(h+τb+τs−Ct+1)I{Ct+1∈(max{h+τo,τb+τs},τb+τs+h)}|Ct])
denote the expected unit cost reductions by borrowing and lending transac-
tions, respectively. We can show the existence of the unique pair of order-up-to
levels can be shown by substituting Et[Bt+1] and Et[Lt+1] into Et[GBt+1] and
Et[GLt+1], respectively, as well as Vˆit(xit, xUjt, Pˆt) into V Uit (xit, xUjt, Pˆt) for all t in
Lemma A3. In addition, the optimal actions in the spot and forward markets
are analogous to Lemma A2.
Proof of Lemma 1. We show Lemma 1 as follows:
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i) Ct ≥ τb + τs
The lending and borrowing firms’ unit cost reductions by sharing inventory
are τb + τs + h − Ct − τk,t and Ct − h − τo + τk,t, respectively. Hence, if
h + τo − Ct ≤ τk,t ≤ τb + τs + h − Ct, then the two firms are willing to share
inventory. Notice that by setting τk,t = −Ct+h+ τb+τs+τo2 , each firms’s sharing
benefit becomes τb+τs−τo
2
.
ii) τo ≤ Ct < τb + τs
The lending and borrowing firms’ unit cost reductions by sharing inventory
are h− τk,t and Ct−h− τo + τk,t, respectively. Hence, if h+ τo−Ct ≤ τk,t ≤ h,
then the two firms are willing to share inventory. Notice that by setting
τk,t = −Ct2 + h+ τo2 , each firms’s sharing benefit becomes Ct−τo2 .
By i) and ii), Lemma 1 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us first analyze the optimal actions without
sharing inventory. Since the leftover inventory is always less than the optimal
order-up-to level, the cost if firms hold leftover inventory is h(xit − Dit)+ +
β(Ft+ τFB)(x
∗
i,t+1− (xit−Dit)+); the cost if firms sell leftover inventory to the
forward market is −β(Ft−τFS)(xit−Dit)+ +β(Ft+τFB)x∗i,t+1; the cost if firms
sell leftover inventory to the spot market is −(St− τS +h)(xit−Dit)+ +β(Ft+
τFB)x
∗
i,t+1. Hence, the cost of selling leftover inventory to the forward market
is always beneficial than holding it because we assume h > β(τFB + τFS).
Moreover, since the cost difference between selling to the forward and spot
markets is {(St−τs+h)−β(Ft−τFS)}(xit−Dit)+ = (CFt −τb−τs)(xit−Dit)+,
firms sell leftover inventory to the spot market if CFt ≥ τb+τs; otherwise, firms
sell it to the forward market.
With the inventory sharing option, the unit cost reduction by bor-
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rowing is (St + τb) − (τo + β(Ft + τFB)) = CFt − h − τo − β(τFB + τFS).
The unit cost reduction by lending is (h + β(Ft + τFB)) − (St + h − τs) =
(τb + τs + h + β(τFB + τFS)) − CFt if CFt ≥ τb + τs; otherwise, the cost re-
duction is (h + β(Ft + τFB)) − β(Ft − τFS) = h + β(τFB + τFS). Hence, in
the case of inter-firm inventory sharing, firms are willing to share inventory if
h+ τo + β(τFB + τFS) ≤ CFt ≤ τb + τs + h+ β(τFB + τFS). In the centralized
inventory sharing case, the unit cost reduction is τb + τs − τo if CFt ≥ τb + τs;
the unit cost reduction is CFt − τo if τo ≤ CFt < τb + τs Hence, the inventory
sharing condition in the centralized case is CFt ≥ τo.
Proof of Lemma 2. The probability that the convenience yield satisfies the
inventory sharing condition during period t+ 1 given Ct is
P [Ct+1 > τo|Ct] = 1− Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
.
The first derivative of the above probability with respect to λ, σδ, τb, τs, and
132
τo are the following:
∂P [Ct+1 > τo|Ct]
∂λ
= φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂λ
= −φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
· (1− e
−κt)
κ
∂P [Ct+1 > τo|Ct]
∂σδ
= φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
τo − µc
σ2c
)
· ∂σc
∂σδ
= φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
τo − µc
σ2c
)
·
√
1− e−2κt
2κ
,
∂P [Ct+1 > τo|Ct]
∂τb
= φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂τb
= φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
,
∂P [Ct+1 > τo|Ct]
∂τs
= φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂τs
= 0,
∂P [Ct+1 > τo|Ct]
∂τo
= −φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
· ∂(τo − µc)
∂τo
= −φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let us denote EPV ISt+1 be the expected per-unit
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value of inventory sharing during period t+ 1 given Ct.
EPV ISt+1 = Et[(Ct+1 − τo)I{τo≤Ct<τb+τs}|Ct]
+Et[(τb + τs − τo)I{Ct≥τb+τs}|Ct]
=
∫ τb+τs
τo
(Ct+1 − τo)dCt+1 +
∫ ∞
τb+τs
(τb + τs − τo)dCt+1
=
∫ τb+τs
τo
Ct+1dCt+1 − τo
∫ τb+τs
τo
dCt+1
+(τb + τs − τo)
∫ ∞
τb+τs
dCt+1
=
∫ τb+τs
τo
Ct+1dCt+1
−τo
{
Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
− Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)}
+(τb + τs − τo)
(
1− Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
))
=
∫ τb+τs
0
Ct+1dCt+1 −
∫ τo
0
Ct+1dCt+1
−τo
{
Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
− Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)}
+(τb + τs − τo)
(
1− Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
))
.
Since Ct is non-negative ∀ t,∫ τb+τs
0
Ct+1dCt+1 =
∫ τb+τs
−∞
Ct+1dCt+1.
In addition, by letting ut+1 = (Ct+1 − µc)/σc,∫ τb+τs
0
Ct+1dCt+1 =
∫ τb+τs
∞
Ct+1 · 1
σc
√
2pi
e
− (Ct+1−µc)
2
2σ2c dct+1
=
∫ τb+τs−µ
σ
−∞
(σcut+1 + µc)
1√
2pi
e−
u2t+1
2 dut+1
= − σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
2
+ µcΦ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
.
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Similarly, ∫ τo
0
Ct+1dCt+1 = − σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
+ µcΦ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
.
Hence,
EPV ISt+1 = − σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
2
+
σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
+µcΦ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
−µcΦ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
− τo
{
Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
− Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)}
+(τb + τs − τo)
(
1− Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
))
= −σc
{
1√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
2
− 1√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
}
−(τb + τs − µc) · Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
+(τo − µc) · Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
+(τb + τs − τo)
The first derivative of EPV ISt+1 with respect to λ, σδ, τb, τs, and τo are the
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following:
∂EPV ISt+1
∂λ
= − σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
2
·
(
−τb + τs − µc
σc
)
·
(
− 1
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂λ
+
σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
·
(
−τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
− 1
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂λ
+Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂λ
−(τb + τs − µc) · φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
·
(
− 1
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂λ
−Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂λ
+(τo − µc) · φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
·
(
− 1
σc
)
· ∂µc
∂λ
= −
{
Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
− Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)}
· (1− e
−κt)
κ
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∂EPV ISt+1
∂σδ
= − 1√
2pi
· e− 12( τb+τs−µcσc )
2
· ∂σc
∂σδ
− 1√
2pi
· σc · e−
1
2(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
2
· (τb + τs − µc)2σ−3c ·
∂σc
∂σδ
+
1√
2pi
·
(
e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
+ σc · e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
· (τo − µc)2σ−3c
)
· ∂σc
∂σδ
−(τb + τs − µc) · φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
· (τb + τs − µc)(−σ2c ) ·
∂σc
∂σδ
+(τo − µc) · φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
· (τo − µc)(−σ2c ) ·
∂σc
∂σδ
= −
{
1√
2pi
· e− 12( τb+τs−µcσc )
2
− 1√
2pi
· e− 12( τo−µcσc )
2
}
·
√
1− e−2κt
2κ
= −
{
φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
− φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)}
·
√
1− e−2κt
2κ
∂EPV ISt+1
∂τb
=
σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
σ−2c (τo − µc)
(
−∂µc
∂τb
)
−∂µc
∂τb
· Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
+ (τo − µc)φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
σ−1c
(
−∂µc
∂τb
)
+ 1
= 1− Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
∂EPV ISt+1
∂τs
= − σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τb+τs−µc
σc
)
2
·
(
−τb + τs − µc
σc
)
·
(
1
σc
)
−
{
Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
+ (τb + τs − µc) · φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
· 1
σc
}
+1
= 1− Φ
(
τb + τs − µc
σc
)
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∂EPV ISt+1
∂τo
=
σc√
2pi
e−
1
2(
τo−µc
σc
)
2
σ−2c (τo − µc) + Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
+(τo − µc)φ
(
τo − µc
σc
)
σ−1c − 1
= −
(
1− Φ
(
τo − µc
σc
))
.
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.2 Proofs of Chapter 3.
In the proofs of the monopoly case, we omit the notation j for nota-
tional convenience since there is only one store in the market. Similarly, in
the proofs of the monopolistic competition with symmetric market share case,
we also omit the notation j for notational convenience since the retailers are
symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 1. We prove Proposition 1 in two steps. First, we set
the selling price; second, we derive the optimal number of stores and serving
area. From §3.1, the monopolist’s profit is
Z = λr(p− gr)−
√
2λrτrdrhr. (1)
Step 1. Selling Price: Given b, the farthest customer’s round-trip distance
is
dFc = 2
√
b2 + b2(tan θ)2 (2)
and thus, from Equation (2), the farthest customer’s utility is
UFc = λc(uc − p)−
√
2λcτcdFc hc
= λc(uc − p)−
√
2λcτchc(2b)
1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4. (3)
Since we assume that the selling price is the price that makes the farthest
customer’s utility be zero, from Equation (3), the selling price is
p = uc −
√
2τchcdFc
λc
(4)
= uc −
√
2τchc
λc
(2b)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4. (5)
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Step 2. Number of Stores and Market Area: The market area covered
by the monopolist r is
r = (1/2)(b2 tan θ)2sn = (tan θ)sb2n, (6)
where 1
2
b2(tan θ)(2s) is the area of the regular polygon.
Hence, from Equation (6), the monopolist’s demand rate λr is
λr = rλc = (tan θ)sb
2nλc (7)
because we normalize the consumer density to one.
By following the distribution assumption in Cachon (2013), the monopolist’s
distribution distance is
dr = 2bn. (8)
By substituting Equations (5), (7), and (8) into the monopolist’s profit func-
tion Z (Equation (1)),
Z(n, b) = λr(p− gr)−
√
2λrτrdrhr
= (tan θ)sb2nλc
(
uc −
√
2τchc
λc
(2b)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4 − gr
)
−
√
2(tan θ)sb2nλcτrhr
√
2bn
= n
[
(tan θ)sb2
{
λc(uc − gr)− 2
√
λcτchc(b)
1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4
}]
−n
[√
2(tan θ)sb2λcτrhr
√
2b
]
.
If
(tan θ)sb2
{
λc(uc − gr)− 2
√
λcτchc(b)
1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4
}
≥
√
2(tan θ)sb2λcτrhr
√
2b,
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then the monopolist wants to increase the number of retail stores to as many
as possible. But, the retailer has the restriction that the maximum market
area is a. Thus, r = a and
n =
a
(tan θ)sb2
(9)
By substituting Equation (9) into Equation (7), we obtain
λr = (tan θ)sb
2nλc = (tan θ)sb
2 a
(tan θ)sb2
λc = aλc (10)
From Equation (9), we derive
b =
(a
n
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2 (11)
By substituting Equation (11) into Equations (2) and (8), we obtain
dFc = 2
√
b2 + b2(tan θ) = 2
(a
n
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2
√
1 + (tan θ)
= φ2c1
(a
n
)1/2
(12)
dr = 2bn = 2
(a
n
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2n = φ2r (an)
1/2 (13)
where φc1 = 2
1/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4 and φr = 21/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4.
By substituting Equation (12) into Equation (4), we derive
p = uc −
√
2τchcdFc
λc
= uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
(a
n
)1/4
. (14)
Hence, we can re-write the retailer’s maximum profit as a function of n using
Equations (10), (13) and (14):
Z(n) = λr(p− gr)−
√
2λrτrdrhr
= aλc
(
(uc − gr)− φc1
√
2τchc
λc
(a
n
)1/4)
−
√
2aλcτrhrφr(an)
1/4. (15)
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Deriving the first order condition of Z(n) with respect to n, we obtain:
∂Z(n)
∂n
=
1
4
aλcφc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4n−5/4 − 1
4
√
2aλcτrhrφra
1/4n−3/4 = 0
and consequently, the optimal nM follows:
nM = a
(
φc1
φr
)2(
τchc
τrhr
)
. (16)
By substituting Equation (16) into Equation (15), the retailer’s profit is
ZM = aλc(uc − gr)− aλcφc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4 ∗ a−1/4
(
φc1
φr
)−1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)−1/4
−
√
2aλcτrhrφra
1/4 ∗ a1/4
(
φc1
φr
)1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)1/4
= aλc(uc − gr)− a
√
2λc(φc1φr)
1/2(hchr)
1/4(τcτr)
1/4
−a
√
2λc(φc1φr)
1/2(hchr)
1/4(τcτr)
1/4
= aλc(uc − gr)− 2a
√
2λc(φc1φr)
1/2(hchr)
1/4(τcτr)
1/4.
By Assumption 1, ZM is always non-negative.
In addition, by substituting Equation (16) into Equation (14), and by substi-
tuting Equation (9) into Equation (6), the monopolist’s optimal selling price
is
pM = uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
( a
nM
)1/4
= uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4 ∗ a−1/4
(
φc1
φr
)−1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)−1/4
= uc −
(
2φc1φr
λc
)1/2
(τchcτrhr)
1/4
and the monopolist’s optimal serving area is
rM = (tan θ)sb2n = (tan θ)sb2
(
a
(tan θ)sb2
)
= a
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Proof of Proposition 2. We prove Proposition 2 in three steps. First,
we set the selling price; second, we derive the optimal number of stores; fi-
nally, the number of retailers are derived.
From §3.1, each retailer’s profit in the symmetric market share case is
Z = λr(p− gr)−
√
2λrτrdrhr. (17)
Step 1. Selling Price: Given b, the farthest customer’s round-trip distance
is
dFc = 2
√
b2 + b2(tan θ)2 (18)
and thus, from Equation (18), the farthest customer’s utility is
UFc = λc(uc − p)−
√
2λcτcdFc hc
= λc(uc − p)−
√
2λcτchc(2b)
1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4. (19)
Since we assume that the selling price is the price that makes the farthest
customer’s utility be zero, from Equation (19), the selling price is
p = uc −
√
2τchcdFc
λc
(20)
= uc −
√
2τchc
λc
(2b)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4. (21)
Step 2. Number of Stores and Market Area: The market area covered
by each retailer r is
r = (1/2)(b2 tan θ)2sn = (tan θ)sb2n, (22)
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where 1
2
b2(tan θ)(2s) is the area of the regular polygon.
Hence, from Equation (22), the symmetric retailer’s demand rate λr is
λr =
( r
k
)
λc =
(
(tan θ)sb2n
k
)
λc (23)
where k is the number of symmetric retailers.
By following the distribution assumption in Cachon (2013), the symmetric
retailer’s distribution distance is
dr = 2bn. (24)
By substituting Equations (21), (23), and (24) into the retailer’s profit function
Z (Equation (17)),
Z(n, b)
= λr(p− gr)−
√
2λrτrdrhr
=
(
(tan θ)sb2n
k
)
λc
(
uc −
√
2τchc
λc
(2b)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4 − gr
)
−
√
2
(
(tan θ)sb2n
k
)
λcτrhr
√
2bn
= n
[
(tan θ)sb2
k
{
λc(uc − gr)− 2
√
λcτchc(b)
1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4
}]
−
[√
2
(tan θ)sb2
k
λcτrhr
√
2b
]
.
If [
(tan θ)sb2
k
{
λc(uc − gr)− 2
√
λcτchc(b)
1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4
}]
≥
[√
2
(tan θ)sb2
k
λcτrhr
√
2b
]
,
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then each retailer wants to increase the number of retail stores to as many as
possible. But, the retailer has the restriction that the maximum market area
is a. Thus r = a and
n =
a
(tan θ)sb2
(25)
By substituting Equation (25) into Equation (23), we obtain
λr =
(
(tan θ)sb2n
k
)
λc =
(
(tan θ)sb2
k
)
a
(tan θ)sb2
λc =
(a
k
)
λc (26)
From Equation (25), we derive
b =
(a
n
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2 (27)
By substituting Equation (27) into Equations (18) and (24), we obtain
dFc = 2
√
b2 + b2(tan θ) = 2
(a
n
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2
√
1 + (tan θ)
= φ2c1
(a
n
)1/2
(28)
dr = 2bn = 2
(a
n
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2n = φ2r (an)
1/2 (29)
where φc1 = 2
1/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4 and φr = 21/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4.
By substituting Equation (28) into Equation (20), we derive
p = uc −
√
2τchcdFc
λc
= uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
(a
n
)1/4
. (30)
Hence, we can re-write each retailer’s maximum profit as a function of n using
Equations (26), (29) and (30):
Z(n) = λr(p− gr)−
√
2λrτrdrhr
=
(a
k
)
λc
(
(uc − gr)− φc1
√
2τchc
λc
(a
n
)1/4)
−
√
2
(a
k
)
λcτrhrφr(an)
1/4. (31)
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Deriving the first order condition of Z(n) with respect to n, we obtain:
∂Z(n)
∂n
=
1
4
aλcφc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4k−1n−5/4 − 1
4
√
2aλcτrhrφra
1/4k−1/2n−3/4 = 0
and consequently, the optimal nS follows:
nS =
(a
k
)(φc1
φr
)2(
τchc
τrhr
)
. (32)
Step 3. Number of Retailers: Given αc and αc, by substituting Equation
(32) into Equation (31), we obtain:
Z(k) =
(a
k
)(
λc(uc − gr)− φc1
√
2λcτchc
( a
nS
)1/4)
−φr
√
2
(a
k
)
λcτrhr(an
S)1/4
=
(a
k
)
λc(uc − gr)
−φc1
√
2λcτchca
5/4k−1 ∗ a−1/4k1/4
(
φc1
φr
)−1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)−1/4
−φr
√
2λcτrhra
3/4k−1/2 ∗ a1/4k−1/4
(
φc1
φr
)1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)1/4
=
(a
k
)
λ1/2c
{
λ1/2c (uc − gr)− 23/2(φc1φr)1/2(τchcτrhr)1/4k1/4
}
.
The number of retailers, k, shall satisfy Z(k) = 0. Therefore,
kS =
λ2c(uc − gr)4
26(φc1φr)2(τcτrhchr)
(33)
Substituting Equation (33) into Equation (32), the number of retail stores per
retailer is
nS =
(a
k
)(φc1
φr
)2(
τchc
τrhr
)
= a
(
φc1
φr
)2(
τchc
τrhr
)
λ−2c (uc − gr)−426(φc1φr)2(τcτrhchr)
= a
26φ4c1(τchc)
2
λ2c(uc − gr)4
(34)
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From Equations (33) and (34), the total number of retail stores is
tkS = nSkS = a
26φ4c1(τchc)
2
λ2c(uc − gr)4
∗ λ
2
c(uc − gr)4
26(φc1φr)2(τcτrhchr)
= a
(
φc1
φr
)2(
τchc
τrhr
)
.
In addition, by substituting Equation (34) into Equation (30), and by substi-
tuting Equation (25) into Equation (22), each retailer’s optimal selling price
is
pS = uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
( a
nS
)1/4
= uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4 ∗ a−1/42−3/2φ−1c1 (τchc)−1/2λ1/2c (uc − gr)
= uc − 1
2
(uc − gr)
=
1
2
(uc + gr) (35)
and each retailer’s optimal serving area is
rS = (tan θ)sb2n = (tan θ)sb2
(
a
(tan θ)sb2
)
= a
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove Proposition 3 in three steps. First,
we set the selling price; second, we derive the optimal number of stores; fi-
nally, the number of retailers are derived.
From §3.1, retailer j’s profit is
Zj = λjr(p
j − gr)−
√
2λjrτrd
j
rhr. (36)
Step 1. Selling Price: Given bj, the farthest customer’s round-trip distance
is
dj,Fc = 2
√
(bj)2 + (bj)2(tan θ)2 (37)
147
and thus, from Equation (37), the farthest customer’s utility is
U j,Fc = λc(uc − pj)−
√
2λcτcd
j,F
c hc
= λc(uc − pj)−
√
2λcτchc(2b
j)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4. (38)
Since we assume that the selling price is the price that makes the farthest
customer’s utility be zero, from Equation (38), the selling price is
pj = uc −
√
2τchcd
j,F
c
λc
(39)
= uc −
√
2τchc
λc
(2bj)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4. (40)
Step 2. Number of Stores and Market Area: The market area covered
by retailer j rj is
rj = (1/2)(bj)2(tan θ)2snj = (tan θ)s(bj)2nj, (41)
where 1
2
(bj)2(tan θ)(2s) is the area of the regular polygon.
Hence, from Equation (41), retailer j’s demand rate λjr is
λjr =
(
rjmj
)
λc = (tan θ)s(b
j)2njmjλc (42)
where mj is the market share of retailer j.
By following the distribution assumption in Cachon (2013), retailer j’s distri-
bution distance is
djr = 2b
jnj. (43)
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By substituting Equations (40), (42), and (43) into retailer j’s profit function
Z (Equation (36)),
Zj(nj, bj) = λjr(p
j − gr)−
√
2λrτrd
j
rhr
= (tan θ)s(bj)2njmjλc
(
uc −
√
2τchc
λc
(2bj)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4 − gr
)
−
√
2(tan θ)s(bj)2njmjλcτrhr
√
2bjnj
= nj · (tan θ)s(bj)2mj · λc(uc − gr)
−2nj · (tan θ)s(bj)2mj ·
√
λcτchc(b
j)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4
−
√
2(tan θ)s(bj)2mjλcτrhr
√
2bj.
If [
(tan θ)s(bj)2mj
{
λc(uc − gr)− 2
√
λcτchc(b
j)1/2(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4
}]
≥
[√
2(tan θ)s(bj)2mjλcτrhr
√
2bj
]
,
then retailer j wants to increase the number of retail stores to as many as
possible. But, the retailer has the restriction that the maximum market area
is a. Thus, rj = a and
nj =
a
(tan θ)s(bj)2
(44)
By substituting Equation (44) into Equation (42), we obtain
λjr = (tan θ)s(b
j)2njmjλc = (tan θ)s(b
j)2mjλc ∗ a
(tan θ)s(bj)2
= (amj)λc (45)
From Equation (44), we derive
bj =
( a
nj
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2 (46)
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By substituting Equation (46) into Equations (37) and (43), we obtain
dj,Fc = 2
√
(bj)2 + (bj)2(tan θ) = 2
( a
nj
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2
√
1 + (tan θ)
= φ2c1
( a
nj
)1/2
(47)
djr = 2b
jnj = 2
( a
nj
)1/2
(s tan θ)−1/2nj = φ2r
(
anj
)1/2
(48)
where φc1 = 2
1/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4(1 + (tan θ)2)1/4 and φr = 21/2s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4.
By substituting Equation (47) into Equation (39), we derive
pj = uc −
√
2τchcd
j,F
c
λc
= uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
( a
nj
)1/4
. (49)
Hence, we can re-write the retailer’s maximum profit as a function of nj using
Equations (45), (48) and (49):
Zj(nj) = λr(p
j − gr)−
√
2λjrτrd
j
rhr
= (amj)λc
(
(uc − gr)− φc1
√
2τchc
λc
( a
nj
)1/4)
−
√
2 (amj)λcτrhrφr(an
j)1/4. (50)
Deriving the first order condition of Zj(nj) with respect to nj, we obtain:
∂Z(nj)
∂nj
=
1
4
aλcφc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4mjn−5/4 − 1
4
√
2aλcτrhrφra
1/4(mj)1/2n−3/4 = 0
and consequently, the optimal nj,A follows:
nj,A = (amj)
(
φc1
φr
)2(
τchc
τrhr
)
. (51)
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By substituting Equation (51) into Equation (49) and by substituting Equation
(44) into Equation (41), retailer j’s optimal selling price is
pj,A = uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
( a
nj,A
)1/4
= uc − φc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4 ∗ (amj)−1/4
(
φc1
φr
)−1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)−1/4
= uc − 21/2(φc1φr)1/2(τchcτrhr)1/4λ−1/2c (mj)−1/4.
and retailer j’s optimal serving area is
rj,A = (tan θ)s(bj)2nj = (tan θ)s(bj)2
(
a
(tan θ)s(bj)2
)
= a
Step 3. Retailer Participation: Given αc and αr, by substituting Equation
(51) into Equation (50), retailer j’s profit is:
Zj = (amj)λc
(
(uc − gr)− φc1
√
2τchc
λc
( a
nj
)1/4)
−
√
2 (amj)λcτrhrφr(an
j)1/4
= (amj)λc(uc − gr)
−(amj)λcφc1
√
2τchc
λc
a1/4 ∗ (amj)−1/4
(
φc1
φr
)−1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)−1/4
−
√
2 (amj)λcτrhrφra
1/4 ∗ (amj)1/4
(
φc1
φr
)1/2(
τchc
τrhr
)1/4
=
(
amj
)
λ1/2c
∗{λ1/2c (uc − gr)− 23/2(φc1φr)1/2(τchcτrhr)1/4(mj)−1/4} . (52)
Hence, the retailer’s profit increases as the market share increases. Let retailer
kA is the retailer who has the smallest market share. Then, from Equation
(52), retailer kA’s profit is
Zk
A
=
(
amk
A
)
λ1/2c
{
λ1/2c (uc − gr)− 23/2(φc1φr)1/2(τchcτrhr)1/4(mk
A
)−1/4
}
,
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and retailer kA’s profit is non-negative if
1
mkA
≥ λ
2
c(uc − gr)4
26(φc1φr)2(τcτrhchr)
= kS.
kS is greater than or equal to one by Assumption 1. Since the (kA)th entering
retailer’s market share in the asymmetric case is less than or equal to the mar-
ket share in the symmetric case, i.e., mk
A ≤ 1/kS, the (kA)th entering retailer’s
profit is non-negative.
Proof of Proposition 4. We show the optimal carbon recovery rates in the
cases of monopoly, monopolistic competition with symmetric market share,
and monopolistic competition with asymmetric market share in the following.
Case 1. Monopoly
Step 1. Total Consumer Utility. Total consumer utility is
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
(
λc(uc − pM)−
√
2λcτcd
i,M
c hc
)
dydx
= 2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
λc(uc − pM)dydx
−2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
2λcτcd
i,M
c hcdydx, (53)
where di,Mc = 2
√
x2 + y2 which is consumer i’s round trip distance to the
closest retail store.
Since (tan θ)b2 = a
snM
from Equation (9), we have:
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
λc(uc − pM)dydx
= 2snM
∫ b
0
λc(uc − pM)x(tan θ)dx
= 2snMλc(uc − pM)(tan θ)(1/2)b2 = snMλc(uc − pM)
( a
snM
)
= aλc(uc − pM). (54)
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In addition, since snM = a
b2 tan θ
(from Equation (9)),
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Mc dydx
=
a
(1/2)b2 tan θ
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Mc dydx
=
a
(1/2)b2 tan θ
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
21/2(x2 + y2)1/4dydx. (55)
Using a change of variables (see Cachon 2013) and by Equation (11), Equation
(55) becomes
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Mc dydx
=
a
(1/2)b2 tan θ
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
21/2(x2 + y2)1/4dydx
= a
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0
(1 + t2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
b1/2
= a
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0
(1 + t2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4
( a
nM
)1/4
= φc2a
5/4(nM)−1/4 (56)
where φc2 =
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0 (1+t
2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4.
By substituting Equations (54) and (56) into Equation (53),
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
(
λc(uc − pM)−
√
2λcτcd
i,M
c hc
)
= aλc(uc − pM)−
√
2λcτchcφc2a
5/4(nM)−1/4 (57)
Step 2. Monopolist’s Profit. From Equations (1), (10) and (13), the
monopolist’s profit is
ZM = aλc(p
M − gr)−
√
2aλcτrhrφr(an
M)1/4. (58)
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Step 3. Carbon Emission Costs. Consumer i emits fcccd
i,M
c amount of
carbon per travel and the frequency of travel is λc
qi,Mc
. Similarly, the retailer
emits frcrdr amount of carbon per distribution and the frequency of distribu-
tion is aλc
qMr
. Hence, the sum of the carbon emissions costs from consumers and
the monopolist is
(1− αc)e
(
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
fcccd
i,M
c
λc
qi,Mc
dydx
)
+(1− αr)e
(
frcrdr
aλc
qMr
)
(59)
where αc and αr denote the carbon cost recovery rates from consumers and
retailers, respectively.
Since qi,Mc =
√
2λcτcd
i,M
c
hc
and qMr =
√
2aλcτrdMr
hr
(from §3.1), and √dMr =
φr(an
M)1/4 (from Equation (13)), we have
fcccd
i,M
c
λc
qi,Mc
= fcccd
i,M
c λc
√
hc
2λcτcd
i,M
c
= fccc
√
λchc
2τc
√
di,Mc , (60)
frcrd
M
r
aλc
qMr
= frcrd
M
r aλc
√
hr
2aλcτrdMr
= frcr
√
aλchr
2τr
√
dMr = frcr
√
aλchr
2τr
φr(an
M)1/4. (61)
By substituting Equations (60) and (61) into Equation (59), and by
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Mc dydx = φc2a
5/4(nM)−1/4 (from Step 2), the carbon emis-
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sion costs becomes
(1− αc)e
(
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
fcccd
i,M
c
λc
qi,Mc
dydx
)
+ (1− αr)e
(
frcrdr
aλc
qMr
)
= (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
2snM
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Mc dydx
+(1− αr)efrcr
√
aλchr
2τr
φr(an
M)1/4
= (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4(nM)−1/4
+(1− αr)efrcr
√
aλchr
2τr
φr(an
M)1/4. (62)
By Steps 1, 2, and 3 (Equations (57), (58), and (62)), social welfare in the
monopoly case is
SW (αc, αr) = aλc(uc − pM)−
√
2λcτchcφc2a
5/4(nM)−1/4 + aλc(pM − gr)
−
√
2aλcτrhrφr(an
M)1/4
−(1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4(nM)−1/4
−(1− αr)efrcr
√
aλchr
2τr
φr(an
M)1/4
= aλc(uc − gr)
−φc2
(√
2λcτchc + (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
)
a5/4(nM)−1/4
−φr
(√
2aλcτrhr + (1− αr)efrcr
√
aλchr
2τr
)
(anM)1/4. (63)
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The first derivatives of SW (αc, αr) with respect to αc and αr are
∂SW (αc, αr)
∂αc
= 2−5/2(λchc)1/2τ−3/2c efccca
5/4(nM)−1/4
∗{3(1− αc)φc2efccc + 2τc(φc2 − φc1)− (1− αr)φc1efrcrτcτ−1r } ,
∂SW (αc, αr)
∂αr
= 2−5/2
(
φr
φc1
)
efrcr(λchr)
1/2τ−3/2r a
3/4(nM)1/4
∗{−2φc2τr − φc2(1− αc)efcccτ−1c τr + 3φc1(1− αr)efrcr + 2φc1τr} .
We obtain the unconstrained solution to the first-order conditions:
αc =
−φc1(vc + fcpc) + φc2(vc + fcpc + 2eccfc)
eccfc(φc1 + φc2)
and
αr =
−φc2(vr + frpr) + φc1(vr + frpr + 2ecrfr)
ecrfr(φc1 + φc2)
.
From the fact that φc1 ≥ φc2, we can verify that the unconstrained (αc,αr)
satisfy αc ≤ 1 and αr ≥ 1. In addition, if vr + prfr ≥ 3φc18φc2−4φc1 efrcr and
vc + pcfc ≥ 3φc28φc1−4φc2 efccc, then SW (αc, αr) is jointly concave. Therefore,
αMc ≤ 1 and αMr = 1 if vr+prfr ≥ 3φc18φc2−4φc1 efrcr and vc+pcfc ≥
3φc2
8φc1−4φc2 efccc.
Case 2. Monopolistic Competition with Symmetric Market Share
Step 1. Total Consumer Utility. Total consumer utility is
2snS(1/kS)
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
(
λc(uc − pS)−
√
2λcτcd
i,S
c hc
)
dydx ∗ kS
= 2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
λc(uc − pS)dydx
−2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
2λcτcd
i,S
c hcdydx. (64)
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where di,Sc = 2
√
x2 + y2 which is consumer i’s round trip distance to the closest
retail store.
Since (tan θ)b2 = a
snS
from Equation (25), we have:
2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
λc(uc − pS)dydx
= 2snS
∫ b
0
λc(uc − pS)x(tan θ)dx
= 2snSλc(uc − pS)(tan θ)(1/2)b2 = snSλc(uc − pS)
( a
snS
)
= aλc(uc − pS). (65)
In addition, since snS = a
b2 tan θ
(from Equation (25)),
2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Sc dydx (66)
=
a
(1/2)b2 tan θ
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Sc dydx
=
a
(1/2)b2 tan θ
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
21/2(x2 + y2)1/4dydx. (67)
Using a change of variables (see Cachon 2013) and by Equation (27), Equation
(67) becomes
2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Sc dydx
=
a
(1/2)b2 tan θ
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
21/2(x2 + y2)1/4dydx
= a
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0
(1 + t2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
b1/2
= a
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0
(1 + t2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4
( a
nS
)1/4
= φc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4 (68)
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where φc2 =
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0 (1+t
2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4.
By substituting Equations (65) and (68) into Equation (64),
2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
(
λc(uc − pS)−
√
2λcτcd
i,S
c hc
)
= aλc(uc − pS)−
√
2λcτchcφc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4 (69)
Step 2. Retailers Profit. In the symmetric market share case, each retailer’s
profit is zero.
Step 3. Carbon Emission Costs. Consumer i emits fcccd
i,S
c amount of
carbon per travel and the frequency of travel is λc
qi,Sc
. Similarly, the retailer emits
frcrdr amount of carbon per distribution and the frequency of distribution is
(a/kS)λc
qSr
. Hence, the sum of the carbon emissions costs from consumers and
the symmetric retailers is
(1− αc)e
(
2snS(1/kS)
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
fcccd
i,S
c
λc
qi,Sc
dydx
)
∗ kS
+(1− αr)e
(
frcrdr
(a/kS)λc
qSr
)
∗ kS (70)
where αc and αr denote the carbon cost recovery rates from consumers and
retailers, respectively.
Since qi,Sc =
√
2λcτcd
i,S
c
hc
and qSr =
√
2(a/kS)λcτrdSr
hr
(from §3.1), and √dSr =
φr(an
S)1/4 (from Equation (29)), we have
fcccd
i,S
c
λc
qi,Sc
= fcccd
i,S
c λc
√
hc
2λcτcd
i,S
c
= fccc
√
λchc
2τc
√
di,Sc , (71)
frcrd
S
r
aλc
qSr
= frcrd
S
r aλc
√
hr
2(a/kS)λcτrdSr
= frcr
√
akSλchr
2τr
√
dSr
= frcr
√
akSλchr
2τr
φr(an
S)1/4. (72)
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By substituting Equations (71) and (72) into Equation (70), and by
2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Sc dydx = φc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4 (from Step 2), the carbon emis-
sion costs becomes
(1− αc)e
(
2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
fcccd
i,S
c
λc
qi,Sc
dydx
)
+ (1− αr)e
(
frcrdr
aλc
qSr
)
= (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
2snS
∫ b
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,Sc dydx
+(1− αr)efrcr
√
akSλchr
2τr
φr(an
S)1/4
= (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4
+(1− αr)efrcr
√
akSλchr
2τr
φr(an
S)1/4. (73)
By Steps 1, 2, and 3 (Equations (69) and (73)), and by pS = uc+gr
2
(Equation
(35)), we obtain
SW (αc, αr) = aλc(uc − pS)−
√
2λcτchcφc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4
−(1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4
−(1− αr)efrcr
√
akSλchr
2τr
φr(an
S)1/4
=
aλc
2
(uc − gr)−
√
2λcτchcφc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4
−(1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4(nS)−1/4
−(1− αr)efrcr
√
akSλchr
2τr
φr(an
S)1/4 (74)
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By substituting Equations (32) and (33) into Equation (74), we derive
SW (αc, αr)
=
aλc
2
(uc − gr)
−
√
2λcτchcφc2a
5/4 ∗ a−1/42−3/2φ−1c1 (τchc)−1/2λ1/2c (uc − gr)
−(1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4 ∗ a−1/42−3/2φ−1c1 (τchc)−1/2λ1/2c (uc − gr)
−(1− αr)efrcr
√
aλchr
2τr
φra
1/4 ∗ a1/423/2φc1(τchc)1/2λ−1/2c (uc − gr)−1
∗ λc(uc − gr)
2
23(φc1φr)(τcτrhchr)1/2
=
aλc
2
(uc − gr)
(
1− φc2
φc1
)
−aφc2
4φc1
efcccλc(uc − gr)(1− αc)τ−1c −
a
4
efrcrλc(uc − g)(1− αr)τ−1r (75)
From
∂τc
∂αc
= eccfc and
∂τr
∂αr
= ecrfr,
∂SW (αc, αr)
∂αc
= −aφc2
4φc1
efcccλc(uc − gr){−τ−1c − (1− αc)τ−2c efccc}
=
aφc2
4φc1
efcccλc(uc − gr)τ−2c {τc + (1− αc)efccc}
=
aφc2
4φc1
efcccλc(uc − gr)τ−2c {vc + pcfc + αceccfc + (1− αc)efccc}
=
aφc2
4φc1
efcccλc(uc − gr)τ−2c (vc + pcfc + efccc)
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and
∂SW (αc, αr)
∂αr
= −a
4
efrcrλc(uc − g){−τ−1r − (1− αr)τ−2r efrcr}
=
a
4
efrcrλc(uc − gr)τ−2r {τr + (1− αr)efrcr}
=
a
4
efrcrλc(uc − gr)τ−2r {vr + prfr + αrecrfr + (1− αr)efrcr}
=
a
4
efrcrλc(uc − gr)τ−2r (vr + prfr + ecrfr).
Consequently, we derive
∂SW (αc, αr)
∂αc
> 0 and
∂SW (αc, αr)
∂αr
> 0
which lead to αSc = 1 and α
S
c = 1.
Case 3. Monopolistic Competition with Asymmetric Market Share
Step 1. Total Utility of Retailer j’s Customers. Total utility of retailer
j’s customers is
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
(
λc(uc − pj,A)−
√
2λcτcd
j,i,A
c hc
)
dydx
= 2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
λc(uc − pj,A)dydx
−2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
2λcτcd
i,j,A
c hcdydx. (76)
where dj,i,Ac = 2
√
x2 + y2 which is consumer i’s round trip distance to retailer
j’s closest retail stores.
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Since (tan θ)(bj)2 = a
snj,A
from Equation (44), we have:
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
λc(uc − pj,A)dydx (77)
= 2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
λc(uc − pj,A)x(tan θ)dx
= 2snj,Amjλc(uc − pj,A)(tan θ)(1/2)(bj)2
= snj,Amjλc(uc − pj,A)
( a
snj,A
)
= (amj)λc(uc − pj,A). (78)
In addition, since snj,A = a
(bj)2 tan θ
(from Equation (44)),
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,j,Ac dydx
=
amj
(1/2)(bj)2 tan θ
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,j,Ac dydx
=
amj
(1/2)(bj)2 tan θ
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
21/2(x2 + y2)1/4dydx. (79)
Using a change of variables (see Cachon 2013) and by Equation (46), Equation
(79) becomes
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
di,j,Ac dydx
=
amj
(1/2)(bj)2 tan θ
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
21/2(x2 + y2)1/4dydx
= amj
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0
(1 + t2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
(bj)1/2
= amj
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0
(1 + t2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4
( a
nj,A
)1/4
= φc2a
5/4mj(nj,A)−1/4 (80)
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where φc2 =
(
4
√
2
5
∫ tan θ
0 (1+t
2)1/4dt
tan θ
)
s−1/4(tan θ)−1/4.
By substituting Equations (78) and (80) into Equation (76),
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
(
λc(uc − pj,A)−
√
2λcτcd
i,j,A
c hc
)
dydx
= (amj)λc(uc − pj,A)−
√
2λcτchcφc2a
5/4mj(nj,A)−1/4 (81)
Step 2. Monopolist’s Profit. From Equations (36), (45) and (48), retailer
j’s profit is
Zj,A = (amj)λc(p
j,A − gr)−
√
2(amj)λcτrhrφr(an
j,A)1/4. (82)
Step 3. Carbon Emission Costs. Retailer j’s consumer i emits fcccd
j,i,A
c
amount of carbon per travel and the frequency of travel is λc
qj,i,Ac
. Similarly,
the retailer emits frcrdr amount of carbon per distribution and the frequency
of distribution is am
jλc
qj,Ar
. Hence, the sum of the carbon emissions costs from
consumers and the monopolist is
(1− αc)e
(
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
fcccd
j,i,A
c
λc
qj,i,Ac
dydx
)
+(1− αr)e
(
frcrdr
amjλc
qj,Ar
)
(83)
where αc and αr denote the carbon cost recovery rates from consumers and
retailers, respectively.
Since qj,i,Ac =
√
2λcτcd
j,i,A
c
hc
and qj,Ar =
√
2(amj)λcτrd
j,A
r
hr
(from §3.1), and
√
dj,Ar =
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φr(an
j,A)1/4 (from Equation (48)), we have
fcccd
j,i,A
c
λc
qj,i,Ac
= fcccd
j,i,A
c λc
√
hc
2λcτcd
j,i,A
c
= fccc
√
λchc
2τc
√
dj,i,Ac , (84)
frcrd
j
r
amjλc
qj,Ar
= frcrd
j,A
r am
jλc
√
hr
2amjλcτrd
j,A
r
= frcr
√
amjλchr
2τr
√
dj,Ar
= frcr
√
amjλchr
2τr
φr(an
j,A)1/4. (85)
By substituting Equations (84) and (85) into Equation (83), and by
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
dj,i,Ac dydx = φc2a
5/4mj(nj,A)−1/4 (from Step 2), the car-
bon emission costs becomes
(1− αc)e
(
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
fcccd
j,i,A
c
λc
qj,i,Ac
dydx
)
+(1− αr)e
(
frcrdr
amjλc
qj,Ar
)
= (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
2snj,Amj
∫ bj
0
∫ x tan θ
0
√
dj,i,Ac dydx
+(1− αr)efrcr
√
amjλchr
2τr
φr(an
j,A)1/4
= (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4mj(nj,A)−1/4
+(1− αr)efrcr
√
amjλchr
2τr
φr(an
j,A)1/4 (86)
By Steps 1, 2, and 3 (Equations (81), (82), and (86)), social welfare in the
asymmetric case is
SW (αc, αr) =
kA∑
j=1
SW j(αc, αr)
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where
SW j(αc, αr)
= (amj)λc(uc − pj,A)− φc2
√
2λcτchca
5/4(mj)(nj,A)−1/4
+
(
amj
)
λc(p
j,A − gr)− φr
√
2λcτrhra
3/4(mj)1/2(nj,A)1/4
−(1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
φc2a
5/4(mj)(nj,A)−1/4
−(1− αr)efrcr
√
λchr
2τr
φra
3/4(mj)1/2(nj,A)1/4
= (amj)λc(uc − gr)
−φc2
(√
2λcτchc + (1− αc)efccc
√
λchc
2τc
)
a5/4(mj)(nj,A)−1/4
−φr
(√
2λcτrhr + (1− αr)efrcr
√
λchr
2τr
)
a3/4(mj)1/2(nj,A)1/4 (87)
Therefore, we can show that αAc = α
M
c and α
A
r = α
M
r .
By Cases 1, 2 and 3, Proposition 4 is proved.
Proof of Proposition 5. In the following, the social welfare and total emis-
sions penalties in the case of monopolistic competition with symmetric market
share are derived.
Social Welfare Penalty (SWP). From Equation (75),
SW (αc, αr)
=
aλc
2
(uc − gr)
(
1− φc2
φc1
)
− aφc2
4φc1
efcccλc(uc − gr)(1− αc)τ−1c
−a
4
efrcrλc(uc − gr)(1− αr)τ−1r .
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Hence, the social welfare penalty is
SWP (αSc , α
S
r ) =
SWP (1, 1)− SWP (0, 0)
SWP (1, 1)
=
aφc2
4φc1
efcccλc(uc − gr)τc(0)−1 + a4efrcrλc(uc − gr)τr(0)−1
aλc
2
(uc − gr)
(
1− φc2
φc1
)
=
e
2
(
1− φc2
φc1
) (φc2
φc1
fcccτc(0)
−1 + frcrτr(0)−1
)
.
Total Emission Penalty(TEP). From Equation (75),
TE(αc, αr) =
aφc2
4φc1
fcccλc(uc − gr)τ−1c +
a
4
frcrλc(uc − gr)τ−1r
=
(
aλc(uc − gr)
4
)(
φc2
φc1
fcccτ
−1
c + frcrτ
−1
r
)
.
Hence, the total emission penalty is
TEP (αSc , α
S
r )
=
TEP (0, 0)− TEP (1, 1)
TEP (1, 1)
=
(
aλc(uc − gr)
4
)
∗
{(
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(0)
−1 + frcrτr(0)−1
)
−
(
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(1)
−1 + frcrτr(1)−1
)}
(
aλc(uc−gr)
4
)(
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(1)−1 + frcrτr(1)−1
)
=
(
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(0)
−1 + frcrτr(0)−1
)
−
(
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(1)
−1 + frcrτr(1)−1
)
φc2
φc1
fcccτc(1)−1 + frcrτr(1)−1
.
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.3 Proofs of Chapter 4.
We prove Lemma 1, Proposition 1, and Proposition 2 at the same time
by considering 16 scenarios.
Proofs of Lemma 1, Proposition 1, and Proposition 2.
(i) Equilibriums in Scenario (1) and Scenario (2)
Given that manufacturer U is located in country U , manufacturer K’s profits
by staying in country K and moving to country U , respectively, are
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− x0SU .
Since w
U
θW
+ τ < wU and SU > 0, manufacturer K stays in country K. Then,
given that manufacturer K is located in country K, since SK = 0, manufac-
turer U ’s profits by staying in country U and moving to country K, respec-
tively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
.
Hence, manufacturer U moves to country K because w
U
θW
+ τ < wU . Then,
given that manufacturer U is located in country K, manufacturer K’s profits
by staying in country K and moving to country U , respectively, are
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− xoSU .
167
Since w
U
θW
+τ < wU and SU > 0, manufacturerK stays in countryK. Therefore,
both manufacturers U and K produce in country K, i.e., the equilibrium is
Case 3.
(ii) Equilibriums in Scenario (5) and Scenario (6)
As we have shown in (i), given that manufacturer U is located in country U ,
manufacturer K stays in country K. Then, given that manufacturer K is
located in country K, manufacturer U ’s profits by staying in country U and
moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
− S
K
x0
.
Then, the manufacturer U ’s profit increase by moving to county K is
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
− S
K
x0
−1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
=
2
9
{
4E[Dt]− 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)}{
wU −
(
wU
θW
+ τ
)}
−S
K
x0
.
Since E[Xt] = X0 + αµt, E[Dt] = D0 + βµt, and E[XtDt] = X0D0 + (αD0 +
βX0)µt + αβ(µ
2
t + σ
2
t ), the manufacturer U ’s profit increase by moving to
county K is non-negative if
αβσ2t ≤ −
(X0 + αµt)
2
(
9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2
{
4(D0 + βµt) + 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)}
−{X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ2t} .
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Hence, when α is negative, manufacturer U moves to country K if
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(
9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
,
and manufacturer K stays in country K even if manufacturer U moves to
country U , i.e., the equilibrium is Case 3. Similarly, when α is positive, man-
ufacturer U stays in country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(
9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
,
and manufacturer K stays in country K, i.e., the equilibrium is Case 1. Notice
that regardless of the sign of α, if σ2t is not high enough, the equilibrium
depends on various parameter values.
(iii) Equilibriums in Scenario (9) and Scenario (10)
Given that manufacturer U is located in country U , manufacturer K’s profits
by staying in country K and moving to country U , respectively, are
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− x0SU .
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Then, the manufacturer K’s profit increase by moving to county U is
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− x0SU
−E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
= −2E[Xt]
9
{
−2E[Dt] + 4E[XtDt]E[Xt]
}{
wU −
(
wU
θW
+ τ
)}
−2E[Xt]
9
{
2
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θW
− τ
)}{
wU −
(
wU
θW
+ τ
)}
− x0SU .
Hence, the manufacturer K’s profit increase by moving to county U is non-
negative if
αβσ2t ≤ −
(
9x0S
U
8
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−{X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ2t} .
(iii-1) α < 0
Manufacturer K moves to country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, given that manufacturer K moves to country U , manufacturer U ’s profit
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by staying in country U and moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
.
Since w
U
θW
+ τ < wU , manufacturer U moves to country K. Then, given that
manufacturer U moves to country K, manufacturer K’s profit by staying in
country K and moving to country U , respectively, are
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− xoSU .
Then, the manufacturer K’s profit increase by moving to county U is
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− x0SU
−E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
= −2E[Xt]
9
{
−2E[Dt] + 4E[XtDt]E[Xt]
}{
wU −
(
wU
θW
+ τ
)}
−2E[Xt]
9
{
2
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}{
wU −
(
wU
θW
+ τ
)}
− x0SU .
Hence, the manufacturer K’s profit increase by moving to county U is non-
negative if
αβσ2t ≤ −
(
9x0S
U
8
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}
−{X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ2t} .
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Since α < 0, manufacturer K moves to country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Given that manufacturer K moves to country U , manufacturer U moves to
country K. Hence, the equilibrium is Case 4 if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
and
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
(iii-2) α > 0
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Manufacturer K stays in country K if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, given that manufacturer K stays in country K, manufacturer U ’s profit
by staying in country U and moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
.
Since w
U
θW
+ τ < wU , manufacturer U moves to country K. Then, given that
manufacturer U moves to country K, manufacturer K’s profit by staying in
country K and moving to country U , respectively, are
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] +
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− xoSU .
Then, similar to (iii-1), since α > 0, manufacturer K stays in country K if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
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Given that manufacturer K stays in country K, manufacturer U moves to
country K. Hence, the equilibrium is Case 3 if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
and
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
(iv) Equilibriums in Scenario (13) and Scenario (14)
(iv-1) α < 0
Similar to (iii-1), when α < 0, given that manufacturer U is located in country
U , manufacturer K moves to country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, given that manufacturer K moves to country U , manufacturer U ’s profit
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by staying in country U and moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− S
K
x0
.
Then, the manufacturer U ’s profit increase by moving to county K is
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− S
K
x0
−1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
=
2
9
{
4E[Dt]− 2E[XtDt]E[Xt]
}{
wU −
(
wU
θW
+ τ
)}
−2
9
{
2
(
2cU +
wU
θW
+ τ − c
U
θT
)}{
wU −
(
wU
θW
+ τ
)}
− S
K
x0
.
Since α < 0, manufacturer U moves to county K if
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU +
wU
θW
+ τ − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, given that manufacturer U moves to county K, by (iii-1), manufacturer
K moves to country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
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Therefore, if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
,
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU +
wU
θW
+ τ − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
and
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − wU − 2c
U
θT
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
,
then the equilibrium is Case 4.
(iv-2) α > 0
Similar to (iii-2), when α > 0, given that manufacturer U is located in country
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U , manufacturer K stays in country K if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, given that manufacturer K stays in country K, manufacturer U ’s profit
by staying in country U and moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
− S
K
x0
.
Then, by (ii), manufacturer U stays in country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
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Therefore, if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
and
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
,
then the equilibrium is Case 1.
(v) Equilibriums in Scenario (3) and Scenario (4)
(v-1) α < 0
Similar to (iii-2), given that manufacturer U is located in country U , manu-
facturer K stays in country K if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, given that manufacturer K stays in country K, manufacturer U ’s profit
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by staying in country U and moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
.
Since w
U
θW
+τ > wU , manufacturer U stays in country U . Hence, the equilibrium
is Case 1 if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
(v-2) α > 0
Similar to (iii-1), manufacturer K moves to country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, given that manufacturer K moves to country U , manufacturer U ’s profit
by staying in country U and moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
.
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Since w
U
θW
+τ > wU , manufacturer U stays in country U . Hence, the equilibrium
is Case 2 if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
(vi) Equilibriums in Scenario (7) and Scenario (8)
(vi-1) α < 0
By (v-1), given that manufacturer U is located in country U , manufacturer K
stays in country K if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Then, similar to (ii), manufacturer U stays in country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
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Hence, the equilibrium is Case 1 if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
and
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU + wU − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
(vi-2) α > 0
By (v-2), given that manufacturer U is located in country U , manufacturer K
moves to country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
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Then, similar to (iv-1), manufacturer U stays in country U if
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU +
wU
θW
+ τ − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
Hence, the equilibrium is Case 2 if
σ2t ≥ −
(
9x0S
U
8αβ
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)

+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
{
(D0 + βµt)−
(
cU − 2c
U
θT
− w
U
θw
− τ
)}
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
and
σ2t ≥ −
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
(9SK
2x0
) 1wU − (wU
θW
+ τ
)


+
(X0 + αµt)
2αβ
[
4(D0 + βµt)− 2
(
2cU +
wU
θW
+ τ − c
U
θT
)]
−
{
X0D0 + (αD0 + βX0)µt + αβµ
2
t
αβ
}
.
(vii) Equilibriums in Scenarios (11), (12), (15) and (16)
Given that manufacturer U is located in country U , manufacturer K’s profits
by staying in country K and moving to country U , respectively, are
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+
wU
θW
+ τ
)}2
and
E[Xt]
9
{
−E[Dt] + 2E[XtDt]E[Xt] + (c
U + wU)− 2
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− x0SU .
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Since w
U
θW
+ τ > wU and SU < 0, manufacturer K moves to country U . Given
that manufacturer K moves to country U , manufacturer U ’s profits by staying
in country U and moving to country K, respectively, are
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2(c
U + wU) +
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
and
1
9
{
2E[Dt]− E[XtDt]E[Xt] − 2
(
cU +
wU
θW
+ τ
)
+
(
cU
θT
+ wU
)}2
− S
K
x0
.
Since w
U
θW
+ τ > wU and SK ≥ 0, manufacturer U stays in country U . There-
fore, the equilibrium is Case 2.
Proof of Propositions 3 and 4.
(i) EOQ Model
Manufacture U ’s and K’s costs, respectively, are(
hK/X
2
)
qE,U +
DE(tU + tK/X)
qE,U
and
(
hK
2
)
qE,K +
DE(tUX + tK)
qE,K
.
From the EOQ formula,
qE,U,∗ =
√
2DE(tU + tK/X)
hK/X
and qE,K,∗ =
√
2DE(tUX + tK)
hK
.
Hence, both qE,U,∗ and qE,K,∗ increase as X increases. In addition, both qE,U,∗
and qE,K,∗ increase as tU or tK increases.
(ii) Newvendor Model
For manufacturer U , the unit underage and overage costs, respectively, are
p− (c/X + τU + τK/X) and (c/X + τU + τK/X).
Similarly, for manufacturer K, the unit underage and overage costs, respec-
tively, are
Xp− (c+XτU + τK) and (c+XτU + τK).
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Then, by the newsvendor formula, both optimal quantities satisfy
G(qE,U,∗) = G(qE,K,∗) =
p− (c/X + τU + τK/X)
p
.
Hence, both qN,U,∗ and qN,K,∗ increase as X increases; whereas, both qN,U,∗ and
qN,K,∗ increase as τU or τK decreases.
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